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Preface

One of the most ubiquitous terms used over the past dozen
years or more has been globalization, but there is no consensus as
to its precise meaning. Instead we have been witnessing an ever
growing number of definitions and descriptions offered by ex
perts in such fields as economics, politics, anthropology and soci
ology. If they agree on anything at aU, it seems that globalization
has come about largely as the result of three factors: the end of
the so-called cold war, the emergence of a new economic world
order, and the ubiquitous use of electronic communications. As a
result, what we have seen so far is that most studies of globaliza
tion have focused primarily on the phenomenon’s political and ec
onomic modalities in general and almost always within the frame
work of “country studies.” It was this dual emphasis both on poli
tical and economic events and on states that peaked my curiosity.
My initial surmise was that most writers on this subject may
have been so impressed with the three main causes of globaliza
tion, itemized above, that they restricted their search for the ef
fects of globalization to the same political, economic and technol
ogical arenas. This interpretation made me uncomfortable because
one must assume that most of these writers are sufficiendy know
ledgeable so as not to confuse cause and effect and to know that a
broad-gauged force like globalization is, by any measure, most cer
tainly impacting aU realms of human activity, including culture and
society. One must, therefore, posit that there is some powerful
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force that is skewing research into globalization toward the politi
cal and economic. Indeed, we do not have to look far to find that
force. It emanates from governments and some private organiza
tions who offer substantial incentives in the form of grants,
awards, memberships in “think tanks” and so on for work on poli
tical and economic subjects while doling out only a relative pitt
ance for studies dealing with culture and society.
Moreover, even without such incentives it is almost always eas
ier and less time-consuming to gather any kind of data within one
country rather than within an area that straddles national bounda
ries. A key question, therefore, is whether research into an ethnic
group’s culture and society should always be at the country level
and below. The temptation to do just that is great because of the
just mentioned relative ease of gathering data and the fact that in
many cases cultures and societies do coincide with political enti
ties. Japanese culture and society are confined to Japan’s political
boundaries, and the same holds true for scores of other cases. But
not for all; there are many ethnic groups that straddle state boun
daries whose cultures and societies ought to be studied as single
entities. Such an approach makes eminently good methodological
sense because it also carries with it an additional benefit. Given
the unquestionably great impact of governments and their policies
on culture and society, as mentioned earlier, a study of globaliza
tion’s impact on any culture and society in two adjacent states rai
ses the possibility of not only reaching the primary goal of gaug
ing the effects of globalization but also of getting at least a preli
minary idea of the degree to which governmental policies influ
ence the forces of globalization.
Mongolia is an excellent choice for studying the impact of
globalization on culture and society for several reasons. One is
that it is perhaps the most prominent case where a large cultural
area is divided into two separate states. I will elaborate this point
in my introduction. Another reason is presented by Shagdaryn Bira’s chapter which goes back 800 years to the time of the Mon
golian empire. Within less than one generation following its politi
cal birth in 1206, Mongolia became a world power. Several key ele
ments of globalization today, such as the relatively free movement
of goods, extensive cultural interchange over large areas of the
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globe, and the creation of a written language to serve as the offi
cial form of communication, were part and parcel of the Mongol
world empire as well. This fact reminds us that globalization is not
a brand-new phenomenon in human history and practically com
mands us to compare the two historical periods.
Finally, Mongolia is a good choice because of its enduring spe
cial relationship with China. In both historical periods, and indeed
throughout recorded history, China’s role has been of paramount
importance to Mongolia because of its size and propinquity. In
the political and military arenas, the differences between the two
eras could not be starker. In the thirteenth century China was one
of the five constituent parts of the Mongol world empire,' having
had for the first time in its long history every square inch of its
territory conquered by an outside force. Today, China governs
half of ethnic Mongolia’s territory and two-thirds of the world’s
Mongolian population.^ It seems, therefore, highly advisable to in
clude China in any investigation of Mongolian culture and society.
Having convinced myself that the time was ripe to start res
earch on globalization’s effect on culture and society and that eth
nic Mongolia is one of the best places to start such research, I in
vited several Mongolists to join me in this new endeavor. I chose
2005 for our conference because it was the eve of the 800* anni
versary of the creation of the Mongolian state and also the thir
tieth anniversary of Mongolian Studies at Western Washington
University. Much to my satisfaction, six Mongolists accepted my
invitation, and we spent two memorable days last August inten
sively discussing globalization in Mongolia and critiquing each
other’s papers. The result of that conference lies before you.
It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the generous finan
cial assistance by the Office of the Provost of Western Washing
ton University, the Henry G. Schwarz Endowment Fund for Mon1 The four other parts were Chagatai in Central Asia, the Ilkhanate in Persia, the
Golden Horde in Eastern Europe, and the Mongolian homeland.
2 One could also include the rapid rise in China’s present economic dominance,
but I do not think the economic differences between the two historical periods
are as dramatic as the political and military ones.
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'golian Studies, the Chinggis Khan Foundation, the Embassy of
Mongolia in the United States, and the Libraries and the Center
for East Asian Studies at Western Washington University. I should
also like to thank Marian Alexander, Catherine Barnhart, Tamara
Belts, Bela Foltin, Jennie Huber, Connie Mallison, Margaret McFadyen, Rick Osen, Wayne Richter, and Kathleen Tomlonovic for
helping out, in large ways and small. Without the timely and unst
inting support by these individuals and organizations this confer
ence and this book would not have been possible.

Henry G. Schwarz
Bellingham
May 1, 2006

Introduction:
Some Conceptual Remarks
Henry G, Schwar2
My contribution to our common endeavor is quite modest.
Aside from editing this book, I will attempt in this introduction to
offer a few general conceptual remarks about culture, society and
globalization and how they apply to Mongolia. Torrents of ink
have been spilled over each of these three concepts, so much so in
fact that everyone seems to have his own take on them. As the au
thors in this volume embark on a pioneering effort to explore the
linkages between culmre, society and globalization in Mongolia, I
believe it is important to get back to basics and try to describe
these three terms as precisely and economically as possible. I
should like to say that my remarks are not intended to be guide
lines for this conference or this book, but rather it is my hope that
they may help stake out the parameters of future research into the
subject of globalization and its effect on Mongolian culture and
society.
To start out with, by culture I mean a complex of objects and
values that affects a person’s sense of identity with a group or soc
iety. It is, therefore, clear that culture and society are inextricably
intertwined. One cannot exist without the other. In the broadest
sense, culmre is a society’s way of life, and conversely, any society
is the arena in which culture resides. It is identified by race, ethni
city, language, religion, or other social categories or groupings.
Cultures and societies have both temporal and spatial dimen
sions. There is little disagreement about their temporal dimensions.
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We all know that what is understood as Mongolian culture today
was not the same at any time in the past, and the same holds true
for society. However, one does not always find the same unanimity
of opinion when it comes to the spatial dimensions of cultures
and societies. While there is common agreement that the size of a
society can range from very small, such as a street gang, to all of
humanity, that agreement sometimes disappears when analysis of
a society and its culture is focused at a level that straddles political
borders.

(Adapted from Henry G. Schwarz, Mongolia and the Mongols : Holdings at Western
Washington Universitf (Bellingham: Western Washington University, 1992), front
ispiece).

Mongolia is a case in point. Among the several dozen of
transnational cultural areas on this planet, there is perhaps none
more suitable for gauging globalizations’s impact on culture and
society than Mongolia. In the first place, Mongolia in any sense of
the word other than political/economic is much larger than the
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country by that name. When one focuses on cultural matters such
as ethnicity and language — in my considered opinion more im
portant than political matters because they are much more endur
ing — one discovers that Mongolia covers a huge area stretching
from the Russian border to the Ordos Bend of the Yellow River
and from the Xing’an Mountains in the east to the Altai Moun
tains in the west.'
When one speaks of one Mongolian culture and society from
Lake Baikal to the Ordos, many people of different walks of life,
even some Mongolists, instantly object that almost a century of
political separation between the state in the north and the Chin
ese-administered southern part has created two Mongolian cult
ures and two Mongolian societies. The interesting thing is that ad
vocates of this view readily agree that Mongolian culture and soci
ety can be fruitfully investigated at lower levels but most of them
find it very difficult to acknowledge publicly the existence of one
Mongolian culture and society stretching from Lake Baikal to the
Ordos. Moreover, there was a time not long ago when native resi
dents of ethnic Mongolia were pressured by their respective gov
ernments to keep quiet on this subject, and even today, although
political controls have been greatly relaxed on both sides of the
border, public acknowledgment of one ethnic Mongolia is still
viewed as politically incorrect by many Mongols both north and
south.
In order to place this deplorable state of affairs in its proper
historical context, we need not go any farther back than the begin
ning of Mongolia’s present political division which occurred when
the Manchu dynasty fell in early 1912,^ less than a century ago. For
^ It is rarely possible to completely match a political entity with a cultural entity,
and our map is no exception. It combines the current political boundaries of
the Mongolian state in the north with Chinese-administered Southern, or Inner,
Mongolia. By doing so, it includes large numbers of Chinese within the south
ern border and a Kazakh minority in the northwestern corner but leaves out
Mongols living beyond the northern and southwestern borders. On the other
hand, unlike almost any other map in print today, it includes practically the ent
ire contiguous area of cultural Mongolia.
2 During the time of the Manchu empire (1644-1911), there were administrative
divisions within Mongolia, just as there were in the other countries and territor
ies taken over by the Manchus, like China, Tibet, and later Dzungaria and East-
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the next eight years, called the period of autonomy, the northern
part of Mongolia succeeded in establishing a rump state with
some of the trappings of sovereignty including a limited degree
of foreign relations., but that changed all too soon.
Meanwhile, the southern part of Mongolia, often referred to as
Inner Mongolia, with more than twice the number of Mongols
than in the northern part, was unable to resist the attacks through
out the 1910s by a succession of Chinese warlords in Beijing who
masqueraded as the Republic of China. As a result, the southern
part of Mongolia has eventually become completely integrated in
to the political and economic framework of China.
Toward the end of the 1910s, a Chinese warlord clique then in
control of Beijing made an attempt to annex the northern part of
Mongolia and might have actually succeeded in its land grab had it
not been for an entirely unforeseen event. The civil war in Russia
had steadily moved eastward, bringing to northern Mongolia first
troops under the command of Baron Sternberg and then, hard on
their heels, the ultimately victorious Red Army. This event had two
effects. The immediate result was that Chinese troops were chased
home and prevented the warlords and their various successors
from trying again. The second effect was that with the naming of
the northern portion of Mongolia a “people’s republic” in 1924, a
process began that over the next seventy years completely subord
inated the territory to policies made in Moscow. They affected not
only the political, economic, and military fortunes of Mongols
living in this rump state but, most relevant to our discussion, also
the Mongols’ view of their own culture and society.
Stalin and his colleagues were well aware of the strong sense of
ethnic identity among all Mongols and the fact that more than
two-third of them lived beyond Moscow’s control in China. Stalin
feared that these Mongols might be used by China or some third
country to undermine his hold over the newly created rump state
in the North.^ The Soviet leaders sought to solve this perceived

ern Turkestan. The important point is that Mongolia was governed in toto by the
central Manchu government through its Lifan Yuan.
^ This fear was not as far-fetched as it had first appeared because after invading
China, the Japanese created an autonomous Mongolian state under Demchug-
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problem in two major ways. They sought to reorient Mongolian
culture through close integration with the Soviet Union and its
East European allies. The results included higher education for
Mongols mostly in institutions in those countries, fluency in Russ
ian, the adoption of the Cyrillic script, and the introduction of
Western art forms, notably European opera."* Moreover, the Soviet
leaders drastically reinterpreted Mongolian history and culture
both in the classroom as well as among the general Mongolian po
pulation. The greatest embodiment of a unified Mongolia, Chinggis Khan, practically became an unperson. When he was portrayed
at all, it was always in the darkest hues.’ It was not only political
leaders like Chinggis Khan who became all but banned but also
major cultural figures, especially those who lived beyond the latterday borders of the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR). For inst
ance, I know of no book by or about Injannasi (1837-1892), argu
ably the greatest Mongolian literary figure of the nineteenth cent
ury and native of southern Mongolia,'’ that was published in the
MPR during its lifetime, 1924-1991. The Soviet leadership also
banned the use of clan names, thereby hoping to weaken an
dongrub which they hoped would, inter alia, be attractive to the Mongols in the
MPR.
^ The Buriat and Kalmyk Mongols, as citizens of the Soviet Union, had of
course already been Russified, but the Soviet leadership would go even so far as
to remove the word “Mongolian” from the official name Buriat-Mongolian
ASSR.
® Another probable reason for the Soviets’ degrading of Chinggis Khan, acc
ompanied by a drastic deemphasis on the entire period of the Mongol world
empire, was their desire to obscure the fact that the Mongols had conquered
Russia. The Chinese, also conquered by the Mongols, had a different “solution”
to the same problem. They declared Chinggis Khan and his successors Chinese
emperors and gave the Chinese portion of the Mongol world empire a thor
oughly Chinese name, Yuan.
^ Following in the footsteps of his father, Wangcugbala (1795-1847), and elder
brother, Giileransa (1820-1855?), both well-known literary figures, Injannasi
produced many works of poetry and prose that resonated well with literate
Mongols during his time and for many generations to come. His most famous
work is his historical novel, Kohe sudur, which continues to be hugely popular in
southern Mongolia, as evidenced by a continuous stream of books about the
book and its author, as well as at least one feature movie and a book of cart
oons.
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awareness of common roots with the majority of their fellow
Mongols who lived under Chinese administration/
This policy of grossly distorting the Mongols’ cultural and hist
orical heritage, relentiessly carried out over many decades, eventu
ally resulted in a wide-spread belief among the citizens of the
Mongolian People’s Republic that they were the only “real” Mon
gols and the other two-thirds, living under Chinese administration,
were erlii^ or half-breeds/ For the past decade or so, the govern
ment of the northern part of Mongolia, officially called Mongol
Uls or simply Mongolia, has taken great strides to change its sov
ereignty from nominal to actual by establishing direct political and
economic relations with scores of other countries and joining do
zens of international organizations. It has been much less energe
tic in its efforts to undo the gross misperceptions that had been
inculcated into generations of Mongols during the Soviet period.
With these few words about Mongolian culture and society, we
now turn to the force at the center of our investigation, globali
zation. At the most general level, we can say that it has been a
phenomenon since the dawn of human civilization and can be de
scribed in the simplest possible terms as a process which intro
duces changes on a scale encompassing many cultures and socie
ties. It does not necessarily denote a truly planetary scale because
concepts like “the world” mean not only physical entities but are
also mental constructs. A case in point is what is frequently refer
red to as the Mongol world empire. It was, of course, the largest
contiguous political entity in human history yet, equally obviously,
it did not cover the entire planet. This fact mattered little to the
people directly involved, conquerors and conquered alike, because
in their minds the empire did indeed encompass their “world.”’* *

^ One could also add the suppression of the Buddhist church. Although the
main reason was internal politics, another motivation probably stemmed from
the church’s close connection with Inner Mongolia and, of course, Tibet.
* Discovering this attitude toward them was perhaps the greatest shock for
Mongols from Southern Mongolia when they were first allowed to visit the
Mongolian People’s Republic.
’ The term “world” is still being used in a less than planetary sense. One local
example is the “world series” in North American baseball, a lingering testimony
to the provincialism of an earlier age.
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This difference between fact and imagination stiU exists but it has
shrunk a great deal, and we must reckon with the possibility that
for an ever increasing share of humanity this difference will even
tually disappear altogether.
This leads us to define the term’s relationship to the concepts
of Westernization and modernization because many people treat
these terms as being synonymous with globalization. They are
based on the older terms of “Western” and “modern” which have
been widely used for perhaps a century or more and would there
fore appear to be both useful and accurate concepts. As we shall
see in a moment, they are not very useful for our investigation of
Mongolian culture and society in the age of globalization.
This may be surprising to some because both Western and mo
dern are undeniably useful terms. The areas in which they are
most useful are place for Western and time for modern. Western
Mongolia, like the Western hemisphere, is an accurate place name.
Modern Mongolian history, like modern times, if identified as a
definite time period, can also be accepted as being accurate. Be
yond place and time, however, both terms become much less use
ful.
The term Western, despite its relatively long use or perhaps be
cause of it, has been widely misused. Today, one finds Mongols,
especially younger ones, labeling certain cultural trends as “West
ern” because, as Peter Marsh suggests in his chapter, it presumably
conveys a certain degree of prestige. It does not seem to matter to
these young people that some trends had in fact originated in Ko
rea or Japan. The term Western, when applied in a cultural or soc
ietal context, is also often less accurate than generally believed. It
is most useful at the time an idea or object is created in, say, Pasa
dena or Paris, but the further one moves away from that time and
place, the less precise or meaningful the term becomes.
The term modern is also less useful in any discussion of cult
ure and society than many people assume. Like Western, the term
modern is maximally useful only within an extremely short time
frame. This is true even in fields where the term is said to have
long-lasting significance.
Two such fields are medicine and history. We are all familiar
with the juxtaposition of traditional versus modern medicine. One
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finds this distinction as much in Mongolia as in North America
and Europe.'” When we look a little closer at what is called traditi
onal medicine in Mongolia we discover that it is not one solid
piece of knowledge and practice but that it consists of several lay
ers." Much of it dates back to the time when Tibetan missionaries
introduced to Mongolia large chunks of Tibetan culture, including
a highly developed medical system,’^ but it has also an older layer
containing in greatly modified form elements of earlier medical
beliefs and practices, and it has added in recent decades a new
layer of some foreign procedures, pharmaceuticals, and machinery.
It would appear that as time went on the traditional/modern di
chotomy gradually lost its initial acuity, and those who still insist
on using it use it in less than objective ways. One can easily ima
gine that the early Tibetan missionaries and their Mongolian follo
wers used this dichotomy in the same biased or prejudicial way
that some of us use it today.
The case for using the term modern in Mongolian history
turns out to be as weak as in medicine. Present historiographical
convention decrees that modern Mongolian history began in 1921.
If one wonders why, a comparison with its neighbor to the south
wiU provide the answer because there the start of modern Chinese
history is fixed at 1840. What these two dates have in common is
that they mark the beginning of the intrusion of massive Euro
pean political and military power that brought in its wake foreign
beliefs and practices. But as in the case of medicine, in no time at
all these foreign or “modern” elements began to be molded into
forms by forces that were both native or “traditional” as well as
even newer external ones. From that moment on, the dichotomy
between traditional and modern weakened.
If the term modern, as I have tried to show, is not as useful for
our understanding of culture and society, it follows that the pro-* *
Occasionally, there is also the explicit or implicit claim that modern medicine
is Western medicine, but one should dismiss such claim as a product of provin
cialism or jingoism.
" One can discover the very same layered look in European medicine, but that
subject is beyond the scope of this book.
*2 Tibetan medicine, in turn, owes much to a)airvedic and other medical systems
in India and beyond.
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cess of modernization loses much of its alleged utility. When
viewed objectively, the term modernization is essentially nothing
more than another name for the continuous process of change
which is inherent in the temporal dimensions of all culmres and
societies.
As for the term Westernization, it is often used for partisan, i.e.
non-scientific, purposes, as when it is praised or condemned as a
powerful force destined, or threatening, to engulf all of humanity.
Yet any sober analysis shows that so far that predicted outcome is
far from certain, and evidence is mounting that Westernization
may well metamorphose into an entirely new hybrid process. We
see numerous examples of this transformation in music and the
visual arts. Moreover, there are cultural currents originating out
side the “West” that may or may not hybridize with “Western”
culmral forms. The growing popularity of manga and anime in
North America and the rise there in conversions to Buddhism, Is
lam and other “non-Western” religions and beliefs are but two ex
amples.’^ Other cultural currents, originating and spreading out
side the “West”, may eventually also impact North America and
Europe. One such recent example is haUyu, the Korean pop cult
ure wave, which had a major impact on Southeast Asia in the
1990s and is now sweeping Japan. Each one of these non-Western
cultural currents may become globalized, which is yet another way
of proving that Westernization is not identical to globalization.
Finally, what are the forces that produce globalization? They
can be both non-human’*’ as well as products of human volition.
We are all too familiar with the former type as we become ever
more inundated with all kinds of electronic communicators. An
example of the latter would be what is sometimes called globalism.
It can be found throughout human history whenever political and
other influential leaders entertained expansionist ideas.Global-

There is at least one crosscurrent that has already led to new hybrid forms, to
wit, in culinary matters.
Gadgets Hke cellular phones are made and used by humans, but the impems
they give toward globalization is autonomous.
One such expansionist idea was manifest destiny, first publicized in 1845,
which declared that the United States was destined to expand to the Pacific Oc-
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ism can be both the cause as well as the effect of globalization.
Two recent examples will have to suffice. The messianic fervor of
German political leaders in the 1930s, clearly aiming at becoming
a world power, grew out of the notion of a mythical Aryan race.
While this globalism was obviously the product of many complex
historical trends, it was an ideefixe that failed to engender globaliz
ation, as hoped for by its creators. On the other hand, the christofascist'® variant of globalism currently held by some people in the
United States who see themselves as entitled to ignore legal con
straints such as international laws and agreements appears to be
predominantly the product of one of the major driving forces of
today’s globalization, namely the temporary military and technolo
gical ascendancy of the United States.
The Mongolian world empire provides an excellent test case
for an earlier kind of globalism which is sometimes called tenggerism'^ and is perhaps best symbolized by the self-proclaimed role
of the khan as the sole representative of heaven on earth. The
crucial question is when tenggerism assumed its messianic role.
Some will argue that it happened prior to 1206 or, put differently,
that tenggerism, or Mongolian globalism if you wish, was the en
gine for the globalization that developed with the expansion of
the Mongol world empire. I have argued obliquely elsewhere'® that
this interpretation is not only factually flawed but also, unformnately and unintendedly, lends credence to the view held by peoples
like the Chinese and the Europeans who were conquered by the
ean. Like many other expansionist ideas, it failed to grow into a full-fledged
form of globalism, but perhaps the final word on this has yet to be written.
A term coined by the American philosopher Eric Hoffer (1902-1983).
See Sh. Bira’s important contributions in his article “Tenggerism and Modern
GlobaUsm : A Retrospective Oudook on Globalisation,” Inner Asia 5:2 (2003),
107-118; “Mongolian Tenggerism and Modern Globalism : A Retrospective
Outlook on Globalism,” yoarW of the Kojal Asiatic Socie^, 2004, 2-12; and his
chapter in this book, “The Mongolian Ideology of Tenggerism and Khubilai
Khan.”
See my "Otrar," Olon Uisjn Mongolch Erderntnii V Ikh Khural (Ulaanbaatar,
1992), V. 3, 333-340; and "Otrar Revisited," in MongolSudlalyn OguullUud- Essays
on Mongol Studies [Commemorative volume on the occasion of Academician Bira's 70th birthday], edited by Ts. Batbayar et al. (Ulaanbaatar : Olon Ulsyn Mon
gol Sudlalyn Kholboo, 1998), 195-208.
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Mongols that the latter were nothing more than barbarians whose
lust for conquest was unbridled and a priori.
As for globalization itself, I mentioned earlier the relatively free
movement of goods and the extensive cultural interchange during
the Mongol world empire period, considered key elements of to
day’s globalization. However, there are some major differences, as
one would expect across the span of some 800 years. There is, of
course, the already mentioned greater spatial dimension today as
well as a much more intense process, both in physical and psychol
ogical ways. Perhaps most importantly, what distinguishes today’s
globalization from its forerunner in the thirteenth century is con
nectivity'’ by which I mean not only a physical two-way street,
such as increasingly intensive electronic communications, but also
a mindset that makes people feel much closer to those with whom
they communicate or about whom them learn electronically. To
paraphrase a well-known slogan in North America, a rapidly inc
reasing number of people in all parts of the planet now “act glob
ally and think locally.”
I will conclude my remarks with a few suggested ways in which
Mongolists may continue the lines of inquiry the contributors to
this book started and fruitfully investigate the interactions among
globalization, culture and society in ethnic Mongolia. I hope that
if my preceding remarks have accomplished anything, they will
convince our readers that our area of inquiry, largely ignored until
now, offers a vast range of research options. It would indeed be
foolish of me to try to list more than a handful here.
Keeping in mind the three areas mentioned at the start of my
remarks — the spatial comparison of Northern and Southern
Mongolia, the temporal comparison between the present situation
and that during the Mongol world empire, and the special China
factor — here are some possible targets for future investigations.
What changes in which aspect of Mongolian culture and society
have taken place during the last decade, and in what ways are
those changes related to the process of globalization? Have these
changes been the same or similar in both northern and southern
A term originating in technology where it means the ability to transfer data
back and forth among various devices.
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Mongolia? If they are different, to what factors may the differen
ces be attributed? Turning the argument around, we should also
ask whether Mongolian culture has in any way shaped the nature
and/or intensity of globalization within ethnic Mongolia? When
comparing different historical periods, we may ask how, if at all,
globalization affected which aspects of Mongolian culture and so
ciety then, as compared with its effects on contemporary Mongol
ia? Conversely, what comparisons might we draw between the im
pact of Mongolian culmre on globalization during these two peri
ods in Mongolian history? And finally, when we look at the huge
changes in China’s relationship with Mongolia between then and
now, should we simply explain them in terms of relative military
and political strength, or have other forces been at work as well?

The Mongolian Ideology ofTenggerism
and IChubilai Khan
Shagdaryn Bira
It was a belief in the Tenggeri (Heaven-God) that inspired and
motivated the unprecedented rise of the Mongols in the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, and this belief was eventually developed
to the point that it constituted a cohesive political theory that can
be called Tenggerism or Heavenism.
The ideology of Tenggerism went through three stages of dev
elopment. It first emerged during the period when Chinggis Khan
founded the Great Mongol State in 1206. At that time it was aim
ed at the sacralization and legitimization of the power of his Eura
sian nomadic empire. The second stage occurred during the peri
od of the world-wide expansionism of Chinggis Khan’s successors.
At that time Tenggerism developed into a sophisticated universal
ideology of Tenggerization, according to which all under Heaven
must be united under the rule of the Mongols. The third stage of
Tenggerism commenced with the reign of Khubilai Khan, who
completed the creation of the universal empire by conquering the
whole of China. Unlike his predecessors, Khubilai Khan was less
concerned with conquests than with the problems of pacifying
and consolidating the universal empire.
I have already dealt with the first two stages of this process in
some of my previous writings.' At this time I would like to speak
about the third stage. It was during Khubilai Khan’s thirty-five

^ Sh. Bira, “Mongolian Tenggerism and Modern Globalism: A Retrospective
Outlook on G\oh?Msm” journal of the 'Royal Asiatic Society 14 (2004), 3-12.
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years of rule that the Mongolian policy of Tenggerization reached
its apogee and the Mongolian empire acquired its universal charac
ter. The world was actually united under one political authority. It
was interconnected by the communication network known as the
drtbge system of horse relay stations. Peoples, ideas, information,
and commerce flowed freely between countries through this net
work. Examples include the creation and introduction of an inter
national alphabet, the so-called square script, which encouraged
the cultural integration of many ethnic groups and the construct
ion of an astronomical observatory at Maraghah in Azerbaijan.
The famous observatory was headed by the great astronomer Nasir ad-Din at-Tusi (1201-1274). It becapie a meeting place of
scientists from various countries and there developed a close coll
aboration between Arab-Iranian and Chinese astronomers. In
1267 Khubilai Khan invited the Iranian astronomer Jamal ad-Din
to his capital Dadu, the present-day Beijing. The astronomer
brought the astronomical instruments sent by Il-Khan Hulegii to
his brother Khubilai Khan. The famous Chinese astronomer Guo
Shoujing (1231-1316) together with his Iranian colleague Jamal adDin founded an observatory in the capital of the empire, and their
research was most fruitful.
It was during the Mongol Yuan dynasty that the Mongols came
into direct contact with a variety of cultures, including Chinese,
Indo-Tibetan, Arab-Islamic and Central Asian. Buddhist literature
was translated from different languages into Mongolian. Not a few
Mongols mastered the Chinese language and script. They took an
active part in literary and translation activities, and some of them
even wrote their works in Chinese. Uighurs, Tanguts, Tibetans,
Chinese and Central Asians worked in close collaboration with
Mongols. In 1307 Bolodtemiir, the Assistant of the Left in the Se
cretarial Council, presented to Qaisan Khan a Mongolian version
of the famous Confucian book Xiaojing in the so-called state script.
The Mongols also became acquainted with the stories of the fam
ous Alexander Romance. Mongke KEan’s minister Mahmud Yalavach once related to his sovereign a story from the Muslim ver
sion of the Alexander Romance, and the Mongol khan was ext
remely pleased with it. The Alexander Romance soon gained wid
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er popularity and in the early fourteenth century the entire work is
said to have been translated into Mongolian.
The exchange of intellectual achievements across the Eurasian
continent found its most illustrious expression in the world’s first
universal history" known as Jami’al-Tawarikh (“The Compendium
of Histories”), compiled by Rashid ad-Din with the assistance and
participation of an international team of historians, including the
Mongol Bolod (Pulad) chingsiang. The close collaboration and
friendship of Rashid ad-Din and Bolod chingsiang are very sym
bolic in terms of cultural rapprochement between East and West.
Thomas Allsen writes that “when acknowledged at all, our Bolod
is usually described, quite accurately, as a literate Mongolian and as
the informant of Rashid al-Din. But he was much more than that.
He may be justly characterized as a Mongolian intellectual-literate,
cosmopolitan, and a man of affairs. Although continuously ex
posed to foreign cultures and to their leading representatives, he
never abandons his ties to Mongolian traditions. Bolod, of course,
knew much about Chinese and later Persian culture, but he re
mained to his dying day ‘the expert’ on Mongolian customs and
genealogy.”^
I have given some details only from the intellectual sphere.
More details can be gleaned from the economic, commercial and
humanitarian interconnections in those days. All of these facts
show that there had been developing something more than
military conquests of nomadic “barbarians” who brought nothing
but destruction and massacre. Rather there took place some kinds
of global processes that, in some ways, can be compared with
modern globalization, specially in terms of making peoples and
countries closer and more integrated than ever before.
Khubilai Khan was a great reformer of the Mongolian ideology
of world domination. He knew his own nomadic civilization as
well as the Confucian, Buddhist, Arab-Islamic and EuropeanChristian civilizations, and he did his utmost to exploit their gains
successfully and selectively in conformity with his policy of
Tenggerization. He explained his religious policy to Marco Polo as
2 Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University" Press, 2002), 79-80.
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follows; ’’There are four gods worshipped by everybody. Jesus
Christ of the Christians, Mohammed of the Iranians, Moses of the
Jews and Buddha Chandamani. As regards myself, I respect all of
those four religions, but whosoever is the greatest and most hon
est in heaven, I wish to have bless me”.^
History confirms that the Mongolian khan finally gave prefer
ence to Buddhism as a neutral and more universal religion in com
parison with other religions known to him. His political pragma
tism allowed him to find the universal and supranational character
of Buddhism well suited to the model of his multinational univer
sal emperorship. As is well-known, since ancient times Buddhism
had been developing an original ideology in which the chakravartin-raja concept occupied center stage. According to this ideology
the world should be united under the banner of Buddhism and
ruled by universal monarchs who turn the wheel of Dharma. It
should be pointed out that in the pro-Buddhist policy of Khubilai
Khan the most decisive role was played by hPhags-pa Lama, the
famous abbot of the Sa-skya monastery of Tibet. The fact that
Khubilai’s policy towards Buddhist Tibet differed greatly from
that towards other countries essentially reflected his specific attimde to Buddhism. Tibet, as a matter of fact, was not conquered
by force, but joined to the Mongol empire by way of establishing a
predominandy spiritual relationship called by the Tibetans them
selves a Yong-mchod (Yong-bdag-mchod gna, in Mongolian: dglige-yin ejen, taktl-un orun) or “Alms-giver-Religious Preceptor” re
lationship which eventually expressed the sacred meaning of the
union of the so-called two orders, that of the Union of the Khan
or “Alms-giver” as the head of the secular power and the Precep
tor as the head of the ecclesiastic power.
In reality, however, the Yong-mchod relationship was not an
equal partnership of the two heads of power. The khan as “the
Alms-giver” played the leading role and provided the Preceptor
with donations, while the Preceptor as the spiritual leader served
to sanctify and legitimate the khan’s power. One can say that this
was the Mongolian interpretation and modification of the old
traditional Indo-Tibetan conception of the Buddhist monarchy on
3 A.C. MouUe, Marco Polo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 201.
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the basis of the Mongolian ideology of Tenggerism. After acute
disputes at their first meeting, Khubilai Khan and hPhags-pa La
ma reached a concordance according to which the oldest Buddhist
doctrine of unity of the ecclesiastical and temporal orders under
went a major transformation. Khubilai Khan saw to it that the
traditional hegemony of the Buddhist religion over the state power
was going to be limited, while hPhags-pa Lama succeeded in get
ting a special status for his country as a spiritual center of the
Mongolian empire. Tibet of that period reminds us to a certain ex
tent of the Vatican in the modern age.
Khubilai Khan carried out bold reforms in the universal ideo
logy of his predecessors. Not rejecting Shamanism and its ideolo
gy, he preferred to apply the main tenets of Buddhist universaUsm
to his policy of Tenggerization. By the Order of Khubilai Khan
issued on the first day of the middle summer month of the Year
of the Mouse (1264) and called the hjah-sa mo-tig-ma (“The Pearl
Yasa”) the Mongol khan, although traditionally referring both to
the power of everlasting Tenggeri'^ and protection of the khan’s
charisma {suujali) in the beginning of his Order, stated as follows:
“Though one should follow the law of Chinggis
Khan to reach aU the best in this Ufe, it is neces
sary to rely upon the Law of Buddha after this
life. Having perceived the meaning of all this [I]
have understood the path of Shakyamuni as a
genuine path only. It is my teacher hPhags-pa
Lama who, having well understood himself that
path, has well taught this path to others. This is
why I have received the dbang (abisheka) from
him and awarded him the tide of guoshri (Chinese:
gupshi), the State Preceptor, and he was declared
to be venerated by all huvrags (lamas).

^ “I have reconstructed the Mongolian original from the Tibetan: tse-ring
gnam-gyi...”
^ See my O "Zolotoi knige” Sh. Damdina (Ulaanbaatar : Izd-vo Akademii nauk
MNR, 1964), 73-74. Cf. Pagha lama-yin tuguji (Kokeqota: Obor Monggol-un
Arad-un Keblel-iin Qoriy-a, 1992), 43-56.
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In the same Order hPhags-pa Lama was designated as the
Head of Religion, and all the huvraqs or lamas of Tibet were re
quired to obey him and be engaged exclusively in religious servi
ces for the welfare of the Mongol khan according to the precepts
of the Buddhist teaching. Under these conditions only the khan
would indispensably provide the lamas with his donations and ve
neration, and would free them from “the three duties - military
service, taxes and ortoge duties.
This Order marked a turning point in the ideology of Khubilai
Khan’s Tenggerism. He actually declared Buddhism to be the state
religion, having appointed hPhags-pa Lama the State Preceptor.
At the same time he underlined his loyalty to the power of Tenggeri and the protection of the khan. Here one can see some kind
of division of power with preference given to the khan’s power. It
is characteristic that almost all the edicts issued by Khubilai
Khan’s successors, kike Buyantu Khan, and imperial family mem
bers, like Mangala, Dharmapala’s widow, Ananda consistendy ref
erred to the power or strength of Eternal Heaven and the khan’s
charisma {sut^), thus demonstrating their loyalty to their traditional
ideology of Tenggerism. Although these documents dealt with the
affairs of different religions — Buddhism, Christianity, Taoism,
and Islam - their representatives were ordered to pray to Heaven
and pronounce benedictions in favor of the Mongol khans.’
It is obvious from the Order and other, similar sources that
Mongolian Tenggerism did not clash with Buddhist universalism,
as it did with Islam and Christianity during the reigns of Khubilai
Khan's predecessors. Moreover, Tenggerism was being consider
ably transformed under the impact of the fundamental ideological
principles of Buddhism. Source materials, particularly Tibetan, tes
tify that with the active participation and assistance of hPhags-pa
Lama the Mongol khan managed to put Buddhism into the service
of his universal emperorship. Thus a new philosophy arose with
the aim of supporting and justifying the policy of Tenggerization
of the Mongols.

6 Nicholas Poppe, The Mongolian Monuments in hPhags-pa Script (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1957), 46-56.
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By his numerous works, especially those addressing Khubilai
Khan and his family members, hPhags-pa Lama did much to sub
stantiate the universal nature of the Mongol empire and legitimate
the right of the Mongol ruler as the Chakravartin-raja. In his wellknown work Shes-hya rab-gsal (The Book to Clarify Knowledge),
hPhags-pa Lama did his best to justify the universal character of
the Mongol empire from the viewpoint of Buddhist historiogra
phy. The book was composed by order of Khubilai Khan’s son.
Crown Prince Chingim, in the Year of the Earth Tiger (1278). The
State Preceptor was the first to include the Mongol empire in the
scheme of the general history of the Buddhist world and to caU
Chinggis Khan a Chakravartin khan (in Tibetan: hkor los sgyur’ba’i rgyalbo).
This was quite a new initiative in the Buddhist historiography
of that time. The author gave a brief survey of the Mongol empire
just after the history of ancient India and Tibet, the two great
Buddhist countries. Hence there first appeared, as I have written
previously, a three Buddhist monarchy scheme (India, Tibet, and
Mongolia) of writing history in Tibetan and Mongolian historical
writings. According to this scheme the history of the Mongol em
pire was incorporated into the history of the Buddhist universe,
and Chinggis Khan and his successors were linked to the sacred
genealogies of the great Buddhist kings of India and Tibet, begin
ning with Mahasammata, the legendary forefather of all the kings
of the Buddhist world.
I want to emphasize that hPhags-ps Lama did not falsify histo
ry by forcefully linking the genealogical bloodlines of the great
Mongol khans with those of the ancient Indian and Tibetan Dharma-rajas, as Mongol historians did later on. He only confirmed
that there was a universal empire founded by Chinggis Khan, and
that this empire! became a Buddhist one under the rule of Khubilai
Khan. On this basis, he had some reason for including the Mon
gol empire into the list of Buddhist countries and for comparing
Chinggis Khan with Chakravartin and likening Khubilai Khan to
the Bodhisattva, calling him a Dharma-raja, the supporter and
protector of the all-victorious Buddhist teaching. One year before
Khubilai became khan, hPhags-pa Lama elevated him to the level
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of a great Boddhisattva khan and wished many blessings on him7
In one of his blessings he called Khubilai “the highest Boddhi
sattva, friend of the Dharma, the right and merciful protector, of
the world”.*
In another blessing hPhags-pa Lama praised Khubilai Khan as
the highest Boddhisattva Sechen Khan, distinguished by his virt
ues, prominent for his sincere belief and merciful wisdom, the ad
vocate of religion and the protector of the world by his honest
mind”.'* The elevation of the Mongol khan as a Boddhisattva by
the head of a religion pursued, after all, a far-reaching aim. Accor
ding to the Buddhist worldview, the Boddhisattva ideal of the king
represented a cosmic liberation that not only delivers his subjects
from aU miseries, but provides a cosmic unity, integration and har
mony to the Universe. And it is not difficult for us to imagine that
Khubilai Khan was not only extremely flattered by aU this praise,
but he accepted it as objectively correct because the khan had,
after aU, been tireless in his attempts to unite “aU under Heaven”
by all possible means.
Khubilai Khan’s new approach towards the poUcy of Tenggerization found its most impressive reflection in the fact that he
himself converted to Buddhism by way of receiving a consecration
(abisheka, Tibetan: dban^ from hPhags-pa Lama, and the act of
consecration was repeated for three times. The first time was in
1253, when he was not yet a khan but involved in Tibetan affairs,
and the two others occurred in 1260 and 1270. The abisheka
which he received was that of Hevajra (Tibetan: dges-pa rdorje),
the Tantric deity (yi-dam). Hevajra is one of the main mtelary dei
ties in Lamaism who was especiaUy worshipped in the Sa-skya mo
nasteries and whose cult is closely Unked with that of Mahakala
(Tibetan: mGon-po). hPhags-pa Lama himself is beUeved to have
received the initiation in Hevajra by Mahakala.

^ hPhags-pa bla-ma, rGyal-po la gdams-pa’i rab-du byed-pa (Sa-skya bkahhbum), Vol. Ba, ff. la/344-37a/430a.
® Sa-skya bkah-hbum, Vol. Va, ff. 3a/390b
® Pagba lama-yin tuguji, Coyiji, ed. (Kokeqota: Obor Monggol-un Arad-un Kebleliin Qoriy-a, 1992), 53.
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The fact that Khubilai Khan got the initiation in Hevajra rites
from the direct transmitter had, from the point of view of Tantrism, a great magic meaning in terms of enhancing his God-like
nature and legitimating his universal khanship. By having gotten
into direct spiritual contact with his tutelary deity Mahakala, the
most powerful defender of religion, Khubilai Khan could claim to
have acquired all his mysterious powers in the cause of ruling his
empire. Thus, the Mongolian khanship could enjoy not only the

Mahakala
/
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favor of Tenggri, but the favor of the powerful Tantric god. The
black figure of terrifying Mahakala had actually become a symbol
of the khan’s might just as the Shamanist black sulde had been the
symbol of Chinggis Khan’s power.
In 1270 on the initiatives of Khubilai Khan and hPhags-pa La
ma there was built a temple consecrated to Mahakala in the place
of Zhuozhou located south of Dadu. At the temple there used to
take place great rituals dedicated to Mahakala, the fearful defender
who suppressed aU evil forces of state and religion. These rituals
were held especially frequendy during times of war. The cult of
Mahakala continued until the end of the Yiian dynasty, and many
temples dedicated Mahakala were constructed in different parts of
China. Even though they were no longer held after the fall of the
Yuan dynasty, these rituals created a tradition of Mahakala wor
ship among the Mongols that continued until modern times. Tan
kas and statuettes of Mahakala had been kept in most Mongolian
families including my own, as he came to be widely regarded as
the main defender and protector of the Mongolian nation.
Judging by the description by Chos-kyi-'od-zer (fl. 1305-1321)
in his poem devoted to Mahakala (“The Great Black”), the deity
was represented in those days as being of black color, having a ter
rifying image with four hands, one face, three red eyes symboli
zing the past, present, and future, and yellow hair, and holding a
sword in his front right hand, a scull in the other right hand, a
spear in his upper left hand, and the dvaja or victory banner in his
lower left hand. This description largely corresponds to the terrify
ing form of Siva in her character as destroyer. Siva is one member
of the Hindu triad of deities, the two other being Brahma “the
creator” and Vishnu “the preserver”. This close similarity means
that the worship of Mahakala was traditionally associated with that
of Siva, who was also depicted in the black color as Mahakala.
The other tutelary deity whom IChubilai Khan had chosen was
Sitatapatra, in Mongolian Cagan Sikiirtei and in Tibetan gdugsdkar can. In 1270 Khubilai Khan, on the advice of hPhags-pa La
ma, hoisted over his throne in the Da Ming Palace in Dadu the
white parasol of the Tantric god Sitatapatra. With that act Khubi
lai Khan turned the Tantric deity into the protector of the Mongol

Tenggerism and Khubilai Khan

23

empire. As is known, the white parasol was popular in Buddhist
countries as an emblem of royalty signifying peace and prosperity,
and Khubilai Khan used it alongside the white siilde or banner of
Chinggis Khan as the “siilde of peace”. The white color and the
calm, peaceful image of Sitatapatra probably resonated well with
the Mongols of Khubilai Khan’s days as they soon began to iden
tify the Tantric deity with their own shamanistic “protective spirit”,
the cagan tug, which was the white standard first raised by Chinggis
Khan as a symbol of peace and protection at the ceremony of his
enthronement in 1206.

Sitatapatra
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One should point out that the ideological and practical mean
ing of the worship of the Tantric deity Sitatapatra was far-reaching
in terms of sacralizing and pacifying the world empire of the Mon
gol khans. Whoever worshipped this deity (ji-dam) entered into a
mysterious and intimate union with his tutelary spirit and enjoyed
her peaceful magic powers and favors. Although Tantrism was int
roduced into the Mongolian empire from Tibet, its origin goes
back to the ancient Indian worship of the feminine as a prime
cause of all phenomena. Therefore, in Tantrism most deities (yidam) are depicted as feminine. The yi-dam Sitatapatra is tradition
ally represented as a female deity with all her attributes. Her color
is pure white with many hands and faces, keeping a vajra in her
main right hand and the white parasol with the long handle in her
main left hand, suppressing innumerable evil forces under her big
waist band. One can find images of Sitatapatra as described here
in the illustrations of the Mongolian version of the Kanjur.'“
Researchers like Herbert Franke and Choyiji have produced
some interesting data from the Yuan shi concerning the rituals of
Sitatapatra that had been suggested by hPhags-pa Lama and intro
duced at the imperial court by Khubilai Khan. The rimals of Sita
tapatra were held every year on the fifteenth day of the middle
month of spring, beginning in the year 1270. During the colorful
ceremony, participated in by the khan and the state preceptor and
a large number of dignitaries, the white parasol was taken from
the khan’s palace and carried in the procession circumambulating
the capital city. The ceremony was attended by huge crowds of
people and looked in all respects like a great festival that included
both religious and cultural forms of colorful entertainment. After
the end of the procession the white parasol was returned to the
imperial palace and again hoisted over the khan’s throne."

^^Rasisereng, Monggol "Ganjuud' daki Burqan-u burin iji horiigjirug : Degedu (Kokeqota: Obor Monggol-un Arad-un Keblel-iin Qoriy-a, 2002), 78.
^^Herbert Franke, From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God: The Eegitimation of the Yiian Dynasty (Miinchen: Verlag der BAW, 1978), 60-62; Coyiji, Mong
gol-un hurqan-u sasin-u teiike-. Yehe Monggol ulus-un iiy-e, 1206-1271 (Kokeqota: Obor
Monggol-un Arad-un Keblel-iin Qoriy-a, 1998), 283-284.
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The worship of Sitatapatra and the rituals associated with it
were designed to demonstrate to the huge crowds attending the
annual festivities and to the empire as a whole the khan’s power to
ensure peace and welfare for all. At the same time, the rituals serv
ed to demonstrate the god-like nature of the Mongol khans as
Chakravartin emperors of the universe.
In conclusion, one should say that during the Yuan period of
the Mongol empire the traditional Mongolian ideology of Tengg
erism underwent great changes thanks to the impact of Buddhist
religious and political philosophy. When compared with other reli
gions and ideologies known to the Mongol khans at the time.
Buddhism offered them a form of universalism that, thanks to its
supranational and cosmopolitan nature, was far more attuned to
the needs of governing a world empire. Rather than replacing
Tenggerism, the Buddhist model of the monarch as Chakravartin
strengthened it by serving as a new innovative paradigm for imit
ation, invocation and, finally, for deification of the Mongolian
khans in their attempts to justify and legitimatize their world dom
ination.
The Mongol Yuan dynasty represented in its ideology and form
more of a Buddhist universal monarchy than the Chinese or nom
adic types of Eastern empires. The introduction by Khubilai Khan,
on hPhags-pa Lama’s initiative, of an elaborate court cult and col
orful ceremonies of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Tantric deities, partic
ularly Mahakala and Sitatapatra, was bound to demonstrate the
Buddhist god-like nature of the universal khanship. If Tenggerism
justified the world-wide conquests of the Mongols, Buddhism in
the form of Tibetan Lamaism was worshiped with the aim of sacraUzing the peaceful domination of the numerically small elite of
Mongols over aU the world.
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Globalization and Mongolia; Blessing or
Curse?'
Paul D. Buell and Ngan Le
"After us the descendants of our clan will wear gold
embroidered garments, eat rich and sweet food, ride
fine horses, and embrace beautiful women but they
will not say that they owe all this to their fathers and
elder brothers, and they wiU forget us and those great
times."
“Whoever can clean his own house can rid the coun
try of thieves.”
Sayings of Cinggis-qan (Riasanovsky, 1965: 88, 89)

Since 1991, Mongolia, no longer part of the Soviet command
economy, has been in the process of adapting to the demands of a
new world economic system. It is now required to sink or swim
based on the dictates of a distant marketplace that has very Utde to
do with conditions in Mongolia itself. It has been able to cope on
ly to a most limited degree and today Mongolia survives largely
from handouts from international organizations and donor count
ries. As has been the case in many other parts of the world, the
demands of globalization have dislocated Mongolian society at its
very roots. In the pages that follow, we will look at one key area of
this dislocated society, Mongolia’s pastoral sector. There privatiza
tion, a key goal of Mongolia’s economic modernization as dictated*
* We would like to thank Morris Rossabi and Gene Anderson for taking the
time to read over and criticize our paper. Their help and encouragement were
invaluable.
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by its creditors, has undermined not only pastoral production it
self, but Mongolia’s whole traditional way of life in the process.
Among the casualties has been Mongolia’s ability to feed its peo
ple. PastoraUsm remains its primary native source of food and has
remained so for centuries. Given its other needs, imported petro
leum and petroleum products, ^ for example, and a high debt load,
Mongolia lacks the wherewithal to import enough food to feed its
growing population adequately. In addition to the products of its
pastoraUsm, Mongolia does produce other kinds of foods, princip
ally grain, potatoes, and hardy vegetables, but supplies are in no
way sufficient to need and privatization has had a highly negative
impact on Mongolia’s grain and vegetable agriculture as well as on
its pastoralism. What is available from local production is, in most
cases, very expensive. Only in the products of pastoralism, dairy
products and meat, the source of cheap food for the vast majority
of the population, is Mongolia fully self-sufficient, although
distribution problems often limit availability and production is
becoming more and more inefficient. All other food products, be
yond the Httle grain and vegetables produced locally, and small
amounts of game meats and traditional gathered plant foods, must
be imported and once Mongolia has paid for its oil and industrial
goods, and has serviced its debts, not much foreign exchange to
meet a growing food deficit remains. Hunger and mal-nourishment, rarely the case before, are now real threats.

^ In 2003, the last year for which fuU figures are available Mongolia imported
512,900 tons of petroleum products, including 259,100 tons of gasoline and
214,800 tons of Diesel fuel, and had a trade deficit of 185.1 million US dollars
{Statisiktjn Emkhtegel, 2004), largely due to its petroleum imports. By contrast,
Mongolia exported, to China, 159,900 barrels of oil to CWna from its own
oilfields located in the wrong part of Mongolia to contribute to national needs.
Although an increasing amount of Mongolia’s gasoline is processed in its own
refineries, to save money, its dependence upon foreign petroleum remains large
and its financial burden from this source has grown greatly with the major price
increases of recent years. Only further development of Mongolia’s own oil is
likely to change this situation and this will have to wait not only increased ex
ploration and development, but considerable investment in local and national
infrastructure to bring domestic oil to the domestic market. Thus Mongolia’s
position as a net oil importer is unlikely to change any time in the near future.
Most of Mongolia’s oU now comes from Kazakhstan {Jane’s Sentinel, 2004).
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Despite its participation in the new world economy of globali
zation, Mongolia thus remains heavily reliant upon the declining
output of its traditional, pastoral sector as its primary food source.
It has no other choice but the sector is in serious trouble and as
hunger grows in Mongolia there is increasing social dislocation.
The reasons for this are many. Key are organizational changes,
namely the collapse of much of Mongolia’s rural infrastructure,
and changing herding practices brought about as a consequence of
organizational breakdowns and the associated privatization of live
stock since the end of Mongolia’s Soviet period. At another level,
greater forces are at work, running the gamut of all on-going social
change in Mongolia. Mongolia, for example, is squandering its tra
ditional social capital, the glue that has held Mongolian society
together for centuries.
Social capital may be defined in various ways (Sobel, 2002).
The World Bank (PovertyNet: “Social Capital”) defines it the
“norms and networks that enable collective action,” a definition
that works very well for Mongolia. There the term above all refers
to the traditional collective institutions and associated social laws
and mores that keep Mongolian society functioning. It also implies
certain traditional resources, such as traditional knowledge systems
and human resources. This includes the traditional leadership of
pastoral society, those individuals who know how to make pastoraUsm work best in difficult and environmentally sensitive areas,
the case virtually everywhere in Mongolia.
Mongolian pastoraUsm continues to embrace more of the terri
tory of Mongolia than any other economic activity. It clearly in
volves much more than simply having a few animals, pasturing
them as needed, and getting them to market, however possible.
Good pastoraUsts must know exactly how to raise their animals,
exactly how and where to pasture them, when to move them, and,
most importantly, how to keep them alive or with minimal losses
through the winter. Mongolian pastoraUsm also involves a sophist
icated understanding of the environment, in terms of its direct
uses for pastoraUsm and in terms of other possibiUties that it off
ers for survival beyond pastoraUsm. The good pastoraUst, for ex
ample, must know how to gather plant foods when pastoral prod
ucts are in short supply, or how and what to hunt. To accompUsh
these things, the good pastoraUst must know how to utiUze social
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institutions, his social capital, to his own benefit. He needs syst
ems of mutual support and cooperative institutions to coordinate
pastoral activities. This is a vital function in an unforgiving land
scape (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999; Sneath, 1999; 2002; Sheehy,
1999; Humphrey and Sneath, 1996; Telenged, 1996). It may or
may not take a village to raise a child, but it certainly takes a whole
network to raise livestock in the Mongolian steppe.
Once its traditional social capital, above all its truly capable
herdsmen working together as part of formal institutional net
works, and all the traditional knowledge and systems associated
with them, is gone, Mongolia could face starvation; at the least an
unacceptable level of adverse social and cultural change. Today
the brightest and the best are steadily fleeing the pastoral life,^
meaning growing future difficulties in sustaining it. Larger move
ments, which have already begun to take place with the worsening
of conditions, could spell national catastrophe. If Mongolia’s past
oral population as a whole, or most of it, moves into the cities, not
only win the pastoral sector itself collapse but with it Mongolian
society as a whole. An Ulaanbaatar of two or more millions, twice
the present population, mostly poor people, with a few sheep and
other livestock, right in town, and living in smoky yurts'* without
plumbing or other amenities would mean disaster by any measure.
Ulaanbaatar is barely able to sustain its present overflow, much
less twice as many.^ And how can such an overflow exist solely on
^ This is particularly true for the better educated population of the Mongolian
middle administrative units, the somon^ formerly the principal service centers
supporting pastoralism locally. Some 77 percent are now in danger of disapp
earing and within them virtually all social and other services to the pastoral sec
tor (EDN, 15 November 2002; 3 December 2002).
According to an estimate published by the Mongolian newspaper Unen, some
140,000 families in the Ulaanbaatar
or yurt district used wood and coal for
heating in early 2003, often in inefficient hand-made stoves. Some 140,000 tons
of wood and 600,000 tons of coal were then being consumed. Demand is likely
to have risen since. Also contributing to Ulaanbaatar air pollution, among the
worst in the world, are the city’s coal-fired power plants, the source of 60 per
cent of its air pollution {EDN, 6 January 2003).
5 The official population of Ulaanbaatar is projected to reach 919,000 by 2010
at present growth rates. Official estimates were 821,800 at the end of 2002, up
3.9 percent over the previous year, and 854,200 at the end of 2003. Some
23,778 officially migrated in 2003, with the total population growth of the capi
tal amounting to 25.8 percent between 1995 and 2001. None of the current off-
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imported food given that Mongolia is unlikely to develop econo
mically fast enough for it to obtain the required foreign exchange
(most of Mongolia’s trading partners are unwilling to take tugriks)
to feed a loose population in the millions?
Below we look carefully first at Mongolia’s traditional pastoralism, as it has developed over the centuries, in the more than 800
years since the Mongols first achieved nationhood, and at its dist
ant Eurasian roots. Particular attention will be paid to pastoraUsm
as a strategy for producing food and as a social system to apply

Mongolian social capital to producing food. Next, we will look at

the threats that exi'st to the pastoral way of life today and the ways
in which it is changing, adversely, in response to these threats. In
the end, if globalization is going to be of much benefit to Mongol
ia, it must not be at the expense of its traditional way of life that
still employs a majority of Mongols and it must not destroy Mong
olia’s food production base in the process. To be sure, a new
Mongolia, one based in mineral extraction and industrialization,
with better infrastructure, the current focus of foreign aid, is emicial population figures takes into account the floating population estimated at
between 70,000, a low estimate, and 200,000. Nearly a third of Ulaanbaatar’s
population is comprised of children under 16 and there are large numbers of
street children, at least 3500 of them in 2001, and other derelicts living in the
sewer system, at least some 10,000 homeless people in aU. Some 70 percent of
the total population lives in the city’s ^er districts, which lack rudiments such as
mnning water and sewage systems and where most of the available electricity
there is illegally tapped. It is estimated that 27-38 percent of the capital’s ablebodied population lacks permanent employment. Although Ulaanbaatar now
accounts for only about one-third of Mongolia’s total population, it accounted
for 47.5 percent of all Mongolian crime in 2002, pointing up the social prob
lems of the capital {EDN, 9 April 2001; 28 March 2001; 13 December 2002; 8
January^ 2003; 20 January 2003; 9 April 2003; 12 December 2003; UBPost, 6 De
cember 2004). Ulaanbaatar is Mongolia’s largest market for food products. In
2002, its population consumed 98.2 kg of meat per capita, along with 51.2 kg of
rmlk and dairy' products, some 138.3 kg of flour, 0.5 kg of butter and oil, 21.2
kg of granulated sugar, 38.7 kg of potatoes, 17 kg of vegetables, 0.5 kg of fish,
17.1 kg of rice, 12.8 kg of fmits and berries, 24.1 kg of eggs, and 9 kg of vege
table oil (EDN, 16 May 2002). According to another estimate, Ulaanbaatar in
mid-2002 had an annual requirement of 59,000 tons of meat and meat products,
147,800 tons of dairy products, 5.1 thousand tons of cream, and 70,900 eggs.
By 2010 the figures are expected to be 82,800 tons of meat, 175,500 tons of
rmlk, 52,200 tons of flour. Altogether, demand was expected to increase 1.2
times by 2005 and 1.5 times by 2010 (EDN, 9 April 2001; 31 July 2002).
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erging. But this new Mongolia wiU need substantial help from ab
road, help often with strings attached, for decades to come, just to
function. There is the question as to whether or not this new
Mongolia will come into being fast enough to offset the losses of
production and social capital in the pastoral sector. Mongolia will
remain dependent on it for the foreseeable fumre if its people are
going to eat and if a growing population is going to find adequate
employment. We conclude that perhaps another approach will be
needed, one protecting the old Mongolia while the new develops.

THE MONGOLIAN BACKDROP
Mongolia is a large country (1,565,000 km^ or about a fifth the
size of the United States), with a relatively small population estim
ated by the CIA World Factbook at 2,791,292 in July 2005. This is
about 1.78 persons per km^. The population is predominately
young, with a median age estimated at 24.28 in 2005 and is grow
ing at an estimated rate of 1.45 percent per annum. This is a consi
derable drop over earlier years. Literacy is high, nearly 98 percent
in 2002 (CIA World FactbooM), although, given the collapse of
much of Mongolia’s social infrastructure, including education,
there is probably reason to doubt this figure and it has almost cer
tainly fallen since. There are substantial mineral resources of every
kind, most importantly copper and gold but also some petroleum,
but Mongolia’s infrastructure, particularly its transportation system,
is too underdeveloped to maximize profitability. Mongolia’s princ
ipal trading partners are Russia and China, with the United States
an increasingly important economic participant, taking 23.2 per
cent of Mongolia’s exports in 2003 although contributing few of
Mongolia’s imports in that year, only 2.9 percent (Statistikiin
Fmkhtgel 2003). The country remains relatively poor with a GDP
of an estimated $5,332 billion in 2004, about $1,900 per capita
(CIA World FactbooH)^ Mongolia has one of the highest debt bur-*
* Year 2004 GDP was said to be an increase of 10.6 percent over 2003 when
GDP was up 5.5 percent over the previous year (MongoUa, Mineral Resources
and Petroleum Authority, 2005). Internal estimates of per capital GDP tend to
be considerably lower and are calculated on a different basis. See, for example,
EDN, 30 December 2002.
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den ratios in the world. ^ The country requires a steady flow of
loans and subsidies to survive as a nation, although much of this is
being invested productively (Jam’s Sentinel, 2004). The most signifi
cant is infrastrucmre development, for example, including the Mil
lennium Road Project (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004), to drastically improve
a transportation system that has been good only around the capital,
with a northern connection to Russia and a southern one to China,
and in a few other favored areas.
A large part of Mongolia’s population, about 42% in 2003
(CL4 World FactbooH), is directly involved in pastoralism to some
degree or another, and thus full time in some form of food prod
uction. * Mongolia’s pastoralism has its roots in the distant past
and has been the subject of much study pointing up the consider
able variety of the activities involved (BueU, Anderson, and Perry,
2000; Bold, 2001). In general terms, for much of the last 3000
years almost the entire steppe zone of Eurasia, not just a few lim
ited parts of it as today, was occupied by pastoral nomads. They
lived in a world apart, by their own rules, and according to their
own principles. Only the coming of the railways in the nineteenth
century definitively altered this fact by making an effective military
conquest and foreign occupation possible for the first time, and
^ In 2001, Mongolia’s foreign debt equaled 90 percent of its GDP (EDN, 8
February 2002).
® At the end of 2003, Mongolia had 25,427,700 head of livestock, up somewhat
over 2002, with a total decline of more than 8 million head since 1999, the high
water mark of Mongolia’s capitalist pastoralism. There were, by contrast, 25.8
million head in 1990, at the beginning of Mongolia’s transition to the market
place. At the end of 2003 the Mongolian annual animal census showed
1,968,900 horses, 10,756,400 sheep, 10,652,900 goats, 1,792,800 catde and
256,700 camels. Animals added during the year were 7,885,500, an increase
which must be set against any losses and animals slaughtered, 3,707,400 in 2003,
down sharply from previous years, including 8,119,300 in 2000 {Statistikiin
Emkhtgel, 2003). This decline indicates that Mongolian herds are being sustained
only with difficulty and that too many animals may have been slaughtered in the
past to maintain herd viability, currentiy a major area of economic difficulty in
Mongolia. Under normal conditions, some 6.5 to 7.5 million animals are consu
med each year, more if meat exports rise (EDN, 3 January 2002; 2 January 2003;
7 January 2003; 4 March 2003; 13 March 2003; 7 November 2003). At the end
of 2002 there were 243,200 families with animals of some kind, include 175,900
herdsman families, down somewhat over previous years, including 398,800 total
herdsmen (EDN, 29 May 2003).
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bringing with it a mass migration by sedentary farmers in many
areas. The surviving pastoral nomads were in many cases made se
dentary, absorbed or driven back to a few refuges too dry or too
cold to support regular agriculture.
Three key elements make the pastoral nomadic way of life pos
sible, and in the past gave pastoral societies the power to dominate
other, sedentary societies located in their proximity.^ First is the
availability of horses in quality and quantity. The horse has been
and remains the centerpiece of steppe Ufe, culturally and economi
cally. It is what makes both the mobility and extensive herding of
the steppe nomad possible. In a few drier areas it has been supple
mented, but rarely completely replaced, by the camel.
Second have been the herd animals that provide the primary
livelihood of the nomad. Most important is the sheep. Today’s
steppe sheep is relatively small and generally has a poor quality
wool, adequate for felt-making but usually not of much use for
weaving, for which the nomad rarely has the time or interest to
pursue. It has primarily been bred, like other steppe herd animals,
for its ability to withstand difficult conditions. The open steppe is
fiercely hot in the summer and cold in the winter, and the only
regularly available fodder is often scanty natural pasture.
Less numerous, but scarcely less important, has been the goat.
It is a more aggressive user of pasture resources than the sheep,
and thus a useful supplement to less hardy sheep under particul
arly difficult conditions. Cattle remain uncommon since they are
more difficult to maintain, but they were very useful in traditional
times, before the coming of the automobiles and tmcks, used for
the same purpose today. They were then the only means for draw
ing the wooden carts upon which the worldly possessions of the
nomad would be assembled.
Third is the physical paraphernalia of pastoral nomadic life.
They have been developed over long periods of time with the spe
cific requirements of steppe life in mind. A major component is
the traditional nomadic tent, or yurt. It is easily transportable and
yet warm and sturdy, with a framework of open lattice work over
which layers of felt are added, today topped by a water-proof can
vas. Also important are well-adapted clothing, primarily of sheep
^ The following is based on BueU, 2004. See also the updated information in
BueU, forthcoming.
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skin, an efficient harness for horses and cattle, and a great variety
of specialized equipment and tools such as the lasso pole, or urga,
used by the Mongols to catch horses without having to bring them
to the ground.
The pastoralism practiced by the Iranian, Turkic, Mongol, and
other nomadic peoples once and presently inhabiting the steppe
zone has primarily involved a system of annual movement bet
ween low-lying winter pastures and mountain summer pastures,
with many local variations.'” Movements are carefully staged and
planned in advance. Variations have included movement along
rivers, upstream in summer, downstream in winter, and in flat,
purely steppe areas, in a broad circular movement. These move
ments are to prevent exhaustion of local fodder resources by rem
aining in any one general area too long, and also to take advantage
of seasonal resources such as the rich grass that grows in the
mountains during the summer.
Foods" have come primarily from animals herded. Some food
may come from whatever else can be secured during the annual
trek, as long as the additional activities involved are not prejudicial
to herding. Trading is included, and formerly, in less settled times,
raiding. Herd animals provide milk, milk products, and meat,
although during much of the year they are simply too valuable to
slaughter. They are used instead primarily for breeding. Not only
do animals raised for such purposes provide more dairy products,
but yield larger herds in the autumn and early winter. Large
numbers of animals then mean security over the rest of the winter
when herd losses can be quite severe. It also gives the nomad the
ability to cull animals at his choice for meat, when other sources
of food are becoming rarer during the winter, and to manage
herds in response to specific winter conditions. The trick is to
reach the spring with a herd that is not too large for existing
fodder resources, but which is stiU large enough to start the cycle
over again. Meat eating is thus not the raison d’etre of nomadic life,
but is rather part of a specific strategy for Ufe. It is dairy products,
available throughout much of the year, in fresh or preserved form.
For Mongolia these have been classified in Erdenebaatar, 1996.
The discussion here is primarily from BueU, Anderson and Perry, 2000; Buell,
1999; 2002; 2004. On the sacred biology of the Altaic world see also Roux,
1966.
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that are actually the nomad’s most important food source, and not
meat. Excessive meat eating usually occurred in nomadic societies
only in extended contact situations such as after conquests.
Living primarily on dairy products is not a problem for most
Europeans, but is for steppe groups since almost aU are unable to
digest fresh milk. We assume that this was true in the past as well.
Thus dairy products were most commonly consumed by the nom
ads in an easily assimilated fermented form.'^ This was so widely
the practice, in fact, that it came to be considered a characteristic
of the steppe world by sedentary societies. Some even borrowed
some of their terminology for fermented milk products from the
steppe. It is thus no accident that the English word yogurt is a
loan word from Turkish.
Various forms of yogurt are eaten in the steppe world, includ
ing yogurt dried for preservation (modern Turkish kurut). Used to
produce it is primarily sheep’s or goat’s milk, but also cow’s milk
when this uncommon food was available. Horse and camel milk is
technically also available for this purpose, but the preferred app
lication of these milks is to make kumiss {atra^. This was the food
with the highest prestige in early steppe societies and continues to
be so today, albeit under somewhat changed circumstances since
few nomads today are able to own the necessary number of mares
to produce a steady supply. It takes about sixty mares, though
fewer milk camels, to supply one individual with a steady supply
of kumiss during the summer months. This was the only season
when an excess of horse or camel milk was available for kumiss
production. Thus only the rich could enjoy the food in abundance,
although almost any could enjoy at least some, and the rich were
obligated to share. Even the rich rarely, if ever, had enough camels
to supply any significant quantity.
Kumiss is sufficiently alcoholic to intoxicate, but its limited
availability discourages alcoholism from this source. Kumiss is
made in a large kumiss-making bag hung near the doors of tradi
tional yurts. Everyone entering was responsible for giving it a
punch or shake to keep the fermentation going. Once made, kum
iss can be clarified to produce “black” kumiss. This process conc

For an introduction see now Indra, 2003.
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entrates the alcohol slightly by removing the particulate matter but
does not in any sense distill.
Meat, when seasonably available or when a special occasion
arises, is usually eaten fresh. It can also be dried, as the Mongols
of the imperial period (the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) did
to make campaign rations (Middle Mongolian si’usu). AU parts of a
slaughtered animal are consumed, except for the wool, the hooves,
and excrement. The latter should be pressed out of the intestines
so that they too can be used, as noted in one of the sayings of
Cinggis-qan. The preferred cooking method is boiling because it is
believed to capture the animal’s essence or soul. It also helps make
limited supplies of meat go farther, and meets the needs of thirsty
nomads living in dry environments. In the past, meat was also
occasionally roasted, but this practice varied from group to group,
and also dependent on the amount of available meat. Moreover,
unlike broth, roasted meat is more difficult to divide evenly with
among the members of a group. Kebabs, the name of which
points to their Persian origin, were not known among the early
Central Eurasian nomads who seem to have adopted them not un
til the Middle Ages.
In addition to providing meat, slaughtered animals also provide
fat for cooking other foods, although frying has been uncommon.
Not all Central Eurasian nomads have the fat-tailed sheep whose
tail (and mmp) fat has become a staple in many areas, both for use
as a cooking fat and for enriching other foods. Popular among
Turkic nomads to this day is the stuffing of intestines to make a
large sausage. Fat (suet) and blood are essential ingredients. Spe
cial parts of the sheep or goat are considered delicacies and are re
served for special personages. Among some steppe cultures, for
example, the eyes are given to a senior person participating in a
feast. In the past, rules also governed reserving certain parts of a
newly slaughtered animal or game for guests or even for a passer
by, a practice among the early Mongols.’’
“After that, when Dobun-mergen one day when to hunt on Toqocaq Rise, he
encountered Uriangqadai people in the forest. They had killed a three-year-old
deer and were cooking its ribs and intestines. When Dobun-mergen spoke he
said: "Please give me [some meat] as the share of meat due another {nokor sirolqa
ke'ejti'S\" Taking [only] half a breast side of the meat with the lungs, and the
hide, they gave all [the rest of the] three-year-old deer's meat to Dobun-
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As with many other cultures, eating is a community activity
among steppe groups and is governed by rules that are sometimes
rather complex. Similarly complex rules have also governed hosp
itality since ancient times. Among the Kazakhs, the powerful used
to take advantage of these rules in order to eat at the expense of
well-off nomads who were obligated to provide free feasting. List
en to poor Kiregkeng’s lament, as told by the traditional Kazakh
poet Aq-Balkhi Korghanbay:
Much wealth of fortunate Kiregkeng,
just like a boundless lake.
Just Hke at an inlet on a river’s side.
Our whole people has come out to drink.’"^
Supplementing milk products and meat from herd animals with
many gathered plant foods has been the practice since ancient
times, as the Secret History of the Mongols, the earliest Mongolian his
torical work, makes clear. It records how, when Cinggis-qan and
his brothers were abandoned in the steppe by their father’s retai
ners after his death, they were nourished by their mother Ho’eliin
with despised wild plant foods:
The Tayyici'ut elder and young brothers, set out on
trek, leaving behind on the pasture grounds Ho'eliiniijin [Lady Ho'eliin], the widow, and the litde children,
the mother and the children:
Ho'eliin-ujin, being born a wise woman,
when she nourished her litde children,
attaching firmly her hoqta [high Mongolian hat],
tying up her robe tighdy,
she went running upstream and downstream the Onon,
She went collecting the wild apples and the bird cherries,
day and night she nourished their throats.

mergen” (Buell, Anderson and Perry, 2000: 31-32; text in RachewUtz, 1972: 1415).
Tolybekov, 1971: 124.
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Mother Ujin, born with courage,
when she nourished her children favored by ancestral
power \sutar\, taking cypress sticks,
she nourished them digging up garden burner and
cinquefoil roots.
Mother Ujin's
children, nourished with wild garlic and wild onions,
managed to grow up to become qans.
The children of the proper Ujin-mother,
nourished with scarlet lily [bulbs],
became wise, well-behaved children.
The beautiful Ujin's
proper children,
nourished with garlic chives and wild onions,
became ancestral figures with posterities [qojira'ut saji^.
Ending their lives by becoming hero-ancestral figures
\eres sayit\.
Bold and brave ones they would seem to have been
made.
Agreeing with one another to nourish their mother,
stationing their mother on the banks of the Onon,
making bent fish hooks together,
they went fishing with hooks for miserable fish.
Bending a fish hook from a needle,
they were fishing with hooks forjebiige and qadara.
Weaving together nets and weirs,
they were fishing out little fry.
But they nourished to satisfaction their mother.'^
Although the text implies that such foods were eaten only un
der conditions of extreme hardship, recent ethnographic data sug
gest that this practice was acmally much more common. The
modern Mongols know and use for their food scores of wild cere
Buell, Anderson and Perry, 2000; 37-38. Text in Rachewiltz, 1972: 28-29. We are
indebted to Igor de Rachewiltz for help in identifying the plants and animals mentioned
(unpublished letter of 19 October, 1990).
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als, fruits and berries, mushrooms, bulbs, nuts, tubers, roots, and
greens (detailed in BueU, Anderson and Perry, 2000), but we know
that this practice was already recorded by Herodotus in his acc
ount of the steppe peoples of his time and by many later observ
ers as well. It seems to have been a characteristic of pastoral
steppe life from the beginning. Moreover, some of the plant foods
were gathered for their medicinal value as well.
Another major source of food for steppe nomads is game,
although they cannot hunt as freely today as they once did. Ob
servers of the early Mongols and of other steppe peoples repeat
edly noted their great interest in hunting, and not just of large an
imals. Among those mentioned are deer, wild pigs, wild sheep, an
telopes, wolves, foxes, hares, marmots, and even rats and mice.
The list is by no means exhaustive and does not include the large
number of fowl that Marco Polo mentioned as Mongol game.
Some Mongol groups also fished, as did Cinggis-qan and his bro
thers, in order to survive. Some steppe groups even made a spec
ialty of fishing, a fact noticed by an early thirteenth-century Chin
ese observer, the Taoist Li Zhichang.
During the time of the Mongol empire most animals were tak
en individually when in season, but the Mongols also engaged in
massive battue hunts. Several groups, cooperating as they did in
herding, would move in from aU sides, driving all animals before
them to be hunted at close quarters in a closed area. As game bec
ame gradually scarcer, this practice was eventually ended.
Some animals have sacral character and have to be killed in
special ways, although most were simply hunted with bow and
arrow in the old days before guns. In recent times Kazakhs, for
example, try not to shed the blood of wolves, but capture them in
such a way that the animals break their own necks after being rop
ed to a saddle of a moving horse.Among the early Mongols
there also seem to have been taboos associated with particular ani
mals. Some could not be hunted at certain times of the year, while
others, captured in the great battue hunts, were intentionally set
free. Such custom had also the practical value of preserving wild
animal stocks. The modern Kazakh word for a natural reserve,
qoryq, originally designated a sacred area, often where some poten

R. Berdibayev, personal communication, summer, 1991.
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tate was buried, where animals could not be hunted out of respect
for the soul of the diseased.'^
Mongols and others, including the Chinese, believed that cert
ain animals possessed special powers. As a consequence, once
they had established their empires, they made a conspicuous dis
play of eating exotic animals. By so doing they believed that they
absorbed the power of the animal being eaten and thus increased
their own.
Cultivated grain is uncommon almost everywhere on the
steppe. It is rarely grown there, although some modern groups,
including the Mongols, have tried to develop farming in part to
provide for what is now a large urban population. During the era
of the Mongolian empire, the conquerors sought to introduce a
more regular cultivation by using captive farmers specially settled
in Mongolia for that purpose, but because the same environmental
constraints affecting growing grain in the steppe also affected such
farming, these efforts were soon discontinued. Migrant farmers,
usually Chinese, have also grown grain in areas adjacent to the
Mongolian steppe and sometimes, when conditions were favor
able and taking great environmental risks, actually in the steppe it
self Nonetheless, some traditional steppe groups do plant crops
in the spring on their winter pasmres, then leave them to go on
their trek, and gather the harvest when they remrn in the autumn.
Millet is specifically mentioned as being grown this way among the
early Mongols. The anthropological theorist Alfred L. Kroeber
characterized the Mongols as a “half-culture” since they were sup
posedly dependent upon sedentary grain to survive, but this was
never acmaUy the case.’® The traditional diet, in all its aspects, pro
vided a more than adequate basis for maintaining Hfe. When
steppe peoples consume grain, they generally do so by choice, not
by necessity, except in those areas such as Inner Mongolia where a
dominant majority forces its foods and food practices on the min

The Mongols also have a tradition of respect for the animals they herd and an
unwilhngness to overuse what nature provides in general terms. Mongol values
in these areas are in strict contrast to Christian approach, the basis of most
externally imposed development, which places man in control of nature with no
questions asked in the event of overuse or waste.
For a discussion of Kroeber and his views see Harris, 1984: 319ff and passim.
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ority or restricts traditional sources of food so the steppe groups
involved have no choice but to eat non-steppe foods.
The system described above has continued for the Mongols
more or less down to the present day except that modern Mong
olia has acquired a large, urban, and sedentary sector, along with
manufacturing, mining and mineral extraction and other industries.
Today, the traditional pastoral sector is smaller than it was in the
nineteenth century and earlier, but it remains the heart of Mongo
lian national life and livelihood. This is true even if Mongolia’s ag
ricultural sector contributes less, on paper, to Mongolia’s current
GDP than in former times. Since 1900, Mongolian pastoraUsm
has undergone many changes, without any of them having so far
fundamentally altered its nature. During the 1920s and early 1930s,
forced collectivi2ation (Murphy, 1966: 92-130), carried to ext
remes, did threaten the very Mongolian way of life and resulted in
enormous death and destruction, including of livestock, whose
numbers took many years to recover. Nonetheless, despite the ex
cesses of the era of forced collectivization, the traditional herds
man was not much disturbed during Mongolia’s main Soviet peri
od beginning in the late 1930s. There had been, at first, much op
position to outside control, even a major revolt in response to lef
tist excesses, but by the 1940s conditions had quieted. Russia, nee
ding Mongolian food and other resources during the second world
war, deemphasized the idealistic collectivization of traditional
Mongolia (Murphy, 1966: 131-146). As a result, the cooperatives
that finally emerged, the negdel, were often clan controlled and diff
ered little from earlier pastoral systems (Saunders, 1996: 45-46). By
1959, 70% of the pastoral land was in the hands of such coopera
tives (Saunders, loc.cit). Other Mongolian land was controlled by
state farms (Saunders, 1996: 105-106), in which members were
employees, including a carefully supported grain production sys
tem that worked relatively well since it was fostered by the gov
ernment and by the Soviet Union.
The final system that emerged in the People’s Republic was
thus very much a compromise with tradition. Communist institu
tions closely meshed with older kinship-based systems for regulat
ing and coordinating pastorahsm.'^ In the end, the Communists

On how this worked out in general see Humphrey and Sneath, 1999: 68ff.
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did not seriously threaten the traditional ways of doing things. On
ly specific institutions such as educational, health, and veterinary
services were new and were supported by the central government.
These services were provided at the somofi''"^ centers. The Commu
nists were particularly successful in raising the living standards of
the herdsmen, including literacy which is very high in Mongolia.
In fact, it is unusually high for a developing country and could
serve as a basis for further development of a new, industrial and
urbanized Mongolia (see Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999; Sneath, 1999;
2002).
While the Communists, except during the era of Leftist devia
tion (1929-1932), never seriously threatened the Mongolian way of
life, and helped provide a basis for a new way of life to exist in
parallel with the traditional systems, rampant capitalism now does.
In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and Mongolia gradually bec
ame a democracy. Gone were Soviet-era subsidies, leaving Mong
olia scrambling since.^' Also vanished was a system that protected
collective as opposed to individual ownership of resources. For
the last “2200 years of statehood in Mongolia, land has never been
privately owed, but belonged to ...highest body of legislature”
(Tumenbayar). Now even this may change and land privatization,
even pastoral land, has become a real issue.
In 1990, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party finally
lost its monopoly on power after decades of one-party rule, al
though it still remained the single largest party in the Mongolian
parliament or KJiural and thus continued in power. An era of radi
cal experimentation with capitalism and the market place began,
fostered by the international organizations that moved in to rep
lace the Soviet Union as Mongolia’s guarantors. Serious disloca
tions resulted, the effects of which are still being felt today (Rossabi, 2005). The Communists finally lost power in 1996, but reg
ained it in 2000 in a resounding success, only to lose it again in
2004. A coalition now governs, but one Communist president has
now been replaced by another. Unfortunately, the Communists of
today are not the Communists of pre-1991 and are also devoted to
2® Mongolia is divided into aimag, or provinces, somon, equivalent to counties,
and bag, the smallest units in the system. Most local services have been grouped
at the somon centers.
The best account of this era is now Rossabi, 2005: 1-79.
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economic reform. Their position has been complicated by Mong
olia’s depressed state as a debtor, and thus they must follow the
dictates of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
other creditors and investors, and accept restraints imposed after
Mongolia’s first wild experiments with capitalism.
One result has been a general drive for privatization, which has
proven to be the greatest threat ever to Mongolian traditional pastoralism because it is based upon individualistic assumptions that
cannot be applied to a necessarily collectivist pastoralism. Al
though only livestock and equipment once belonging to the old
cooperatives {negdeJ) have so far been privatized, there is pressure
to privatize pastures too (Pocha, 2005). Unfortunately, individually
held pastures, whatever the theory of land ownership behind them,
and restricted movement of herds speU disaster, aU the more so
because Mongolia has serious environmental problems.^^ They are
an issue in and of themselves, but the overuse of pastures that has
resulted from privatization of livestock and a too rapid build-up of
livestock numbers by individuals anxious to maximize their profits,
regardless of the condition the pastures are in, has made them aU
the worse.
Privatization laws were enacted in 1992, so as to accord with
the liberal economic reforms then being carried out by Mongolia’s
But not aU of Mongolia’s environmental problems are due to herding. Mining
has, for example, devastated much Mongolian land and gold mining is a serious
competitor with herding for scarce water resources. See the discussion in Rossabi, 2005: 175ff See also Badarch, Batsukh and Batmunkh, 2003; Pocha, 2004.
In 2000, Mongolia consumed some 443 million m^ of water, equal to 1.5 per
cent of reserves, but water consumption, thanks to gold mining in particular,
may now be up considerably. Mongolia’s biggest water problem is in the Gobi,
a naturally dry region where 60 percent of Mongolian wells are located, to serve
around 200,000 herding households. These are too few wells serving too many
{EDN, 24 March, 2003). Recently, as an indication of the scope of the problem,
the Tuul River, from which most of Ulaanbaatar’s drinking water comes, has
begun to dry up. Falling water levels are primarily due to industrial use and
there is increased water pollution due to the same origin as well (EDN, 15 May,
2002). In 2002, 42.5 percent of Mongolia’s territory was threatened by deserti
fication with moving sands having seized 1.44 million hectares of once produc
tive land over the last thirty years, including much formerly useful pasture land,
70 percent of which have now been affected by sand intrusion (EDN, 20 Dec
ember, 2002). This has lead to increased disputes over those pastures that have
still not been degraded (EDN, 25 December, 2002).
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democratic governments (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004). These reforms were
then seen as necessary to speed economic development and en
hance a sustainable investment in land. They also met demands by
the World Trade Organization and the World Bank as precondi
tions for those organizations to support Mongolia Jane’s Sentinel,
2004). Included as part of this reform effort were two other imp
ortant reform laws, a revised Mongolian Constitution, and a new
general Land Law.^^
The new Mongolian Constitution was the first document in
Mongolian history to enforce land entitlement institutions. The
land is now essentially the property of the state, unless given to a
citizen on the basis of private ownership. Even then, the state ret
ains the power to confiscate land from landowners, who are resp
onsible for the maintenance of land, and to order exchanges of
land with compensation in order to meet certain state needs. The
state may also confiscate land in order to ensure public health, the
prevention of environmental degradation, and for reasons of nati
onal security. The new Constitution was followed by the 1994
Land Law. Mongolia’s land is currently zoned by the Land Law,
which has designated 76% for agriculture and grazing. The Law
has allowed, under the Mongolian Constitution, state owned land
to be leased to Mongolian citizens, businesses, and organizations
for up to sixty years (Tumenbayar).
Privatization endorsing individual, not state, ownership of the
means of production has been considered critical for Mongolia’s
capitalist development, and developmental aid has generally been
formulated on a basis that is antagonistic to any collective owner
ship. Here the dominant influence has been Garret Hardin’s fam
ous “tragedy of the commons” idea:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture
a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herds
man win try to keep as many cattle as possible on the
commons... As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to
maximize his gain.. .The rational herdsman concludes

On Mongolian land reform see also Hanstad and Duncan, 2001. Most of the
relevant documents have now been published by the Mongols in English
translations.
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that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add
another animal to his herd. And another; and another...
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the
tragedy. Each man is locked into a system which com
pels him to increase his herd without limit — in a world
that is limited. Ruin is the destination towards which
all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a society
that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom
in a commons brings ruin to all” (Stavins, 2000: 13)^"*

Though first discussed in 1968, the concept of the “tragedy of
the commons” is still relevant when discussing the overgrazing
problem in Mongolia. The maximization structure offered by capi
talism, for example, with each herdsman striving to raise more and
more animals, has destroyed a key area of Mongolia’s traditional
social capital, the cooperative institutions of Mongolia’s pastoral
way of life which has served as the traditional source of food for
Mongolia. The ending of the old system has led, in essence, to im
peded rights of entitlement to the food provided by livestock. In
the past, if a herdsman wanted to keep many more livestock on
common pastures, he would have had to negotiate with other
users of the same pastures, usually meaning the rest of his clan. By
contrast, in the capitalist system of Mongolia, the control over
access is lost, for “[The] 1994 [Law] makes it impossible to pre
vent free-riding or to exclude outsiders from grazing” (Griffin,
2003c: 68). The huge number of deaths among livestock in recent
years has been one result as the carrying capacities of many past
ures have been exceeded.
The problem, as Fratkin and other critics of Hardin’s idea point
out is that commons are not truly commons. Ideally, in economic
terms, commons are a common good with minimal costs accruing
from their use, since these are spread finely over the maximum
number of users. In fact, most of the world’s commons, particu
larly pastoral lands used traditionally, are not even remotely an
open, common good. There are significant marginal costs associ
2“* In fairness to Hardin, he later modified and moderated his ideas and recog
nized the fact that the problem lay in unregulated commons. Unfortunately, it
was Hardin’s original idea that has had the greatest and most enduring influence.
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ated with their use due to traditional controls and sanctions im
posed on their users and over-users. In fact, if these controls and
sanctions did not exist, the societies having the commons would
mostly likely have themselves ceased to exist long ago. Overuse of
common land would have destroyed the given environments that
have formed the very basis for commons’ use. In fact the only
true commons in an economic sense are probably those created by
the imposition of Hardin’s ideas, where the traditional controls
and sanctions have been done away with in the name of a mis
placed development (see the discussion in Fratkin, 1997) and the
rule of law needed to control the new use of formerly common
lands has not yet emerged. This is precisely the problem in Mong
olia.
Ever since the first emergence of the Mongols as a people with a
history, there have been various mechanisms in place for control
ling the use of pastures.^^ At the one level, the mechanisms have
been political, for example, the assignment of pastures by higher
authorities, including rulers and princes and, in later times, monas
teries, and the control that all higher authorities have exercised
over actual pastoral practices including movement (Bold, 2001;
Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999). At the other, as Roux points out, reli
gious beliefs, principally those involved with the worship of the
spirits of the lands and waters, with sacred mountains and animals,
have restrained pasture use and the use of other environmental
resources. How this worked out in practice is seen in the recent
example of the mgdel. Although older religious ideas became
somewhat submerged while not completely vanishing under the
influence of Communist ideology, the negdel was until the end an
effective means of regulating pastoraUsm within its jurisdiction
and keeping pasture use under strict control. It worked in close
accordance with the dictates of Mongolian society. The negdel was
also an effective marketing mechanism, channeling the products
of pastoralism to the center, where they could be further distribu
ted. As already indicated, it also functioned as the basic Mongolian
unit for social services, including, education, medical and other
treatment, and even modern veterinary support (Fernandez-GimeOn the general topic of the sustainability of pastoralism under Mongolian
conditions see Sheehy, 1999. On pastoralism and livestock breeding see also
Telenged, 1996.
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nez, 1999; see also Bruun, 1999). Although a Communist institu
tion, and associated with a modern world of medicine and educa
tion, in their work the negdel were not all that different from the
religious units that controlled much of Mongolian society before
1911 or, for that matter, formerly existing princely domains. But
now Mongolia has a true commons in every sense of the word,
and such regulatory institutions no longer exist in the name of pri
vatization, and the sanctions coming from below and from above
are no longer sufficiently strong to prevent “tragedy.” The result
has been a paradox: the attempt to avoid the “tragedy of the com
mons” has been its very cause.
The important thing is that the old Communist structures are
gone and the new land laws form the basis of property rights for a
capitalistic society. They may, in the end, improve the Mongolian
way of Ufe under a capitalistic society. Nonetheless, it is still imp
ortant to understand that the privatization provisions of the new
land laws do not recognize the traditional land use of the herders
or the traditional principle of collective or group ownership, since
clans are not technically corporations, i.e. collective units whose
rights are protected in Mongolian law (Tumenbayar). Traditional
herders being the main force behind the land, there is an apparent
disconnect between economic structure encompassing anti-herd
ing practices and a system of social capital which has dealt with
geographic restraints of Mongolia.
Since privatization was introduced, Mongolia’s main source of
agriculture is still livestock. Some 88% of Mongolian agriculmre is
related to pastoraUsm (Griffin, 1997). Unfortunately, as much as
95% of Mongolia’s land is classified by some as highly vulnerable
to desertification, and the size of Mongolia’s deserts grows each
year, which is a visible phenomenon (Tumenbayar), although there
are varied explanations of precisely what is taking place and even
of the actual size of the phenomenon. Although the media and
scholars have generally explained privatization in terms of overgrazing by the herder (Griffin, 1997; 2003c: 33; Leicester; Tumen
bayar), this reason merely scratches the surface. As Griffin has put
it: “The claim of widespread overgrazing is.. .exaggerated.” In fact,
while grazing has increased for some land, it has decreased for
other (Griffin, 2003c: 70), in part due to a decline in distances mi
grated as part of a normal pastoral regimen (Fernandez-Gimenez,
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1999; Sneath, 2002). This is due to the decreased support available
for migration itself and to inexperienced herdsmen, including ma
ny forced out of Mongolia’s swollen cities back to the land, trying
their hands at livestock raising, for good or iU (Sneath, 1999; 2002).
Thus the true issue is the concentration of intensified land use
which has been caused by the structural issues emerging from pri
vatization.
The concentration of pastoralism on limited lands is Mongolia’s
post-Soviet problem. It has been caused primarily by rural decUne
due to the mass migration of herdsmen to the northern areas of
the country, where there are more jobs outside agriculture. Life is
more comfortable there in the larger established settlements with
such amenities as heating systems and thick-walled apartments.
Nonetheless, although many herdsmen are attracted to the north
for reasons of comfort and opportunity, leading to rural disloca
tion and even labor shortages, the main issues with the changes
taking place aU involve the transformation into a free market
system.
Extracting minerals for trade has been the main focus of Mong
olian governments since liberalization,^'’ and has pushed for the
creation of numerous settlements, actually small rural shanty
towns, to appear along the northern border with Russia in order
to transport the minerals to the railways needed for shipping. In
addition, by placing most of its social resources within these sett
lements, the government has unintentionally encouraged the mig
ration of herdsmen to the North. During the Soviet era, resources
were concentrated in local settlements, primarily somon centers, to
encourage some sedentarization that would enhance the control
over the nomads. Since 1991 and the final coUapse of the Soviet
Union, these settlements, because they have relatively more re
sources than other sites, combined with the new ability of herds
men migrate freely, are being taxed to serve the local population in
ways never intended while at the same time they are themselves in
decline and even in the process of disappearance. The migration
north has only been intensified since the new government has all
owed wells to dry up in the Gobi, and veterinary services and intSee, however, the recent summary provided in Badarch, Batsukh and Batmunkh, 2003. Minerals have not always provided the greatest amount of short
term foreign exchange, even if emphasized in terms of capital investment.
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ermediary livestock transport of the past have all but disappeared
outside the larger settlements (Griffin, 2003b: 65-66).
To make matter worse, the Law on Land Fees, passed in 1997,
has placed an additional burden on setdement land. It allows the
exemption from grazing fees and offers a tax exemption of fifty
tugrik^ now worth a few cents, for every' animal produced, thereby
encouraging herders to raise more animals than the land can
maintain. Whereas in 1990, there were only 75,000 herdsman fam
ilies, that figure increased to 187,000 in 2000. This is a more than
a 100% increase of users of a land that has already been stressed
by past increases in numbers of herders. However, as Tumenbayar
observes, “new entrants to the herding communities are const
rained in gaining access to pastures, as they tend to have much less
developed kinship and other social networks and have greater
tendency to remain sedentary”. This has meant more pastures clo
ser to the settlements with a resulting increase in pasture damage
and desertification. This dire scenario was created by the improper
use of pastures that is slowly destroying the most important means
of access to food in Mongolia.
While the rural lands are facing their own problems, cities have
also begun to reflect the negative effects of the Land Law. Ulaanbaatar, the capital, is the only true modern city in contemporaiy'
Mongolia and may soon or already have a population exceeding
one million. In and around the city the importance of livestock
and the degradation of land is evident. According to Tumenbayar,
in 1990 Ulaanbaatar contained only 76,000 private livestock, but
this figure increased to 301,000 in 1998.^^ The increase of land use
involved has led to lands next to the city, as is the case with the
settlements, becoming overgrazed. To make matters worse, the
dust blown up from the degraded pastures has been added to the
soot and smoke emanating from cooking stoves that are using
A somewhat lower figure of 233,000 is given for the end of 2002 but this is
Ukely an underestimate {EDN, 8 January, 2003; 10 April, 2003). This trend may
accelerate in the future since it is now official policy to promote an intensified
animal husbandry close to the large population centers, in part because of the
problem of marketing distantiy produced food and other agricultural products.
Among those enunciating this policy was former Prime Minister N. Enkhbayar,
See EDN, 11 March, 2002; 19 May, 2003; BBC (Asian-Pacific, 24 October,
2003).
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dung, wood and coal, making Ulaanbaatar one of the most pollu
ted cities in the world (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004).
While desertification and pasture degradation have endangered
the future development of food production, the movement of
people to herding or city jobs has also diverted resources from
grain farming, thereby deepening food insecurity (Tumenbayar;
Sneath, 2002). In the 1950s, the government began to form large
to midsized grain farms which increased domestic grain product
ion and thereby lessened the need for imported grain. Now, in ac
cordance with the Land Law, the land has been fragmented into
small units whose owners do not have the capital to properly
maintain their fields which, according to Tumenbayar, have great
ly deteriorated. As a result, Mongolia’s grain production feU from
718,000 tons in 1990 to 195,000 tons in 1998 (Sneath, 2002; 196)
all the way down to 106,900 tons in 2002 (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004), be
fore slightly improving to 165,000 tons in 2003 (Statistikijn SSmkhtgel, 2003)^* The result of this calamitous downturn has been that
Mongolia now has to import grain, something it did not do regu
larly under Soviet sponsorship (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004; Griffin, 1997).
Mongolia suffers as a result, since funds are lacking to import aU
the grain needed. Some 139,300 tons of wheat were imported in
2002, and although this figure feU to only 61,500 tons in 2003 (Statistikiin Emkhtgel, 2003), not all of the decline can be accounted for
by increased Mongolian production. In any case, importation of
flour has remained particularly high, 75,200 tons in 2003, comp
ared to 96,900 tons in 2002 (Statistikiin Emkhtgel, 2003).^^ Demand
In addition, 65,446 tons of potatoes and 24,596 tons of vegetables were har
vested in 2002, figures weU below Mongolia’s minimal needs. Not only were
harvests smaller in that year, but 2 miUion head of livestock were also lost
(EDN, 15 January, 2003). In 2003, in addition to the nearly 165,000 tons of
wheat, 78,000 tons of potatoes and 58,100 tons of vegetables and about 3,000
tons of other grain crops were harvested. Of the wheat, 29,400 tons was to be
reserved for 2004 seed. This is a high figure. The Mongolian harvest for 2003
was said to meet approximately 30 percent of its flour needs, 52 percent of its
potato needs, and 31 percent of its vegetable needs (EDN, 27 August, 2003; 19
November, 2003).
Other food imports by Mongolian in 2003, that is, beside wheat and flour,
included 100 tons of vegetable oil, 3,000 tons of margarine, and 19,000 tons of
sugar, 5,100 tons of candy, 5,200 tons of “flavored flour products,” 100 tons of
canned fruits and nuts, 14,800 tons of rice, 1,900 tons of tea, 23,300 tons of
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for both grain and flour will continue to grow rapidly since a
growing urban population generally lacks the production where
withal to supplement limited grain foods with those from an act
ive pastoraUsm. That is to say, Mongolia’s position in these areas
will only grow worse with each passing year.
Although Mongolia continues to export food, like beef to the
former Soviet Union (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004), as a result of various
pastoral dislocations described in the preceding paragraphs, the
country has nonetheless gained recognition in the media as being a
center of hunger. Headlines such as “Mongolia Herdsmen Face
Starvation” (BBC News, 14 March, 2000), “Alarm over Food Cri
sis” (BBC News, 28 June, 2000), “Mongolia’s People, Tradition
Threatened by Disastrous Winter” (Leicester) are common in art
icles relating to hunger in Mongolia, that often describe its vast
emptiness and the dangers encountered by Mongolia’s sparse in
habitants. To be sure, these headlines are connected with the sev
ere d^ud conditions of the early part of this decade as animals were
unable to feed due to blizzard conditions or severe icing but the
main reason why millions of animals died in single years was a too
rapid increase of herds under conditions of privatization of own
ership that encouraged the raising of too many animals beyond the
capacities of the pastures and the pastoral infrastructure, which
continues to be in decline, to support them.
Some of the metaphor used in such press reports might lead the
reader into believing that the source of hunger is Malthusian:
Mongolia simply has too few resources to maintain its current po
pulation, thus the hunger, but this interpretation gives an entirely
false impression. The true issue is the structural changes that have
taken place in Mongolia since the end of Mongolia’s Soviet period
in 1991, when subsidies and protectionism began to disappear and
the pastoral infrastructure and marketing mechanism began to
crash (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004; Sneath, 1999; 2002; Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999).
fresh fruit, 5 million liters of soft drinks, and 17.2 million liters of alcoholic bev
erages, of soft drinks, commodities not usually produced in Mongolia, but also
55,100 tons of butter, a very high figure, and up substantially over the previous
year, 40,200 additional tons of potatoes, 7,100 tons of onions and garlic, which
can be produced locally, and 6,200 tons of millet, which also can be produced
locally.
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Mongolia has since the beginning of recorded history been a
country dedicated to pastoralism, and has not experienced real
hunger as a nation until the last decade. Against Malthusian theory,
Mongolia’s population has begun to increase far more slowly than
in the recent past, and growth has been quite moderate during the
present occurrence of hunger. In fact, Mongolia’s period of rapid
population growth, marking a recover}' from a low point in the
twentieth centur}', was under the Communists and during that
period living standards actually improved. There was no hunger.
Since then the rate of population increase has dropped from 2.9%
in 1980 to 1.4% in 2000 (Griffin, 2003a: 6). It has, since leveled
off (Jane’s Sentinel, 2004) at about that plateau, barely a replacement
rate when the aging of the Mongolian population is taken into acc
ount and likely future growth rates if present trends continue.^®
The statistics thus show a 51.7% decrease in the true population
growth rate (Griffin, 2003a: 5). Therefore, Malthusian theory sim
ply does not explain Mongolia’s problems since population press
ure is now minimal in a country that was sparsely populated to be
gin with.
To be sure, one could strengthen the Malthusian argument by
pointing to environmental problems, principally the continued ex
pansion of Mongolia’s deserts and ground contamination caused
by gold and other mining activities, that have reduced the total
amount of Mongolian pasture. Moreover, the climate may be wor
sening, with the frequent dq;ud having been particularly severe in
recent years (BBC News, 14 March, 2000; Jane’s Sentinel, 2004).
MTiile each of these environmental problems has contributed to
hunger in Mongolia, the main reason why Mongolia has faced real
hunger in the last decade or so, is its turn to a free-market econo
my, a change that has had a strong adverse impact not only upon
Mongolian pastoralism, but even on its limited grain agriculture.

The reasons for the decline in the population growth rate are many. Econo
mic conditions today are certainly factors but the fact that Mongolia is becom
ing increasingly urban and urban populations are more hkely to restrain births is
clearly a factor too. The death rate will rise as the population ages further dec
reasing the growth rate if fertility remains the same.
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THE FORGOTTEN WAY OF LIFE
Mongolia’s shift to a free market has not only dislocated Mong
olian society in fundamental ways, physically shifting its popula
tion and resources around and dislocating Unks, but it is also slow
ly undermining Mongolia’s traditional modes of production. These
are urgently needed if Mongolia is to produce enough food under
sharply limiting environmental conditions.
Over the centuries Mongols have developed an intricate web, a
key part of their traditional social capital, for food access. Like
other Eurasian pastoralists, most Mongols have remained almost
totally dependent on their livestock. Their traditional foods have
been largely and nearly exclusively what Mongol pastoralists can
gain and consume from animals, usually without seriously deplet
ing their herds. In practical terms, this has meant a variety of fer
mented dairy products some of which, when dried, last virtually
forever, thus allowing dairy products to be stored indefinitely.^'
Other foods, including rare meat, grains and grain foods consum
ed by preference to break the monotony of a primarily dzity food
diet, play only a minor role.^^ The Mongolian diet is not a rich nor
certainly a varied one but it is more than adequate, and it is ideally
suited to local conditions and given environmental resources. In
thousands of years, no one has much improved on it.
Aligned with this diet, and in part to sustain its production,
Mongolia has pursued its highly complex pastoral support system,
directly involving everyone in the community. This system is now
breaking down. In the past, the system nearly always involved
movement in regular cycles, often over quite large distances, as reFresh milk production was 3.1 million liters during the first eight months of
2003, but Mongols rarely consume dairy products fresh. See EDN, 7 Novem
ber, 2003.
The Mongols do now fish on a large scale, licenses being issued for a catch of
21,000 tons in 2003. Much of this appears to be exported {EDN, 12 May, 2003).
Gathering of plant foods also continues, including buckthorn fruits, which are
also cultivated, and probably pine nuts and other nuts, although most of those
collected may be exported {EDN, 19 August, 2003; 4 December, 2003). Also a
source of supplemental food for the Mongols is hunting. Some 58,593 marmots
were taken in 2003, along with far smaller numbers of larger animals, although
most of these go to foreign hunters who pay for the privilege of hunting in
Mongolia {EDN, 3 December, 2003).
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quired by sustainability, usually by small groups of herdsmen mov
ing and camping along with their livestock. In the Soviet period,
herding families were grouped into larger units during the colder
months of the year, when they most often camped next to towns
which provided education to their young and social services to
ever}fone. This was part of the negdel system (see Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999).
Thus during the winter and spring herding families were usually
established at a permanent camping site, situated at a low altitude
in order to find more protected shelter for livestock birth in the
early spring. The true nomadic life, by contrast, was expressed du
ring summer and aummn when the herdsmen created small noma
dic camps, usually at higher altitudes, called hot ail. They included
two to eight families on average. Depending on the specific natur
al circumstances of their local environments — mountain pasture
{hangai}, semi-desert (gobi), desert {els), dry plains, river valleys, etc.
— the hot ail could separate for part of the summer-autumn herd
ing season. The ail formed the foundation for societal communal
land use, for within this family unit the distribution of resources,
most significantly pasture land and water wells, took place (Buell,
Anderson, and Perry, 2000: 30-34; Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999).
This remains the case even today, although the structure of fami
lies has often changed, in part due to the return of unemployed re
latives from the city, and movement is usually now only over short
distances.
Under Mongolian conditions, resources are usually too limited
for groups to compete with one another, although this is another
area of traditional Mongolian life that is now changing rapidly. In
the past, usage was carefully coordinated over a larger region lead
ing hot ail to form larger social networks called neg goliinhon or neg
nutgiinhan. They were co-users of a pastoral environment and est
ablished the right to land use for all participating herdsmen (Tumenbayar). Generally speaking, these larger social networks were
clan-based (Buell, Anderson and Perry, 2000: 30-34). There were
no exclusive, private rights of individual herdsmen over land use.^^
The land remained a communal property and the individual herds
man had to be connected to a group, for example through kinship.

This facet of pastoral society is discussed in particular detail in Tolybekov.
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in order to gain access to the land and its pastoral resources. Since
higher-level groups coordinated pasture land use, a herdsman was
prohibited from grazing without the approval of the neggoliinhon or
neg nutgiinhan. If conflicts over land issues did occur, oral agree
ments were made to resolve the issue, intermediated, if necessary,
by clan or group elders or, in more recent times, by local officials
at the somon or even aimag level (Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999; Bold,
2001). The negdel usually coincided with the somon, although having
its own governing body.
This is the part of pastoralism in Mongolia that has now more
or less coUapsed, with devastating results. Herding units still exist,
but they are now Utde coordinated beyond a basic level with sev
ere negative consequences for the environment and herding in ge
neral. By contrast with today, traditional Mongolian society was
sensitive to the limitations of the land, and the ways in which tra
ditional herdsmen have used it have involved a complex system of
sustainable exploitation by careful regulation of the usage of space
in time. In addition, the Mongols have obviously developed a diet
that works for them and a pastoral system to support it. This sys
tem, by tradition, entitled everyone within a group or kinship unit
to access to pasture in some form or the other, even when prima
rily herding someone else’s animals, and to pastoralism’s main
product, food, which by Mongolian tradition had to be shared.’"*
In short, traditional Mongolian society offered a highly devel
oped system of social capital, now being eroded. It allowed for
subsistence in harsh terrain through providing the essentials of life:
housing (covered by felt made from sheep’s wool), clothing (felt
and skins), water (cooperatively controlled wells and other sources,
food and, most important, the right not to go hungry. This is in
addition to social capital in the form of mutual assistance provided
in herding and other forms of social networking promoting sur
vival and effective pastoralism.

^'^Contributing to the sharing of food in Mongolian society is its nature. A Mon
golian sheep, usually small, when slaughtered provides just about enough meat
to feed a family. Traditionally, any left over meat is given to neighbors ensuring
distribution across families (Buell, Anderson, and Perry, 2000: 30-34). It will not
keep otherwise. The same has been tme for many seasonal foods such as ku
miss, available for only a relatively short time and thus to be shared.
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MARKETING ISSUES
Most of this is now gone. Much of the higher organization of
Mongolian society has now vanished and even the ways in which
pastoralism is done have changed (Sneath, 1999; 2002; FernandezGimenez, 1999). Although land remains, in theory, common, live
stock are not in any way, as was once the practice. AU have been
divided up after the demise of the negdel, meaning that present
herds are individually owned and pastured.
There are two main problems with this. One is that movements
are now over a shorter distance, in part because the support net
work that the negdel once provided in assisting movements no lon
ger exists. Even when individuals have taken over vehicles once
belonging to the negdel they often cannot maintain them, since gas
oline and diesel fuel have become far more expensive, when avai
lable at all, not to mention spare parts. There is also the problem,
and here lies the “tragedy,” that individuals, in order to maximize
profits, try to keep more animals even if their resources will not
support them. There are also far more herdsmen now, as the un
employed return from local centers and cities, anxious to compete
for their own right to exist (Sneath, 1999; 2002; Fernandez-Gimenez, 1999).
These facts and the reduced movements mean that the negative
impact of the current pastoralism on the environment is now far
greater than before. Some pastures are being used to exhaustion,
others barely. Secondly, the negdel was also the means by which lo
cal products were channeled, sometimes through forced requisi
tions, a form of taxation, from the pastoral sector to the center,
particularly Mongolia’s towns and cities. Now the forces of the
market place apply but the market does not really work.^^ Most
products produced locally remain local, resulting in a shortage of

This is not only true for food marketing. Mongolia’s wool and skin process
ing industries were only operating at a 5-40 percent capacity at the beginning of
2003 due of a shortage of basic raw materials and uncontrolled exports, mean
ing the raw materials were being trucked over the border in a raw state to meet
ad hoc demands by-passing local processors {EDN, 23 January 2003). Also an
indication of marketing dislocation to some degree, although the need for for
eign exchange is important too, is Mongolia’s continuing exportation of meat,
about 20,000 tons annual, nearly all of it to Russia {EDN, 24 January 2003).
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food products at the national level. Instead of a plethora of dairy
products, which should have been the logical result of more
herdsmen and more animals, there is now a shortage and the pres
ent system, in part due to large-scale losses of livestock on acc
ount of concentrated overuse of limited pastures, is far less effi
cient than the old. Environmental pressures have thus increased
but there is no real gain from them, while the prices for those
foods reaching the national market have gone up considerably, as
has everything else.
Thus Mongolia’s enforced worship of the market place has re
sulted to a great degree in a collapse of the market locally. In most
respects, when we also take into consideration the high prices that
people in the pastoral sector must pay for just about anything they
do not produce and consume, government policy has resulted in
deep economic isolation. A dangerous c}'cle has developed in
Mongolia: the country must now import more food, but the cost
of this food is competing with the cost of industrial goods needed
to develop Mongolia so that it can become less dependent upon
its own pastorahsm.^*’ That is to say, inept policy threatens the very
thing that Mongolia needs to survive in the future as well as in the
present (Sneath, 1999; 2002; Fernandex-Gimenez, 1999; see also
Rossabi, 2005).

Aware of this, Mongolia briefly imposed a 15 percent import tariff on impor
ted potatoes, cabbages, beets, carrots and flour between 1 August, 2003 and 1
April, 2004, but such responses only make the problem worse since shortages
remain and prices will rise to match greater import costs {EDN, 28 July, 2003).
To supplement limited locally produced wheat, the United States supplied
24.500 tons in 2003 as a grant (EDN, 31 July, 2003). Japan was to supply anoth
er 20,000 tons in 2003 and a purchase of 40,000 tons from Russia was later un
der consideration. Formerly, wheat was purchased from Kazakhstan but this
has proven far too expensive for the Mongols (EDN, 5 March, 2001; 27 August,
2003). The Mongols currently consume about 240,000 tons of flour a year, ab
out 30 percent of which was to come from domestic production of wheat in
2003 (EDN, 1 October, 2003). Apparently 300,000 tons of high quality wheat
need to be raised to produce this much flour (EDN, 30 October, 2003). None
theless, even if Mongolia produces wheat at this level again, it may stiU import
cheaper Chinese and Russian flour, undermining local production (EDN, 28
November, 2003). The deficit of wheat and flour in Mongolia were estimated at
167.500 tons and 122,400 tons respectively at the end of 2003 (EDN, 31 De
cember, 2003).
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JUDGMENT DAY
We have argued that the social dislocation and resulting hunger
characterizing much of Mongolia today is the result of structural
changes and the inability for the Mongols to adapt themselves to a
newly formed capitalistic society that has emerged since 1990.
Mongolia, in short, simply does not have the right kind of social
capital to respond to new conditions. In fact, when traditional
social capital is applied in the new environment it is often const
rued as corruption and is regarded entirely negatively, as if it were
something out of place. That is to say, the ver}^ traits and interact
ions that make the Mongols so potentially successful in a pastoral
environment is counter-productive in an urban, industrialized env
ironment.’' A new system of appropriate social capital for the new
economic and social environment has yet to emerge, and until it
does traditional values will run largely counter to what is required
for it to be a part of the modern world.
Hence, in Mongolia, a country known for group collaboration in
the form of clan control over resources, particularly pastures (Bu
ell, Anderson, Perry, 2000: 27-35), traditional communalism is not
in sync with the need to develop in a capitalistic society, with indi
viduals functioning through self-interest rather than through
group decision. Yet it is group decision that has been the basis of
Mongolia’s past success in feeding its people with limited geog
raphic resources and has prevented, through group censure, the
“tragedy of the commons” arising through overuse of fragile past
ure resources. In short, liberalization has undermined much social
stability and curtailed access to food, a social necessity, by stress
ing individual over social needs. It leaves people ill fitted to funct
ion under new conditions because of a lack of social capital and to
develop and sustain an economic system that is able to feed the
hungtyr and sustain them socially.
In addition, hunger produced by scarcity is deepened by the
poverty and inequality prevalent in aU capitalistic societies. In the
traditional pastoral system, inequality was low, but privatization of
One example is the practice of living in yurts and trying to herd animals right
in the city. This practice has meant not only a lower standard of living for the
urban migrant but also a highly polluted urban environment. Catde wandering
free along the main streets does not work very well in a large city, alas.
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the once communal livestock has created vast inequalities, with
the herders having the most experience and political power
receiving most of the livestock. In 1992, the top 5% of the largest
herders held 200 animals, while the bottom 42%, comprised of fe
male-headed households and young herders, had on average thir
ty-one animals (Griffin, 2003b: 18). Since then the situation has
further deteriorated, not so much because the number of animals
per household has fallen, but primarily because the cost of every
thing else has skyrocketed.^^ In a society that still bases most food
access through livestock, the inequality inherent in capitalism has
certainly destroyed the food security for the common Mongol.
The ultimate question is whether or not it will also destroy Mong
olian society as a whole.

CONCLUSION: A RACE AGAINST TIME
What should Mongolia do? The answer is to pay heed to the
past while planning for the future. Owen Lattimore many years
ago pointed out that the most efficient use of Mongolia’s territory
is for pastoral nomadism, and that for ecological reasons grain ag
riculture will never take root on more than a limited or temporary
basis (Lattimore, 1962). To feed themselves from their pastoralism,
Mongols have had to develop a highly complex system of seasonal
land use, which has proved to be the most productive possible
land use, given the country’s geographical conditions. The drive
towards privatization, stressing individual rather than group own
ership of land, is slowly destroying the traditional system of land
use and with it food production, thereby creating substantial social
dislocation and hunger in Mongolia. Mongolia is rich in mineral
resources, and profits from these minerals could be used to suppIn 2002, while 87.5 percent of all families of herds owned 200 or so animals,
the lowest standard for survival was then set at 390 head and those families ha
ving the average of 200 or so were considered potentially poor, although some
were involved in other occupations as well as herding. Only 2.5 percent of aU
herding households were then considered well off and 47.8 percent were offici
ally poor (EDN, 11 August, 2003). At the end of 2001, 639 families had 10001499 head, thirty-eight had 1500-2000, and thirty-one had more than 2000
{EDN, 29 January, 2002).
See also examples and information in Rossabi, 2005: 132ff and passim.
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lement Mongolia’s existing food production, even if it declines
further. The question, however, is whether these resources will be
developed quickly enough, given Mongolia’s infrastructure prob
lems, to compensate for a decline in domestic food production. If
they are not developed rapidly enough, hunger may turn into star
vation in wide areas of Mongolia. This is the process that Mongo
lia’s government has to deal with as it seeks to develop privatiza
tion further in response to the demands of the capitalistic world
market. We are not advocating in this paper that Mongolia should
abandon its path of modernization, but simply to moderate it.
Nothing less than Mongolia’s national survival is at stake in a
world in which little Mongolia is being stared at intensely by two
giants, Russia and China.
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Globalization’s Impact on Mongolian
Identity Issues and the Image of Chinggis
Khan
Alicia J. Campi

PART I: The Mongols, this previously unheard-of nation that unexpectedly
emerged to terrorize the whole world for two hundred years, disappeared again
into obscurity with the advent of firearms. Even so, the name Mongol became
one forever familiar to humankind, and the entire stretch of the thirteenth
through the fifteenth centuries has come to be known as the Mongol era.'
PART II; The historic science was the science, which has been badly affect
ed, and the people of Mongolia bid farewell to their history and learned by
heart the bistort' with distortion but fuU of ideolog}'. Because of this, the Mong
olians started to forget their religious rituals, customs and traditions and the pa
triotic feelings of Mongolians turned to the side of perishing as the internation
alism was put above aU.^
PART III: For decades, Mongolia had subordinated national identity to So
viet priorities__Now, they were set adrift in a sea of uncertainty, and Mongol
ians were determined to define themselves as a nation and as a people. The new
freedom was an opportunity as well as a crisis."

As the three above quotations indicate, identity issues for the
Mongolian peoples have always been complicated. In our increas
ingly interconnected, media-driven world culture, nations with

Baabar, Histoij ofMongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Monsudar Publishing, 1999), 4.
“The Political Report of the First Congress of the Mongolian Social-Demo
cratic Party” (March 31, 1990), 14.
" Tsedendamdyn Batbayar, Mongolia’s Foreign Folicy in the 1990s: New Identity and
New Challenges (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 8.
2
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small populations and histories full of difficulties in protecting na
tional sovereignty, are both assaulted and supported by the effects
of globalization. For Mongolia, the challenge of forging a new nat
ional identity under such circumstances is especially evident in
2006, when all eyes turn to Mongolia’s 800* anniversary of state
hood.
This anniversary commemorates the 1206 kuriltai that confirm
ed the ascendancy of Temujin over the nomadic tribal confedera
tions by naming him khan. At this momentous 1206 assembly, Te
mujin took the sacred name of Chinggis, reorganized his army and
administration, and chose the name Mongol (aka Monggot) for both
the united tribal entity {undes, nationality) and associated geopoli
tical territory {ulus, nation). The mystery of the meaning of the
word Monggol fittingly embodies the mystery surrounding exactly
who and what it represented. This same ambiguity has continued
through the centuries as the Mongol empire rose and waned, as
the Mongol people united and split, and challenges the nation
even in this globalized era.
Today Mongolia’s globalization specialists are spending much
time identifying priority sectors and development objectives. For
example. Dr. L. Nyamtseren has noted that “for any country it is
inevitable to be involved in the global process of integration.
Mongolia needs to analyse carefully an [sic] international econo
mic global trends, find out where exactly Mongolia stands at this
moment, how positively or negatively the trend affects Mongolian
economy and to identify its own developmental concept, strategy^
and poUcy.”'* However, in order to identify developmental strate
gies, economists and policy planners—Mongolian and foreign alike
—first must step back and look at the issues of what is democratic
Mongolia’s identity should be and how integration into the global
ized marketplace community will strengthen and preserve this id
entity.

L. Nyamtseren, “Main Developmental Pattern of Mongolia in the Edge of the
21 Centur)',” 'Renovation of Mongolia on the Eve of the XXI Century and Future Deve
lopment Patterns (Ulaanhaatar: Mongolian Development Research Center, 2000,
122-143), 140.
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Although this paper will concentrate on examining the impact
of globalization on establishing a modern Mongolian identity in
the twenty-first century, the identity issue must first be placed
within the historical context of discussion of the nature of earlier
Mongolian identities. This naturally leads to an examination of the
role of Mongolia’s founding father, Chinggis Khan, in defining
previous and present Mongolian identity issues.

CHINGGIS KHAN LINEAGE AND CULT IN THE POSTMONGOL EMPIRE PERIOD
L. Munkh-Erdene at Hokkaido University, who has researched
Mongolian nationalism in the late nineteenth century to mid-1920s
prior to the establishment of socialism, maintains that the prime
traditional basis for Mongol statehood was the Borjigid lineage
{Mongol ovogton) which perpetuated “the Mongol ulus as an historical
community.”’ He cites native Mongol chronicles, which glorified
Chinggis Khan and his descendants as having divine origin and
the Mongol people (Blue Mongol) as the heart of an empire made
up of other inferior peoples. To keep the bloodlines pure, inter
marriage with the conquered Chinese people during the Yuan dyn
asty was prohibited. Thus, Chinggis Khan and his lineage were the
cement connecting the various geographically dispersed Mongol
peoples during the empire period.
In later centuries, after the breakup of the Mongol empire, line
age ties were strengthened by the fact that Chinggis Khan himself
became the object of a special religious cult, centered on the Ordos region of China where a sanctuary existed housing his suppo
sed reUcs.^ In Mongolia proper, the importance of the Borjigid Un-

5 Lkhamsuren Munkh-Erdene, “Inquiry to Mongolian Nationalism Through
Terms and Concepts, From Late Nineteenth Century' to Mid-1920s” (Sapporo,
Japan: unpublished paper, 2004), 2.
^ John Man, Genghis Khan, Ufe, Death, and Kesurrection (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 290-298, summarizing Rihu Su, “The
Chinggis Khan Mausoleum and its Guardian Tribe” (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania dissertation, 2000) and the April 1935 visit described in Owen
Y.2XtxmoK, MongolJourneys (London-. Doubleday, 1941).

70

Alicia J. Campi

cage continued through the Manchu Qing period (1644-1911),
buttressed by a close tie to the Buddhist Church. According to
Mongolian political theory, the Borjigid line was a co-ruler of the
Qing Empire through alliance with, not conquest by, the Manchu
royal line. Initially, Mongols during the Qing period had a policy
prohibiting intermarriage with the conquered Han Chinese.
Munkh-Erdene believes that when this policy finally was changed
by the Manchu court in the nineteenth centur)^, the Mongolian
nobles in Urga were motivated to lead a revolution against the
Qing and its successor, the Republic of China, to preserve the pu
rity of the Mongol lineage (‘one origin, one blood’). Munkh-Erde
ne notes that some modern Mongol researchers believe that the
Mongolian noble class did have a well established Mongol ulus and
Mongol ovogton identity, and were seen by the Mongol commoners
[arats and shabi) as exemplifying a verj^ different identity from the
hated Manchu and Chinese officials. For all classes there was a
genuine fear of Chinese cultural and physical assimilation which
would lead to the disappearance of ‘Mongolness’.^
However, Christopher Atwood does not believe the Mongols
before 1911 understood the concept of nationality which is defin
ed by customs, language and ancestry, and differs from citizenship
which is defined by residence with one sovereign government.®
Christopher Kaplonski seems to agree with Atwood because he
suggests that the Mongols did not have a strong sense of ethnicity
prior to the twentieth century, but rather only an identity based on
“a limited locality,” such as a tribe or even specific geographical
location.'’ Both viewpoints are disputed by Munkh-Erdene, who
maintains that during the late Qing period a new Mongol “ideolo
gy included also anti-colonial, anti-assimilation, and anti-Chinese
elements.. .It was not and could not be a Western type of civic

Munkh-Erdene, 2004, 3.
^Christopher Atwood, “Nadonal Questions and National Answers in the Chin
ese Revolution, Or, How Do You Say
in Mongolian?” East Asian Work
ing Paper Series on Eanguage and Politics in Modem China 5 (Bloomington, Indiana:
1994), 37-73.
^ Christopher Kaplonski, “Creating National Identity in Socialist Mongoha,”
Central Asian Survey, 17/1 (1998), 35-37.
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nationalism.”'*^ Yet, Munkh-Erdene does note that perhaps with
the Khiagta Agreement in 1915 there is a distinction in the way
Mongols used undesten (nationality) for Mongols in Mongolia pro
per versus ovogton (all Mongol peoples in general). He also indic
ates that Jamsarano in the late 1920s refers to his ‘Mongolian
tribes’ {undesteri), which signifies both his nationalism and his und
erstanding of nation.
The autonomous government under the Bogdo Khaan, a nat
ive Tibetan but spirimal and political ruler of the Mongol state
which emerged from the collapse of the Qing, is a peculiar period
in Mongolia’s historical consciousness. During these years of tur
moil and occupation by Chinese and then White Russian armies,
Mongols grew in consciousness of nationhood. By this time it is
clear that the Mongols had a definite sense of nationality and were
seeking an independent sovereign nation for the Mongol national
ity alone. This is not to say there was no idea of unification with
other Mongol groups in other regions, but independence for the
area of autonomous Mongolia was the major goal.

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD
After the 1921 communist revolution in Urga, power was first
consolidated in the hands of the revolutionaries by the deliberate
crushing of aristocratic rule. However, the arrest and execution of
many in the noble class, including those claiming direct relation
ship to Chinggis Khan, was a peculiar problem for the new social
ist government. How could the Borjigid descendants be liquidated
without liquidating the Mongol state? One solution to the prob
lem was to abolish the use of all family and clan names in 1925:
“It was purely for political reasons, to eliminate the influence of
the nobility and destroy the hereditary stams of their children.
Two or three generations later, people here didn’t even know they
had lost their clan names.”" One of these people without memory

Munkh-Erdene, 2004, 4.
"“In Search of Chinggis Khaan,” Mongolia Today—Online Maga^ne 2 (2000), in
www.mongoliatoday.com / issue/2 / tomb_mistery.html.

72

Alicia J. Campi

of a clan name is N. Enkhbayar, former Prime Minister and rec
ently elected new President of Mongolia.
During the early socialist period Mongolia needed to find a
new identity, since it was tearing down its old Borjigid aristocratic
one. The Mongol land had to be glorified, as well as the commun
ist revolutionaries who had achieved independence and beaten
back the foreign occupiers of the last years of the autonomous pe
riod. One major contributor to forging the new identity that was
strongly linked to the physical Mongolian landscape was the poet
D. Natsagdorj, who was the editor of the newspaper A People’s
Warrior. Educated in Leningrad, Berlin and Leipzig, he wrote artic
les about Mongolian history and the new Mongolian People’s Re
public (MPR) for German magazines. In 1929 he returned to
Mongolia where he wrote A Short History ofMongolia and translated
many foreign novels. In the 1930s he wrote his best dramas, inclu
ding Amidst Sad Hills, songs, and his great poem. My Motherland.
His works were used by the communist state to extol the new
Mongolian identity: “In these poems filled with inspiration the
great poet sculpted the beautiful image of Native Land dear to
every Mongolian heart.”'^ In fact, he was lauded as the inventor of
a new genre in Mongolian literature, propaganda poems.
The conscious development of popular identification with the
Mongolian land as opposed to traditional ‘feudal’ and religious
culture is evident in Carole Pegg’s research on Mongolian musical
and dance genres. Pegg documents how the Mongolian official
establishment in the late 1920s consciously modified old Mongol
ian motifs to glorify the socialist revolution, and to write out
Chinggis KLan from Mongolian history and performance. Poetry
and song which had been created to eulogize the founding father
only could continue during the socialist period if such references
were dropped. New “themes acceptable under communism inclu
ded nature, the homeland, love of parents, children, the state, and
the Party. References to ethnic identity and associated heroes were
not permissible.”’^

’^ErdenbiHg (1986), 21, cited in Munkh-Erdene.
'^Carole Pegg, Mongolian Music, Dance, and Oral Narrative (Seattle and London:
University of Washington Press, 2001), 23.
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But supporters of the traditional Borjigid lineage standard of
Mongol identity did not completely disappear under communism.
Mongolia’s leading intellecmal of the twentieth century, Biambyn
Rinchen (1905-1977), was arrested in the late 1930s for being a
‘nationalist’, ‘pan-MongoUst’ and anti-revolutionary. Even after his
release, he did not hide his respect for Chinggis Khan as a far
sighted world political leader. Rinchen’s life motto was “Mongolia
must be Mongolian,” and some Mongol writers assert that he was
a strong influence on the young leaders of the 1990 Mongolian de
mocratic revolution.''^
Meanwhile, the Japanese in the 1930s believed that they could
influence communist Mongolia to move toward their camp by
promoting pan-Mongolism and Chinggis Khan, following the
same policy as they were pursuing in Inner Mongolia. The Mong
olian leader Demid, who was accused of siding with the Japanese,
was said to have proclaimed; “Let the Khalkhas return and restore
the times of the Great Chingis; the Great Japan will help.”'^ Under
pressure from Stalin, such leaders were systematically purged from
the Mongolian government.
Several decades later in 1962 Mongols sought to associate their
national identification with Chinggis Khan on the 800th anniver
sary of his birth in Khentii aimag. A stone monument was secretly
was by the government, and a conference was organized by the
Academy of Sciences to assess his historical role. While the confe
rence was in progress, a critical telegram from Soviet Academician
Zhukov, who maintained Chinggis Khan had played only a ‘reactionar}"’ role in Mongolian history, was sent to B. Shirendev at the
Academy. Nevertheless, some Mongol intellectuals proceeded
with their favorable re-evaluation of Chinggis Khan’s role. The
head of the Historical Committee, Academician Natsagdorzh gave
a lecmre entitled “Chinggis as the Founder of the Mongol State,”
which was reported on by the Party newspaper Unen. He stressed
the positive benefits Chinggis had brought to Mongolia, including

Shagdariin Sandag and Harry H. Kendall, Poisoned Arrows, The Stalin-Choibalsan
Mongolian Massams, 1921-1941 (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), 149-151.
Sharad K. Soni, Mongolia-Pussia P^lations: Kiakhta to Vladivostok (Delhi: Shipra
Publications, 2002), 120.
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unification, statehood, law codes, and literacy, versus the destruc
tiveness of his military campaigns. Ts. Damdinsuren wrote a rep
ort refuting some of the criticism of the Soviet scholars.’'^ Comm
emorative anniversary stamps even were issued by the govern
ment.
In September 1962 Tomor-Ochir,'^ a secretary of the Mongol
ian People’s Revolutionary Party’s Central Committee who was
engaged in a political struggle with Premier Yu. Tsedenbal, was
dismissed from office for inflaming nationalist feelings among the
people through his connection with the Chinggis Khan anniversa
ry. The special stamps were withdrawn and the party press critici
zed intellectuals who were considered too nationalistic. The whole
issue was examined at a Party ideological congress in 1963, attend
ed by a Soviet delegation under Ilichev. Robert Rupen has sugges
ted that “probably what brought the Genghis Khan celebrations
to such an abrupt end was their entanglement with the unrelated
Sino-Soviet dispute, since the Chinese, viewing Genghis as an im
portant Chinese emperor, had organized big celebrations of their
own. But basically the disowning of the anniversary celebrations
was a minor victory for rigidity and party solidarity in the chronic
contradiction between the claims of communism and of Mongol
nationalism.”’*
The legacy of the failed attempt to resurrect Chinggis Khan is
seen by the fact that ten years later, noted Mongolian historians
Shirendev, Natsagdorzh, Perlee, and Bira in their History of the
Mongolian 'People’s Republic criticized Chinese historians for being
“apologists for Genghis Khan and his bloodthirsty deeds.”’’ They
quoted Tsedenbal and the January 1963 report by B. Lkhamsuren
at the Republican Conference on Problems of Ideological Work.
’®D. Dashpurev and S.K. Soni, Keign of Terror in Mongolia 1920-1990 (New Del
hi: South Asian Publishers, 1992), 61-62.
Tomor-Ochir is thought to have been killed in 1985 by pro-Tsendenbal sup
porters with the help of the Mongolian secret police, the Dotood Yam. See Dash
purev (1992), 63 and 76 n. 30.
’*C.R. Bawden, The Modem History of Mongolia (New York; Frederick A. Praeger,
1968), 418-419.
^‘^History of the Mongolian People’s Republic (Moscow; Nauka Publishing House,
1973), 54.
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The official history admitted that there was some progressive sig
nificance to Chinggis Khan organizing the tribes in a single organ
ic state, yet cautioned that “attention must be drawn to the quite
obviously ruinous effects of the Genghis Khan conquests both on
the peoples who were subdued and on Mongolia itself, the popul
ation of which was reduced and its productive forces dispersed
over foreign lands.
The anti-Chinggis Khan line and dissociation of the founding
father with the Mongol state continued to be maintained by the
Mongolian government and intellectual establishment until the
end of the socialist period. This was explained in the official histor\' as: “The political unification of Mongolia in a single state could
have helped towards a further advance in the country’s productive
resources and its economic and cultural progress. The obstacle to
this, however, was the aggressive policy of the Mongol feudal lea
ders headed by Genghis Khan, who turned the people into warri
ors and the country into a militar}^ camp. The aggressive camp
aigns of Genghis Khan and his successors against the peoples of
China, Iran, Russia and other countries were a supreme disaster,
since they held up for a long time the progressive development of
those peoples. During these campaigns enormous material and
cultural assets were destroyed and tens of thousands of people
were wiped out. The aggressive wars of the Mongol feudal leaders
also had the effect of halting the growth of the productive forces
and culture of Mongolia itself and brought the Mongolian people
nothing but sufferings.”^'

THE REVIVtM. of CHINGGIS KHAN DURING THE DE
MOCRATIC REVOLUTION
In the 1989-1990 struggle by the young Mongolian democrats
against communism, the leading political parties put forth a num
ber of demands, one of which focused on Mongolian identity iss
ues. They called for “the revival of traditional Mongolian culture,
20 History of MPR (1973), 54 and 518 n. 120.
2' Ibid., 13.
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re-introduction of the old Mongolian script, rehabilitation of Gen
ghis Khan and encouragement to Buddhism.”^^ The founding fa
ther of Mongolia, dead 800 years, suddenly was pulled from the
rubbish heap of history by young, historically ignorant Mongols
seeking both to criticize their communist elders and find a new
nationalistic identity. Rock musicians sang songs dedicated to the
Great Kdian. The nation’s number one band, Khonkh, stood next
to a giant portrait of Chinggis and mournfully sang an apologia for
the lack of respect of previous generations: “WiU you forgive us?/
For we used to focus/Only on the black spots of your life,/Distorting the record of history/And thus deceiving future genera
tions.”^’ The term Bogdo Ezhen [saintly/holy/august Lord/Ruler]
was found increasingly in opposition political newspapers and documents.
This phenomenon was certainly initially home-grown. Mongol
writers such as Sh. Sandag, when reviewing the communist past,
have claimed that one of the main reasons Mongolia maintained
its independence during the twentieth century was because any
country that produced such great world leaders as Chinggis Khan
and Khubilai Khan could not have its statehood and cultural iden
tity extinguished.”
In early 1990, prior to the downfall of the communist govern
ment, an organization called the “Palace of Chinggis Khan,”
which was meant to represent the ovogton or large extended family
descended from the world conqueror, was established by Khalkha
Mongols claiming direct descent from him. This private social and
culmral association was given much publicity in official and non
official newspapers as having the goal of the perpemation of the
memoty" of Chinggis. Yet the organization was open to all Mong
ols regardless of bloodlines, because Chinggis Khan is the father
of Mongolia and thus the ancestor of aU Mongols. At this time

22 Soni, 2002, 223, quoting Mike Faber, “Mongolia Moves Towards Perestroi
ka,” Development Folicy Keviem 8:4 (December 1990), 426.
22Nicholas Kristof, “Where Genghis Khan Is In,” The New York Times Maga^ne
(May 27, 1990), 23.
24
[Democracy] 7 (June 1-10, 1990), 4.
25 Sandag and Kendall, 2000, 170.
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daily prayers with incense in his honor were resumed after a more
than a sixty year hiatus at the capital’s Gandan monastery.
The Mongolian Revolutionary People’s Party (MPRP), in the
midst of rejecting communism and reincarnating itself as a socialdemocratic party, faced a national election in 1990, and thus
desired to identify with the growing nationalistic movement prai
sing the great khan. It permitted a modest public celebration in
honor of Chinggis Khan’s birthday in May with a special edition
of the newspaper Unen, full of articles on Chinggis, including an
article by an astrologer which concluded that the Mongol leader
conveniently was born on May P' (traditional communist May
Day could then be retained as a national holiday). The newspaper
also included the text of the poem, “The Tomb of Chinggis,”
composed by national poet R. Choinom in the early 1960s but
until then banned from print as too chauvinistic and nationalistic.
The nationalistic frenzy was fed by the events surrounding the
conference held in Ulaanbaatar in August 1990 dedicated to the
750* anniversary of the Secret History of the Mongols. Although plan
ning for the event had started years before and the Mongolian go
vernment had obtained UNESCO support to celebrate the anni
versary of the writing of this unique Mongolian historical epic ab
out Chinggis Khan’s life, only small announcements were placed
in Unen explaining the conference. A nine-part stamp series, with
only one stamp of Chinggis’ image, was printed. However, the
winds of political reform and revived Mongolian nationalism enc
ouraged the conference’s activists and young scholars to glorify
the nation’s founder. Quickly, a new ballet for children and an op
era were commissioned, and special songs and poems were writ
ten.
A special exhibit devoted exclusively to works glorifying Ching
gis Khan was organized by the Mongolian Artists Union, timed to
correspond with the conference on the Secret History. In a panMongolist gesture, art pieces also were displayed from well-known
Inner Mongolian artists. Images of Chinggis Khan proliferated in
the ‘black market’ and portraits bearing his injunction: “If my bo
dy dies, let it die, but do not let my country die,” appeared every
where. Also, there was an artistic movement to modify the Chi
nese-stylized official Yuan dynastic portrait characterization of
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Chinggis to make him appear less sinicized, younger, and more
Mongol in physical appearance. Thus, the 1990 Secret History
conference became for Mongols the catalyst for an explosion of
long suppressed joy and pride over Chinggis Khan.
With the Democratic Revolution, Mongols were able to focus
not only on redefining national identity, but also on restoring their
own personal tribal and family identities. In 1991 President P.
Ochirbat began the process with a decree restoring family names.
People were permitted to choose their own name, and over sixty
percent chose the name of the clan of Chinggis, the Mongol ovogton,
Borjigid.^^ This was an indication of the strong identification Mon
gols continued to have to a common ancestor or common bone
that is connected to the Borjigid royal lineage.

EXPOSURE TO GLOBALIZATION NURTURES TRADITI
ONAL IDENTITY THEMES
Newly democratic Mongolia in the 1990s was exposed to the
modern Western world and the whole issue of globalization. At
first glance, it might be assumed that globalization’s impact on
modern Mongolia’s identity only would favor the emerging urban
culture over the traditional rural one, accelerating the evolutionary
process from the socialist era. Connecting Mongolia with the tech
nologically diverse Western world with its instant media seemingly
should promote the new over the old in the minds of its people.
In fact, concern has grown that Mongolia in this new global era is
losing its traditional culture or is a society split in two, as the mod
ern urban Western lifestyle centered around Ulaanbaatar loses
touch with the needs of the growing poor rural herdsmen around
the countr}^
Many Mongols inside and outside the government were forced
to re-examine the question of “what is Mongolia’s identity?” The
government’s particular challenge is to formulate development
strategies for Mongolia that maintain Mongolia’s uniqueness and
sovereignty, as the nation seeks to integrate itself more within the
“In Search,” 2003.
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Asian region, something that its long-standing Soviet ties had pre
vented for over seventy years. Coming up with a modern reform
ulation of Mongolia’s identity in today’s globalized world is an iss
ue that has been discussed for the last fifteen years by Mongolia’s
policymakers and strategic studies experts. For example, Tsedendambyn Batbayar from the Institute of Strategic Studies has writ
ten extensively on Mongolia’s search for a new post-Soviet identi
ty. Noting that early Mongolian nationalism was submerged ben
eath the expansive push of both China and Russia, he claimed that
in 1990 “independence rekindled the desire to rediscover Mongol
ian identity.”^^ For Batbayar, Mongolia’s identity must be a prod
uct of geography, of culture which includes Chinggis Khan, and of
foreign policy. He believes that as Mongolia debates whether it
belongs to Central Asia or Northeast Asia, it is actually debating if
it win have a nomadic versus a modern identity.
Batbayar and many other Mongolian policymakers have an ob
vious bias against nomadism, implying that if Mongolia retains
traditional nomadism, it cannot become modern. Thus they reject
the nomadic economic model which has sustained the nation and
people in difficult climatic and geographical conditions over the
centuries. Most of the Western development and poverty allevia
tion experts who advise Mongolia promote such a biased, dismiss
ive attitude, as seen in UNDP and Asian Development Bank rep
orts. The embodiment of rejecting nomadism is Mongolian Presi
dent Enkhbayar, who when prime minister famously stated; “It is
not my desire to destroy the original Mongolian identity but in or
der to survive we have to stop being nomads.”^*
However, some Mongolian economists, such as D. Byambasuren, are convinced that nomadism is one of the keys to Mongolian
modern as well as traditional identity: “In the history of [sic]
world, Mongols are known as nomadic herders, bearing the noma
dic branch of traditional civilization tree at the edge of the twen
tieth centurjt Therefore, nomadic life values and culture are to
appear as a main basis that determine national mentality and ways

Batbayar, 2002, 17.
David Murphy, “No Room for Nomads,” Far Eastern Economic Eeview (May
31,2001), 122.
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of survival of Mongols.Some modern Mongolian anthropolo
gists believe that Mongolian nomads are freedom loving, individu
alistic, and quick learners, characteristics highly suitable to the new
democratic free market era.
Like the communists of the last century, modern Mongolian
policymakers today have the dilemma of choosing what in tradi
tional Mongolian culture to promote and what to denigrate and
change. The Mongolian nomadic lifestyle and economy with its
special form of poverty dramatically increased in the country’s ear
ly globalization period, so it is debatable whether or not nomad
ism is destined in fact to disappear. In the early twenty-first cent
ury, it is apparent that the majority of Mongolia’s leaders choose
to reject nomadism as a backward economic form despite its being
uniquely Mongolian, but they still seek to retain and glorify the na
tional father of Mongolian nomadism, Chinggis Khan. They can
take this attitude because, curiously, in the democratic era the
Mongols have found that many Westerners actually highly respect
Chinggis Khan for his empire rather than criticize him as ‘uncivili
zed’.

WESTERN VIEWS OF CHINGGIS KHAN INFLUENCE
DEMOCRATIC MONGOLIA’S IMAGE
Globalization’s impact of linking Mongolia to international cul
tural and ecological non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
such as affiliates of the United Nations like UNESCO and ecolo
gical/ environmental groups, somewhat unexpectedly is providing
financial underwriters and vocal advocates for preserving traditio
nal Mongolian cultural elements which had been under attack for
so much of the socialist twentieth century. Living between two gi
ant neighbors which had little affection or nostalgia for the Mong
olian empire, the Mongols had become accustomed to foreigners
negatively evaluating their historical past. However, with the end

Byambasuren, “National Factors Affecting Development Strategy of Mon
golia,” Kenovation of Mongolia on the Eve of the XXI Century and Future Development
Fattems (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Development Research Center, 2000), 107.
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of Mongolia’s isolation from the global marketplace in the 1990s,
some Western nations, particularly the United States, Canada,
Australia, and Great Britain which were not overrun by the Mon
gols and did not have any memory of destruction or murder to co
lor their views, indicated they were favorably impressed by what
they knew of Chinggis Khan and his empire. Mongolia soon clear
ly understood that the one thing almost everyone in the world did
know about the country was Chinggis Khan, and for many of
these foreigners he was awe-inspiring rather than awful. As Nicho
las Kristof of The Neiv York Times wrote: “He may have killed peo
ple by the millions, but he was also a great nationalist and one of
the most brilliant commanders in history.”’”
Mongols also learned that many serious Mongolists in the Uni
ted States wrote with admiration about Chinggis Khan. For exam
ple, Kaplonski asserted that “Genghis Khan forged the Mongols
into a unified group of people and created a nation single-handed
ly. He’s like George Washington and Abraham Lincoln and aU our
Founding Fathers rolled into one.”’' There was even the radical
approach to Chinggis Khan, advanced by Paula Sabloff, which has
led to a new school of reinterpreting him as a democratic leader.’^
Even a scientifically-trained Mongolian historian such as Batbayar
was enthralled by the peculiar concept that his nation’s once des
pised founder is not associated just with murder, but also with
promoting democratic principles!” Thus, many in the Mongolian
inteUecmal and political establishment have enthusiastically em
braced Chinggis Khan not only as a symbol of past glories, but al
so as a symbol recognized around the world as a great leader of
the new democratic Mongolia.
But why were Westerners in the 1990s attracted to Chinggis
Khan and the imperial past in the “democratic” Mongolia? The
founding father, who had been a non-person for much of the
twentieth century, became the object of intense foreign curiosity
30 Kristof, 1990, 23.
3' Beth Brophy, “Rethinking the Legendary Barbarian Genghis Khan,” in Untold
Tales of the Great Conquerors. U.S. New and World Report (2005), 48.
33 Paula Sabloff, Modem Mongolia: Keclaiming Genghis Khan (Philadelphia: Univer
sity of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2001).
33 Batbayar, 2002, 26.
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when the young Mongolian anti-communists used his image in
their demonstrations as a nationalistic rallying point. Foreigners
then sought to “sell” Chinggis Kihan by linking his name to their
efforts and products to attract the favor of the Mongols. The first
major manifestation of this phenomenon was the “Gurvan Gol”
[‘Three Rivers’] expedition conducted by a group of Japanese sci
entists and Mongolian Academy of Sciences from 1990 to 1993,
sponsored by the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper. Japanese scientists
employed ultrasound technology to identify as many as 1380 und
erground cavities that could be old royal tombs. However, the ex
pedition was very controversial from the outset, because the Japa
nese were accused of bribing Mongolian officials to secretly pros
pect for minerals under the cover of searching for Chinggis
Khan’s tomb. The expedition had not counted on the intense pro
tests of the Mongolian public against any attempt to excavate for
the grave, because of the taboo about desecrating the burial spot
Chinggis had made such a great attempt to hide from the world.
As we approach the 800* anniversary of Mongolian statehood,
we are now in the midst of an ever greater Chinggis Khan boom
promoted by foreigners. The origin can be traced to a 1995 article
in The Washington Post which named the Mongolian leader the
“Man of the Millennium.”^'* After SablofPs promotion of Chinggis
Khan as a democratic leader worthy of modern Mongolia, a num
ber of new biographies by non-Mongohst writers such as Jack
Weatherford'^^ of MacCalester College and John Man^'’ of Great
Britain appeared to great sales. Weatherford, whose well-written
book reached The New York Times bestseller list despite its shaky
scholarship, has been interviewed on National Public Radio and
other programs in the United States to explain his view that
Chinggis Khan was a progressive, wrongly criticized, great ruler.'’’

Joel Achenbach, “The Era of His Ways,” The Washington Post (December 31,
1995), FI.
Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modem World (New York:
Crown Press), 2004.
John Man, Genghis Khan, Life, Death, and Resurrection (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2004).
“AU Things Considered,” National Public Radio, with Robert Siegel, March
25, 2004, in http://www.npr.org/templates/story/stoty.php?storydd=1791972.

Globalization, Mongolian Identity, and Chinggis Khan

83

Chinggis Khan has attracted the attention of other types of media:
the BBC has a one-hour documentary planned for release in 20056; Russian director Sergey Bodrov is planning a Hollywood-style
epic on the young Chinggis called “The Mongol;” and there also is
a much hyped film project on Chinggis Khan announced by Hol
lywood actor Steven Segal.
U.S. Nem and World Keporf in the fall of 2005 published a coll
ector’s edition on “Untold Tales of the Great Conquerors,” which
has an article on rethinking Chinggis Khan’s legacy. It concludes
that perhaps Chinggis was both a barbarian and a renaissance
man: “Now, nearly eight centuries after his death, Genghis Khan’s
reputation seems to be undergoing a dream makeover.”^** British
reporter Andrew Osborn has written that Chinggis Khan, modern
Mongolia’s sole historical figure capable of resurrecting a sense of
greatness, is a “feel-good rallying point,” for a people increasingly
disenchanted with the country’s supposedly democratic postCommunist rulers.’^ Even foreign-organized adventure tourists,
newly exposed to Mongolia in this globally-interconnected world
are encouraged to go to Mongolia to view the new Chinggis Khan
as no barbarian, but “a pragmatic assimilationist,” whose legacy to
his nation was “the curious, hungr}^ readiness to embrace good
things from whatever sources and to combine them opportunisti
cally as life flows along.”^” Is this not a recipe for success for the
modern globalization proponent?
The foreigners’ dream to find the tomb of Chinggis Khan has
not gone away. For several years there has been an American exp
edition pressuring Mongolian officials for permission to survey
likely sites, and in 2005 this search has even been turned into a
kind of archaeological tourism. It seems step by step the world
wide media (e.g. National Geographic, the History and Discovery
channels, the Wall Street Journal, International Herald Tribune, Time
Magatpnd), manipulated by foreigners seeking tomb booty and/or
Beth Brophy, “Rethinking the Legendary' Barbarian Genghis Khan,” in Untold
Tales of the Great Conquerors. U.S. New and World Report (2005), 46-51.
Andrew Osborn, “The Cult of Genghis Khan,” Independent News (London:
May 11,2005).
David Quammen, “In the Kingdom of Eternal Blue Heaven,” National Geog
raphic Adventure Qanuary' 2006),102.
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international fame, are complicit in pressing the Mongolian autho
rities to agree to search for the founding father’s burial site.
Even if Chinggis Khan is not considered a democratic national
leader, it is clear that most of Mongolia’s contemporar}^ historians
as well as the populace would agree with Mongolian historian Baabar who wrote about Chinggis and his meaning for today’s Mon
gols; “For Mongols who traditionally revered their ancestors,
Chinggis KEaan was a god....Chinggis Khaan is something more
than [a national hero] for Mongols: their lodestar, spiritual force,
and the object of not only of national but of personal pride.”'*'
However, there is a small caveat; below the surface, such ador
ation of Chinggis Khan as the symbol of “Mongolness” recently
seems to be producing a murmuring backlash. This author has
spoken with Western-educated young Mongolian intellectuals who
decry the national fixation and glorification of the great khan.
Perhaps they are responding to the obvious clash between exalting
the founding father and denigrating the traditional nomadic cult
ure which he epitomizes. It appears that this contradiction wiU
continue to puU at the Mongolian psyche, and globalization and
integration into the world perhaps exacerbate, not resolve, this
issue.

INNER MONGOLIAN IDENTITY ISSUES
Among other Mongol peoples physically outside the indepen
dent nation, the search for national identity in our newly intercon
nected world is similarly tortured and contorted. There are several
young Inner Mongolian scholars who have been confronting the
question of “Who are the Mongols?” in the multi-ethnic state of
modern China.
One such scholar is Almaz Khan, who from Berkeley has writt
en on the min^ identity of the Mongols at the end of the twen
tieth century. He notes that the Mongolian identity is a matter of
negotiation and contestation between the Mongols and the Han
Chinese as well as between different regional and occupational
« Baabar, 1999, 34.
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subgroups of Mongols in Inner Mongolia. He calls this complex
web of relationships which affect the overall Mongol group iden
tity “a homogenizing ‘Mongolness’ for the public domain.”'*^ Khan
emphasizes the importance of historical memor}' on the part of
Mongols and Chinese in Mongolian “self-imaging and representa
tion.”'*^ Both ethnic groups focus on the ‘otherness’ of Mongolian
identity. Mongolia is beautiful, wild, mysterious, barbaric, and dan
gerous. Such an image affects the “PRC state politico-economic
policy and practice and has affected the process and shape of the
Mongol’s min:(u identity.” Despite the fact that millions of Chinese
agriculturalists for over a century have poured into the Inner
Mongolian territory and this massive colonization has changed the
traditional pastoral economy and demography and forced most
Mongols to give up animal husbandry to adopt agriculture and ur
ban living, Nei Menpgu [Inner Mongolia] “continues to be percei
ved the way it has always been: as an exotic and wild region where
all is boundless blue sky, grassland, herds, and nomads.”**
Khan asserts that this archaic image of the pastoral Inner Mon
golia has been propagated since the founding of the People’s Rep
ublic of China through the spread of state media and arts, especi
ally by television. Nevertheless, Han Chinese sociopolitical control
in the latter half of the twentieth century has advocated the “ad
vanced” state of a settled way of life and forced more and more
Mongols to shift away from pastoral life to agriculture. This then
has accelerated the disintegration of a coherent Mongolian culture
and society, which in turn “has served to awaken a stronger sense
of Mongol ethnic consciousness and a keenly felt need for, and
attempts at, cultural revival and identity reinforcement. This rein
forcement centers on the symbolism of pastorahsm in opposition
to the agricultural.”*^
The oppression of the Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia
inspired an ethnic revival movement in the 1980s, yet since the
■*2 Almaz Khan, “Who Are the Mongols? State, Ethnicity, and the Politics of
Representation in the PRC,” in Melissa J. Brown, ed., Negotiating Ethnicities in
China and Taiwan (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1996), 126.
« Ibid., 127.
Ibid, 132.
«Ibid, 139.
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Cultural Revolution most Mongols no longer wear traditional
dress and urban Mongols generally are unable to speak Mongolian.
Mongolian political representation in the regional government has
dropped from 50 percent in 1947 to 10-15 percent in the new cen
tury. In response to the real issue of ethnic survival, Khan recog
nizes the growth of art and literature, often associated with Chinggis Khan, to express Mongolian sentiments, and the emphasis on
the image of pastoralism as a rallying point, cultural marker and
demarcation of Mongolian identity.'^'’ “For the Inner Mongols,
Chinggis Khan has come to serve specifically as a symbol of eth
nic/cultural survival of their group in relation to the overwhelm
ingly dominant Chinese state and society.”"^^ Yet, for the wealthier,
more politically facile Inner Mongolian intellectuals and urban
Mongols, the embracing of the pastoral symbols to which they att
ach sentimental value but do not represent their actual everyday
Chinese way of life reality is a kind of “self-denial” of their actual
cultural lives or “self-othering.”'*** Such Mongols are the majority,
and they usually are embarrassed by their rural cousins, but as ag
riculturalists and city-dwellers who have “demographic and econo
mic weight, they have no (positive) symbolic values to offer to the
nation-state, the Han Chinese, or the Mongols as a whole.”'^’
Inner Mongolia’s attitudes toward Chinggis Khan, according to
Khan, are different from how ‘Outer Mongols’ see him. Khan be
lieves that Chinggis Khan as a national symbol was suppressed in
the nation of Mongolia during the communist period not because
he was a rival rallying point of Mongolian nationalism, but for pol
itical reasons governed by the Sino-Soviet relationship and bec
ause the Russians never Uked the Mongol conqueror.^® Khan exp
lains that Chinggis Khan became “a symbol of opposition and
yearning for a strong Mongol fatherland and independent nation-

Ibid., 143.
Almaz Khan, “Chinggis Khan: From Imperial Ancestor to Ethnic Flero,” in
Stevan HarreU, ed.. Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle ; Lon
don: University of Washington Press, 1995), 248.
‘*8 Khan, “Who?,” 1996, 152.
45 Ibid., 154.
50 Ibid., 262.
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state,so democratic Mongolia rightly has elevated him to a nati
onal hero.
Uradyn Bulag, who has established himself as an expert on
Chinese Mongolian minority policies, also has written about the
Chinese ‘Inner’ Mongols quest for identity through Chinggis
Khan: “What Mongols see of themselves in assessing the twenti
eth century' is that they are weak and overwhelmed by the Chinese,
and that they are themselves hopelessly divided, unable to either
become a united people or defend their interests in the face of the
combination of a powerful Chinese state and large-scale Chinese
migration to Inner Mongolia. Their decline in this century is a
sharp contrast to their history of glory and valor. The constant
yearning for Chinggis Khan is, in this sense, a yearning for the rec
overy of Mongol prowess.”^^
Bulag has noted that the Chinese cleverly appropriated Ching
gis Khan in the twentieth century and made him a Chinese hero—
“the only Chinese to defeat the Europeans.” Bulag sees this as a
revision of Chinese multiculturalism theory, so that Mongolian
and other non-Han Chinese heroes, who were long denounced as
China’s enemies, are now defined as Chinese.’^ Yet, how Han nati
onalism, which was originally targeted against China’s historical
enemies such as the Mongols and Manchus, could then embrace
unwilling non-Han peoples as equals in the post-dymastic period,
becomes a real question.
China’s absorption of Mongolia’s founding hero has been a
centuries-long process. The Manchu Qing dynasty created a spec
ial administrative unit supported by an annual budget to care for
the shrine of Chinggis Khan in the Ordos. In the nineteenth cent
ury' the Qing court opened Inner Mongolian grasslands to Chinese
agricultural development and settlement. After the establishment
of the Republic of China in 1911, Inner Mongols experienced
even more intense Chinese colonialism which in the main erased
Ibid., 263.
52 Uradyn E. Bulag, The Mongols at China’s Edge: Histo^ and the Politics of National
Unity (Lanham; Rowman & Litdefield, 2002), 234-235.
55 Uradyn E. Bulag, “The Chinese Cult of Chinggis Khan: Genealogical Nation
alism and Problems of National and Cultural Integrity'” (Victoria, Canada; Oct
ober 3-5, 2003), 2.
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Inner Mongolia as a viable independent political entity. The cult
and symbolism of Chinggis Khan lost its dynastic sponsorship.
Meanwhile, in independent communist Mongolia, after the late
1920s, the Chinggis Khan cult was suppressed and local shrines
destroyed.
When the Japanese established control in Manchuria in the
1930s under the Manchukuo government, they planned to per
manently house the Ordos relics and memorial to Chinggis Khan
in a massive mausoleum in Ulaanhot, Inner Mongolia to rally the
Mongolian tribes to their side in the fight to expand Japan’s Grea
ter Co-Prosperity Sphere. Mongols, supported by Pu Yi’s Daur
(Darhad) Mongol wife Wan Rong and the Daur general Guo
WenUng, built a Chinggis Khan temple (completed on September
30, 1943), the central symbol of Mongolian nationalism in eastern
Inner Mongolia. This temple, Wang Yeh Miao, was “where the
guardian spirit of the holy founder of the Mongol dynasty will be
deeply revered, so that it may become a shining example for the
creation of a united Great Asia.”^'*
However, pro-Chinese Nationalist princes appealed to the Nat
ionalist army to protect the Ordos relics from removal. As a result,
they were evacuated to Gansu and passed through Communistheld Yenan to a welcome by a 10,000-strong throng. In 1944 the
Communists with Mao’s approval established a Chinggis Khan
memorial with statue in Yenan. When the Communists won the
Chinese civil war, their new government, to placate the Inner
Mongols, constructed a large Chinggis Khan mausoleum in 1954,
remarkably similar in design to the destroyed Japanese model. It
consisted of three ^fr-shaped buildings at Ejin Horoo Banner in
the Ordos for the housing of treasures and ‘relics’. There, the Darkhad guardians of the sanctuary were confirmed in their positions
and the Chinese government subsidized annual sacrifices.^^ It offi
cially was dedicated on April 8, 1956, the year of the Sino-Soviet
split, so Chinese officials also may have been trying to woo the
goodwill of the Mongols across the border.^^

5“' “Genghis Khan’s New Fan Club,” The London Times (June 1, 1980).
Bawden, 1968, 417.
56 “Genghis Khan’s,” 1980.
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The present Inner Mongolian autonomous region took shape
only in 1956, at a time when Mongols were already a 1-5 minority
in their own homeland. For Inner Mongols, especially communist
ones, there still is a continuous struggle to resolve the nationality
question of how historical and cultural differences between Mon
gols and Chinese are mediated in a socialist, but nationalist, re
gime.Khan sees a parallel evolution in the evolving of Chinggis
Khan from an exclusive symbol of imperial legitimacy through ac
tual kinship bloodlines to an embracing symbol of ancestry for all
Mongols (aU are “sons and grandsons of Chinggis Khan,” as Mao
said).^® He also attributes the growth of the image of Chinggis
Khan to mass media and Chinese movies. It will be interesting to
watch as China opens itself up to globalization to see how the
world’s fascination and reinterpretation of Chinggis Khan will im
pact on both Han Chinese marketing strategy and theory of China
as a multi-ethnic culture.
Complicating the identity situation is the reaction of Han Chin
ese to Chinggis Khan in communist China. Wurlig Borchigud, a
researcher who claims direct descent from Chinggis Khan’s Borjigid clan, has written about how China used its educational system
in the 1950s and 1960s to formulate a common Chinese culture of
shared descent by teaching that aU modern Chinese ethnic groups,
including the Inner Mongols, are natives of China’s common terri
tory and acmaUy can trace their origins to the founding Yellow
Emperor of China.^’ After the destruction of the Cultural Revolu
tion was repaired, Chinese since the 1980s have been flocking to
the Ordos shrine of Chinggis Khan to ‘worship’ him as a Chinese
national hero. To Bulag such a phenomenon serves the interest of
contemporary Chinese nationalism: “The Chinese cult of Chinggis
Khan may be understood both as a statist attempt to accommo
date minorities within China and as the exercise of a racial nat-i57 Bulag, 2002, 7.
5^ The Yunnan Mongol community published a poem entided, “We Are the
Sons and Daughters of the Steppes: Children and Grandchildren of Chinggis
Khan,” Khan, “Chinggis”, 275-276.
5^Wurlig Borchigud, “The Impact of Urban Ethnic Education on Modern Mon
golian Ethnicity, 1949-1966,” in Stevan Harrell, ed.. Cultural Encounters on China’s
Ethnic Frontiers (Seatde ; London: University of Washington Press, 1995), 279.
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onalism on the part of a victimized nation seeking to exact re
venge for the humiliations of Euro-American and Japanese colo
nialisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’”^®
How then have the Inner Mongols reacted to aU of this? Have
the Mongols in China taken pride in the Chinese embrace of their
national hero? A measure of the tension between Chinese and In
ner Mongolian views of national identity as seen through the
prism of Chinggis Khan is played out today over the plan for the
government of China to spend about $20 million to renovate the
Ordos mausoleum shrine built to Chinggis Khan. A local but wellconnected Han Chinese businessman has proposed revamping the
shrine into an entertainment complex and theme park, attractive
to domestic and foreign tourists. Chinggis KEan would be pack
aged by the Chinese as the founder of a great Chinese dynasty and
a good tourist attraction in his own right. The shrine would be pri
vatized and its maintenance taken away from the Darkhad Mongol
traditional protectors to become a profitable Chinese Mongolian
Disneyland! Inner Mongolian authorities in 2004 quietly had ag
reed to let construction begin on the new project.
However, press accounts were published revealing the const
ruction plans. News spread quickly among the 3.9 million ethnic
Mongols in Inner Mongolia. In late 2004 campuses of the Inner
Mongolian Normal University and other universities had to be
sealed off, and a concert by the famous hard rock band from inde
pendent Mongolia, Hurd, was cancelled to stave off demonstra
tions.^' Darkhad Mongol pickets gathered at the mausoleum site
for over a month, forcing the local government in December 2004
to halt construction and sack the mausoleum/museum director.
The sensitive issue, described on internet sites, has mobilized the
Inner Mongols and Mongols outside China to resist further att
empts at commercializing the shrine: “This shrine is ours. The
state doesn’t own them [relics]—we do.”'’^
“ Ibid., 2-3.
James Brooks, “Ulan Bator Journal: The Mongolians Are Coming to China
With Heavy Metal! China Frets Over Mongohan Metal Band,” The New York
Times (November 26, 2004).
B. Gardi, “In Inner Mongolia, Tribe Resists Bid to Turn Shrine Into a Theme
Park,” Riz4/'o Free Asia (February 17, 2005), in www.smhric.org/news-75.htm.
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It is a good guess that the whole question of how to treat Chin
ggis Khan and his importance in identity issues, for both Han Chi
nese and Inner Mongols, will continue to be a significant issue.
Khan concludes that “the symbolism of Chinggis Khan has gone
through a complicated history of change in signification and appli
cation,” and shown a high degree of adaptability in different hist
orical contexts as the concept of Mongolian ethnicity in China has
changed.*'’

SOME COMMENTS ON THE KALMYK AND BURIAT
MONGOLIAN IDENTITIES
For Mongol groups still incorporated in the Russian state after
the collapse of socialism in 1990, a re-examination of national
identity issues, particularly when exposed to the successful indep
endence movements in the Baltic and Central Asian republics,
naturally took place. Buriats were annexed to the Russian state in
treaties in 1689 and 1728, when the territories on both sides of
Lake Baikal were separated from what is now independent Mong
olia. From that time until the early twentieth century, the Buriat
population increased from 27,700 to 300,000. Buriats to the west
of Baikal (Irkutsk Buriats) were Christianized, ‘russified’, and took
up sedentar}' agriculture. The eastern Buriats (Transbaikal Buriats)
remained Lamaist Buddhists and some continued to be ^^r-dwelling. Under the Czarist government. Buddhism thrived and became
an important factor in Buriat cultural development, as it was
among the Khalkhas to the south. The Buddhist Church ceased to
exist officially in the 1930s, during the Stalinist general persecution
of religion. In 1958 the word ‘Mongol’ was removed from the
name of the republic (Buriat ASSR).
However, in the late 1980s there was a revival of lamaism as
part of Buriat Mongol national consolidation and spiritual rebirth.''"’ Contacts between Buriats and independent Mongolia inc
reased greatly during the democratic era. While certainly having an
Khan, “Chinggis,” 277.
www.economicexpert.com/a/buryat.htm.
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opportunity to learn more about the father of the Mongolian nat
ion, Chinggis Khan, was one of the results of communication with
other Mongol groups and Western nations, Buriat national identity
also was influenced by the revival of shamanism. Perhaps renewal
of shamanic practices was accepted as part of the revival of tradi
tional ‘Russian’ forms of religious practices (which also included
Lamaism), and thus was more acceptable to Russian political auth
orities, who feared any ‘pan-MongoUsm’ movement.
Research on this intriguing topic is being done by doctoral smdent Manduhai at Harvard University, who did two years of field
work among Buriats in Dornod, Mongolia and at the Ulaanbaatar
Shamanic Center. She argues that “one of the multiple meanings
of Buriat shamanic practices is a construction of nationalism—as
an imagined community that articulates a collective identity. Sha
mans foster nationalism by bringing together the spirits of lost
land, Buriat people, and the Celestial Court in one communal rimal. Research shows that such practice of nationalism was develop
ed historically as a form of Buriat resistance to colonialism and
displacement.”^^ Manduhai concludes that the political instability
within Mongolia led to shamanism’s resurgence among Mongol
Buriats.
As for the Kalmyk Mongols, this semi-nomadic branch of the
Oirat Mongols migrated from Chinese Turkistan to the steppe
west of the Volga in the mid-seventeenth cenmr}'. As allies of the
Russians, they guarded the eastern frontier of the Russian Empire
for Peter the Great. About 300,000 Kalmyks who lived east of the
Volga in 1771 tried to return to China but were tragically decima
ted enroute. The Kalmyks west of the Volga, who remained in
Russia as practicing Lamaists, were given the Turkish name Kal
myk or ‘remnant’. After the incorporation of the Soviet Union,
the Kalmyks were given an autonomous region. However, many
Kalmyk units fought the Russians in collaboration with the Nazi
Germans in World War II, so Stalin deported about 170,000 to Si
beria in 1943 and dissolved their republic. About 6,000 were allBuyandelgeriyn Manduhai, “The Spirit of My Homeland is Recalling Me: Na
tionalism, Landscape, and Ritual Among the Buriats of Mongolia: Abstract,”
Central Eurasian Studies Society 4* Annual Conference (Boston, October
2003).
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owed to return to the Volga homeland under Khrushchev and the
Kalmyk ASSR was re-established in 1958.
The Kalmyks sought independence at the dissolution of the
USSR in the 1990s, but instead were made a republic within the
Russian Federation in February 1992 in an effort to calm the polit
ical crisis. The new president of the republic agreed to abandon
their separatist claims in 1994. In the post-Soviet period, Kalmyk
Buddhism and cultural forms such as the Kalmyk epic Janggar
have been revived. StiU, the Mongolness of the Kalmyks is proclai
med on the official website of the republic, where reference is
made to the fact that the Kalmyks “used to be a part of the Mon
gol state created by Chenghis-khan in the 13* century.” It also de
fines the Kalmyks as “a Mongol-speaking nation in the European
part of Russia.”'^'’

CONCLUSION
Mongolia is trying to establish itself as a viable democratic.
Western-oriented, free market economy with a unique and valu
able native culture. It is seeking to redefine its national identity
and world image in terms that inspire its own people and at the
same time revise any negative image left from its imperial past 800
years ago. “Mongols are seeing off the 20* cenmry with the crisis
of ethical heritage.”'’^ The key to this search for a new identity ap
pears to be the redefining and renewal of the symbol of Chinggis
Khan, the founder of both the Mongolian state and nationality. As
the historian Baabar told a foreign reporter in 2005: “He is the
founder of our state, the root of our history. The communists very
brutally cut us off from our traditions and history and got us to
adopt the ways and views of Western civilization—with a red color
of course, but still Western. Now we are becoming Mongols

www.kalmykykiaembassy.ru/html/ehistory/html.
Byambasuren (2000), 109.
Pocha, “Mongolia” (2005).
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Byambasuren proclaims that at this period of new independ
ence after the struggles of the twentieth century, it is not wrong to
be proud of the great Mongol empire. He maintains that the only
way Mongolia can progress in the world is if Mongols themselves
are healthy: “True essence of this phenomenon is that Mongols
discovered themselves in a completely new way and started to res
tore their national values.”'’^ Dr. Ts. Tsetsenbileg of the Mongol
ian Academy of Sciences notes that “understanding how Mongol
ians view Genghis Khan throws light on how Mongolians view
their own heritage and, to a certain extent, themselves. Within this
rapidly changing world, Genghis Khan, if we acknowledge him
without bias, can service as a moral anchor. He can be Mongolia’s
root, its source of certainty at a time when many things are uncer
tain.”’^"
Most of the international response to this emerging Mongolian
identity has been positive. Mongols are no longer feared nor look
ed down upon as barbarians. In fact, foreigners have reacted very'
enthusiastically to preserving Mongolian culture and history which
has permitted the Mongols, regardless of where they live, to exp
lore their roots and heritage with pride. The only caveat is that
some foreigners may fall prey to using Chinggis Khan and his me
mory to promote their own value systems and thus, consciously or
unconsciously, distort the entire Mongolian process of re-examin
ing their history as they seek a modern, global identity.
The challenge to “invent” a modern Mongolian identity in ind
ependent Mongolia is equally felt in other Mongol communities in
China and Russia. Identity issues are even more significant for the
growing Mongol immigrant Western-based communities living
outside the traditional homelands, because they must struggle with
what and how to preserve of Mongolian culture while functioning
in completely different societies. There is also the question of how
should Mongolian peoples respond to other cultures which are ex
propriating Mongolian iconic symbols as their own national her
oes, as China is deliberately doing. Mongolian reaction to the Chi-

Byambasuren (2000), 110.
^®Jehangir S. Pocha, “Mongolia Sees Genghis Khan’s Good Side,” International
Herald Tribune (May 10, 2005).
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nese attitude of claiming Chinggis Khan as a Chinese hero bears
watching.
Other nationalities and culture may soon be claiming Chinggis
Khan as their own. In February 2003 an Oxford, England study
published in the American Journal of Human Genetics on “The Gene
tic Legacy of the Mongols” estimated that the Mongol leader’s
blood lineage has more than 17 million direct descendants—one in
ever}^ 200 people in the world living now, although only one-fifth
are present-day Mongolian men!^’ A follow-up study by the 2005
Search for Adam television series produced by the National Geo
graphic Genographic Project confirmed that the Mongolian leader
is the ancestor of about 0.5 percent of the male population of the
world today.^^
Globalization today acts as a catalyst for the urban Mongols to
abandon the economic particularities of nomadic culture, and yet
this same globalization has brought monied Western cultural pres
ervation organizations to Mongolia to protect and publicize those
vet}' same nomad traditions. Integration within the Asian region
and world economy will provide both opportunities and challen
ges in the future for Mongolia, as it struggles to define its post-so
cialist national identity. This is summed up by economist Byambasuren: “The world that Mongols enters into relation with is enter
ing new development stage and undergoing transition. The world
of the 21th century is going to be entirely different from the one
of the 20th century. It is going to be the world that lives according
[to] globalization and intellectual competition rules. In order to
compete and obtain [its] own sustainable position Mongols should
have new understanding of themselves and of [the] entire
world.”^^ It is certain that Mongolian national identity will conti
nue to be closely linked to the image of Chinggis Khan. Less clear
is whether or not the Mongols will be proud of the ‘universalizing’
of their national symbol, Chinggis Khan, or chauvinisticaUy react

Nicholas Wade, “A ProKfic Genghis Khan, It Seems, Helped People the
World,” The New York Times (February 11, 2003) and Pocha, 2005.
Beth Brophy, “Father of His Country, and Everyone Else,” in Untold Tales of
the Great Conquerors (U.S. News and World Report: 2005) 50-51.
Byambasuren, 2000, 118.
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to protect their unique relationship to his image to maintain their
national self-identity of ulus and undes.
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Globali2ation in Mongolia: Cultural
Evidence from the UB Post
Mei-hua Lan
As a communist country from 1924 to 1990, Mongolia was
subjected to overwhelming Soviet influence in all areas, including
journalism where Mongolia’s equivalent to Pravda was a newspaper
called iinen. However, with the coming of democratization in
1990, Mongolia’s freedom of the press has been improved,' and a
large number of newspapers and journals, including English-lang
uage newspapers, have appeared on the market. At the same time,
the press and all other facets of Mongolian society have been sev
erely impacted by the forces of globalization.
The purpose of my paper is to examine the impact of globaliz
ation in Mongolia by analyzing the information provided by the
UB Post in a period of about four months, from No. 454 of
Febmary 3 to No. 472 of June 9, 2005. Although the UB Post is
only a weekly newspaper, it does provide the most important news
of an entire week to its readers.^ Each issue has eight pages and
' According to the statistics of Freedom House, Mongolia was a country of no
press freedom in the Soviet era, became a country of partiy press freedom since
1990, and was even ranked as a country of press freedom in the years of 1992
and 1999-2001. See various publications of the press freedom survey of Free
dom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey.htm (accessed
23 June 2005).
2 The readership of the UB Post is primarily foreigners in Ulaanbaatar, but Mon
gols interested in learning English such as students of English departments are
also its possible readers. The domestic news of the UB Post is covered by its re
porters or translated from major Mongolian newspapers. Foreign news is usual
ly pieces from major news agencies of the West, China, Russia, or other Asian
countries. They are important news pieces that also appear in other major
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cost 500 tugrig (about 45 cents) in early 2005. The results will tell
us more about the present situation of Mongolia in the era of
globalization.
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LEARNING FOREIGN LANGUAGES
Learning foreign languages is now very popular in Mongolia. It
has been my experience that Mongols are good at learning foreign
languages. They are not afraid of saying a wrong sentence or using
a wrong expression. I am personally acquainted with several schol
ars who did not learn their English in any formal education but
through self-study at home and learning from other English spea
kers at their job sites, and it is not uncommon to find Mongols
who can speak more than one language.
This linguistic facility seems to be deeply rooted in history. In
the thirteenth century, during the time of the Mongolian world
empire, many Mongols were known to be conversant in the vari
ous languages, such as Chinese, Tibetan, Persian, and the many
Turkic languages, spoken in history’s largest contiguous empire.

newspapers in Mongolia. Although part of the stories or articles appearing in
the UB Post are chosen for its particular readership and may be not of major
concern of ordinary Mongols, they also teU us some aspects of the life in Mon
golia and the attitude of the newspaper toward its foreign readers.
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When Tibetan Buddhism became a popular religious belief among
the Mongols in the sixteenth century, education in Mongolia came
under the control of the Buddhist monasteries, and Tibetan bec
ame the language of instruction as well as the canonical and litur
gical language.
Later, when the Mongols came under Manchu rule, Chinese
merchants eventually became economically dominant, and as a
consequence Chinese became an important and useful language
for the Mongols to learn. Ma Hetian, a Chinese agent who travel
ed in Mongoha in 1926-27, observed that many Mongol women
who served as temporary wives of Chinese merchants learned Chi
nese, wore semi-Chinese clothes, even played Chinese musical ins
truments, sang Chinese songs, and arranged their dwellings entire
ly in a Chinese fashion.^ Mongolian women learned Chinese to
serve their temporary husbands, and men learned Chinese for eco
nomic, political, and cultural use. During the Soviet era, Mongols
began to learn Russian in their elementar}' schools, and many of
them continued their higher education in Russia. It is no surprise,
therefore, that during the seven decades of Russian dominance the
most spoken foreign language in Mongolia was Russian.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratic ref
orm in Mongolia, the official policy of Russian as the second lang
uage was abandoned, and English is now taught at the elementary
school level. English is also popular outside the school. When you
enter a bookstore in Ulaanbaatar, you can easily find English text
books, dictionaries, and other learning materials. The replacement
of Russian by English as the main foreign language clearly indic
ates Mongolia’s turning from Russia to the United States and its
opening to the capitalist world.
The reason for this shift to English is not difficult to find. A
language is not only a system for communication or a culture carr
ier, but also a symbol of power. Knowledge of English has bec
ome a necessity mainly because the United States is perceived as
the most powerful country in the world. In order to survive or
find an adequate position in the new capitalistic and global era.
^ Ma Ho-t’ien, Chinese agent in Mongolia: A report on the hirth of the Mongolian People’s
Kipublic, tr. John De Francis (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949), 128.
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Mongols are trying hard to learn foreign languages, and above aU,
English. To what extent some Mongols are willing to go to learn
English and the culture it represents is reflected in this recent inci
dent. It is reported that in 2005 two Mongolian university students
went to London to participate in an international public speaking
competition hosted by the English Speaking Union. Although nei
ther student was selected to attend the final, they said that their
main aim was not to win first prize, but to “participate and get in
contact with people around the world,” and the trip to the United
Kingdom “opened their eyes to a very different lifestyle.”'**
Ever)' issue of the UB Post during the period under considera
tion had a weekly ad for language teachers: “Native speaking Eng
lish, German, Japanese language teachers wanted,” with English
always listed first. There was also a separate ad for recruiting only
English teachers.^ Ads of two international schools appeared regu
larly in the newspaper. One was the International School of
Ulaanbaatar,and the other the Ulaanbaatar Elite International
School.^ Although their students are from several different coun
tries, English dominates these schools’ curricula.® The paper also
published news about Mongolian students studying in the United
States'* and Canada.
Another Western language that is currently rising in popularity
mostly among young Mongols is German. This popularity is pardy
due to historical circumstances. During the Soviet era, many Mon“English language competition fosters international connections,” The UB Post,
9 June 2005, 2.
5 “Classifieds,” “Teacher wanted,” The UB Post, 9 June 2005, 3.
These ads appear in The UB Post on February 17 (p. 4), May 5 (p. 3), May 12 (p.
5), May 19 (p. 5), June 1 (p. 3), and June 8 (p. 5) of 2005.
^ These ads appear in The UB Post on April 28 (p. 3), May 5 (p. 5), May 12 (p. 5),
May 19 (p. 5), May 26 (p. 3), June 1 (p. 6), and June 8 (p. 3) of 2005.
* According to the web site of International School of Ulaanbaatar, “ISU offers
Mongolia's only internationally recognized curriculum in English. All classes are
taught in English.” See “Curriculum,” International School of Ulaanbaatar,
http://www.isumongolia.org/index.php?option=content&task=blogcategory&i
d=12&Itemid=38 (accessed 1 December 2005).
’’ “Trip to Illinois concretes education,” The UB Post, 31 March 2005, 5.
“Learning as an international experience; Canadian project crosses borders in
education,” The UB Post, 1 June 2005, 5.
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gols worked and studied in the German Democratic Republic,
now the eastern part of a reunited Germany. Another, perhaps
even more important reason for German being studied by a grow
ing number of Mongols is Germany’s economic power. The Mon
golian government considers Germany its leading European part
ner. So far, about thirty German firms have invested in Mongolia.
These include several joint enterprises such as the beer company
Khan Brau, the Mercedes-Benz representative VITSAMO, and
Lufthansa Technik’s cooperation with the Mongolian national air
line MIAT. ” Moreover, since the early 1990s some German
speaking Mongols have gone to Germany in hopes of finding a
better Life.
The sharp rise since the early 1990s in the use of English, Ger
man and other Western languages has resulted in what some Mon
gols consider a flood of advertising and other signs all over Ulaanbaatar using the Latin alphabet. Opponents of this trend have
sought to reverse it by promoting a cause initiated mostly by acad
emics to make the Mongolian script the country’s official script.'^
On March 1, 2005, the newspaper Khumuun Bichig, which is printed
in traditional Mongolian script, made an appeal against the use of
the Latin alphabet for business names and signs. The appeal is in
tended to be a part of the “Traditional Mongol Script Day” on
May 1.'^
Unlike English and other Western languages, Japanese and
Korean have witnessed a sharp rise in popularity among Mongols
only partiy because of economic and political reasons but mostly
for their linguistic and cultural similarities. The structure of Mong
olian, Japanese, and Korean are so close that people who speak
any one of the three languages can easily learn the other two. I
recall that in 1993 a Korean student studying in Ulaanbaatar told
me that it was almost too easy for him to learn Mongolian, espe” “Mongolia,” Federal Foreign Office of Germany, http://www.auswaertigesamt.de / www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?type_id= 14&la
nd_id=115 (accessed 27 June 2005).
'2 “About Mongolia,” Embassy of Mongolia, Washington D.C., http://www.
mongolianembassy.us/eng_about_mongoha/land_and_people.php
(accessed
26 June 2005).
“Appeal against Latin alphabet,” The UB Post, 3 March 2005, 1.
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cially conversation. All he needed to do was to substitute the
Korean with Mongolian words. In the same year, a Japanese rest
aurant owner told me that reading Mongolian was not very diffi
cult for him, but that correct pronunciation demanded a lot of
effort. Books and other materials for learning Japanese and Kore
an languages are for sale in most bookstores. There are also radio
and television programs teaching the two “related” languages.
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Most Mongols who learn Japanese and Korean wish to study in
or find a job related to the two countries.To many Mongols,
*■* There are approximately 20,000 Mongols in South Korea. Many of them
work there illegally. According to the UB Post Korean immigration officials said
on February 5 that they deported seven Mongols for illegal stay and were seek
ing seven more from the same group. “Twelve Mongols Deported from South
Korea,” Tie UB Post, 8 February, 2005, 5. Since there is a Mongolian communi
ty in South Korea, Mongohan artists also go to Korea to perform for their
countrymen. For instance, Nomin Talst, a famous Mongolian pop music group,
had its first overseas concert in Seoul for the Mongolian audience during the
past Tsagaan Sar holidays. Paul Bacon, “Nomin Talst Play Seoul Music,” Tie
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Japan and South Korea are role models because they are Asian
and therefore culturally closer than Europe and America. This
perception has helped popularize certain Japanese and Korean
products and styles. Readers can find in the UB Post ads of a den
tal clinic that emphasizes its “Japanese management,”'^ and an ad
inviting people to buy private houses built “in Korean style”"’ (see
the illustration on the preceding page).
As mentioned by Migeddorj Batchimeg, a senior researcher at
the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia, while Russia still
enjoys certain political and economic influence in Mongolia, it is
now China which is emerging as the main political and economic
partner of Mongolia.'^ Therefore, a growing number of Mongols
have come to perceive the learning of Chinese as an important
and necessary goal. So far, China’s booming market is probably
the main reason for the Mongols to learn Chinese. Anyone who
masters Chinese can easily find a decent job in a Mongolian
company, as evidenced by some of my Mongolian friends. How
ever, it has proven much more difficult to work for a Chinese
company. Almost every Chinese group visiting Mongolia, no matt
er whether it is official or private, brings along a Mongol from In
ner Mongolia as its own interpreter, probably because the mem
bers of these groups trust their “own” Mongols more.

INTERNATIONAL CUISINE
In the entertainment section on the back page of the UB Post,
there are usually recipes or restaurant reviews. Besides, the ads of
UB Post, 17 February^ 2005, 6. Because there is an increase in the number of
Korean tourists who visit Mongolia, Korean Airlines decided to increase its
flights from Seoul to Ulaanbaatar starting June 1, 2005. “Increase in Korean Air
FUghts,” The UB Post, 7 April, 2005, 1.
'5 The same ad of Hope Dental Clinic appeared in every issue of The UB Post
from February 8 to April 21, 2005. It always appeared on page 3.
“Komodo village,” The UB Post, 21 April 2005, 7.
Migeddorj Batchimeg, “Future challenges for the PRC and Mongolia: A
Mongolian perspective,” The Jamestown Foundation, http://jamestown.org/
publicauons_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3322&article_id=2369704
(accessed 27 June 2005).
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some restaurants also appear often in the newspaper. The readers
can taste an international flavor via these short essays and ads.
During the period of my investigation, recipes appeared of foods
from Russia,’* Korea,’^ Italy,^° China,^’ and Middle East.^^ Ads of
the Hazara Indian Restaurant (see illustration on next page), Taj
Mahal Indian Restaurant, Los Bandidos Indian and Mexican Rest
aurant, and the Detroit American Bar (see illustration on next
page) were regular feamres in the newspaper, while an ad of Le
Bistrot [sic] Frangais appeared once.^* Although only a relatively
few Mongols are able to afford eating out at such exotic restaur
ants, many others may enjoy cooking some foreign dishes at home
with the help of the recipes in the UB Post. What seems beyond
dispute is that the culinary scene in Ulaanbaatar has acquired a
more cosmopolitan flavor.
During my trips to Ulaanbaatar in the last decade, I could
clearly notice a growing interest in foreign cuisine. There are more
choices than the options mentioned above. During the Soviet era,
in addition to traditional Mongolian food, only Russian and cert
ain European foods were available, but since the early 1990s cui
sines from many other countries have appeared as a symbol of
Mongolia’s new openness. For example, fried chicken and ham
burgers are presented as Mongolia’s opening to the United States:
an ad for the Detroit American Bar proudly announced that “The
Motor City Comes to Ulaanbaatar.”^"’ This establishment is seen
not just as a bar, but as an American icon transplanted onto Mon
golian soil. Such advertisements are, of course, motivated by the
Iryna Po[e]psel, “A Hunger for Russian Food,” The UB Post, 3 February 2005,
7; Iryna Poepsel, “No. 5: Kotletas,” The UB Post, 24 February 2005, 8.
Iryna Poepsel, “Korean Gem Hidden in Deepest Bayanzurkh,” The UB Post,
17 February 2005, 8; James Brown Park, “Seoul Food,” The UB Post, 9 June
2005, 8.
2'^ Iryna Poepsel, “Italian Cuisine in Ulaanbaatar,” The UB Post, 10 March 2005,
7; Todd Smith, “No. 9: Agho e Olio,” The UB Post, 21 April 2005, 7.
Moe KhoU, “Help, I’m Locked Inside a Chinese Cookie Factory,” The UB
Post, 28 April 2005, 7; Howie Ba, “The Chinese Are Coming, the Chinese Are
Coming,” The UB Post, 26 May 2005, 8.
Isabela Irra, “A Piece of the Middle East,” The UB Post, 21 April 2005, 7.
23 The UB Post, 3 March 2005, 3.
24 The UB Post, 26 May 2005, 4.
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ultimate aim in the new capitalistic market which is to attract cust
omers and thus bring in more money.
Awarded best restaurant for dinner in UB
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After official diplomatic relations were established between
Mongolia and South Korea in March 1990, the ties of friendship
and cooperation between the two countries have steadily developed in
various fields, including diplomacy, economics, and culture. Currently
thousands of Mongols work legally or illegally in South Korea to send
funds to relatives back home. Due to good quaUpf and reasonable
prices, Korean products can be easily found on the Mongolian mark
et and Korean soap operas are warmly received by Mongolian audien
ces. When it comes to food, kimchi, a national Korean spicy vege
table pickled and seasoned with garlic, red pepper, and ginger,
now appears on the dining table in many Mongolian households
even though traditional Mongolian dishes have been known to be
rarely spicy. A Mongolian scholar told me that his family began to en
joy kimchi after his sojourn in Seoul as a visiting scholar. For him
kimchi is not only a dish but also something symbolizing his family’s
tie with Korea.
To me, the most significant change in foreign cuisine is the rapid
increase in the number of Chinese restaurants in Ulaanbaatar. When I
stayed there for six months in 1993, I could find only a couple of
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Chinese restaurants in the city. However, according to a restaurant
review in the UB Post, the author learned from a recent publication
of the Department of Non-Mongolian Foods in the Ministry of
Edible and Non-Edible Comestibles that there are now 234 Chin
ese restaurants in Ulaanbaatar.^^ The author of another restaurant
review easily listed eleven Chinese restaurants in Ulaanbaatar.^^ This
marks the reversal of a recent historical trend. Prior to the split bet
ween China and the Soviet Union in the mid-1960s, relations between
Mongolia and China were friendly and cooperative. There were many
Chinese living in Mongolia, Chinese food was popular, and many
Chinese restaurants existed in Mongolia. During the split, however,
Mongolia had no choice but to stand on the side of the Soviet Un
ion, and its relations with China plummeted. They got so bad that
in 1983, Mongolia began to systematically expel some of the 7,000
ethnic Chinese in Mongoha to China. Many of them had lived in
Mongolia since the 1950s, when they were sent there to assist in
construction projects.^’ Another victim of that policy were Chin
ese restaurants in Mongolia whose numbers greatly decreased.
How authentic the various foreign cuisines in Mongolia are is
not important in this discussion. Restaurant owners and managers
are modifying the taste of their dishes to attract more Mongolian
customers. The important thing is that the large variety of foreign
cuisines, especially those from countries currently popular in Mon
golia, testifies to the influenee of globalization and Mongolia’s ea
gerness to open its doors to the world.

THE ARRIVAL OF CHRISTIANITY
The Mongols were known for their religious tolerance in the
thirteenth century. Their practice of religious tolerance was not
Moe KhoU, “Help, I’m Locked Inside a Chinese Cookie Factory.” The num
ber may include aU restaurants or eating places where so-caUed Chinese food is
provided. The author of the article complains that one can find bad Chinese
food just about anywhere in Ulaanbaatar.
Howie Ba, “The Chinese Are Coming, the Chinese Are Coming.”
“Background Note: Mongolia,” U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2779.htm (accessed 26 June 2005).
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only a demonstration of self-confidence on the part of leaders like
Chinggis Khan, but also a positive factor that helped them to cre
ate the Mongol world empire. Besides shamanism and Buddhism,
Islam and Christianity were also practiced among the people with
in the Mongol empire.
With the return of Buddhism to Mongolia at the end of the six
teenth century, many Mongols became devoted Buddhists. Being a
lama became commonplace and the number of Buddhist monaste
ries and temples increased significantly. Buddhism became an ins
eparable part of the Mongolian tradition. When the Manchus rose
to power in the seventeenth century, they tried to put the religion
of the Mongols under their control, but they did not challenge
their religious belief and actually became strong promoters of
Buddhism. As for the Mongols, they continued to practice religi
ous tolerance and did not try to convert believers of other religi
ons to Buddhism.
While Mongolia came under the sway of the Soviet Union in
the 1920s, Russian atheism and materialism started to have a pro
found effect in the entire countty^ Religious practice gradually
became a taboo which resulted in a decline in the people's com
mitment to Buddhism, but the religion never entirely vanished
from Mongolia. With the coming of democratization in the 1990s,
Mongolian traditional culture began to regain its importance, and
the revitalization of Buddhism and shamanism is part of this pro
cess. The Mongolian government is making use of some traditio
nal metaphors to emphasize Mongolia’s genuine independence,
and common people embrace their cultural heritage to help them
selves cope with the difficulties that followed the enormous chan
ges in the early 1990s.
One of the consequences of democratization and globalization
has been the arrival of Christianity in Mongolia. Actually, one
could speak of a return because back in the thirteenth century
Nestorian Christianity appeared to have had a presence in some
parts of Mongolia, but their influence vanished a long time ago.
The present influx of Christianity started, according to infor
mation supplied by Serving in Mission, an international Christian
mission agency, with Christian radio programs, but the churches
that have subsequently been established are thoroughly Mongolian,
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and an estimated 20,000 believers now live in MongoUa.^^ Some
Mongols have become Christians because they accept the teach
ings of that religion while others do so because they want to build
a connection to the outside world, especially to the West.
In the UB Post, a joint ad of the International English Speaking
Christian Fellowship and the Mongolian Bible Teaching Seminar
appear almost every week. Christ Fellowship of Mongolia once
published an ad for an “English praise and worship evening” in
the newspaper.^^ Another ad was an invitation for people to parti
cipate in a “one-hour non-stop praise and worship.”* I know
some Filipino and Korean missionaries who serve devotedly in
Ulaanbaatar while keeping a low profile. The Mongolian govern
ment was very suspicious of foreign missionaries in the early
1990s, so the latter had to disguise their true identity and held
meetings secretly in private homes. Now conditions for missiona
ries has considerably improved but is stiU not without problems.
Besides news about Bible teaching, praise, and worship, other
Christian activities, the UB Post also included an item about Presi
dent N. Bagabandi sending a telegram to the Vatican to convey his
condolences over the death of Pope John Paul II,^’ and another
item featured his congratulatory message to the newly-elected
Pope Benedict XVI and Mongolian Catholics rejoicing for Pope
Benedict XVI.* In another ad in the UB Post, I noticed that Kore
an missionaries established an elementary school to educate Kore
an children in Ulaanbaatar that offered both a Korean and an
English curriculum.’^
Under the influence of democratization and globalization,
Christianity returned to Mongolia. If the country continues its democratization efforts, Christianity as well as other religions will

“Mongolia,” Serving in Mission, http://www.sim.co.uk/where/mongolia.
htm (accessed 27 June 2005).
2’ The UB Post 19 May 2005, 2.
30 The UB Post 9 June 2005, 4.
3' “President Sends Telegram to the Vatican,” The UB Post April 2005,1.
32 “Mongolian Catholics Rejoice for Pope Benedict XVI,” The UB Post 28 April
2005, 1.
33 “Ulaanbaatar MK School,” The UB Post 26 May 2005, 5.
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continue to gain adherents in Mongolia, but Buddhism and sham
anism are like to remain more influential.

PROSTITUTION AND TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN
An article in the March 24 issue, entitled “The Dark Side of
Casino Lights” described how Mongolian girls were trafficked to
Macao by other Mongolian women to become prostitutes. The
article was based on an interview of a 21-year-old woman with the
pseudonym Bolor that was originally printed in the newspaper
Mongoliin Medee on March 18.
According to the interview, Bolor was betrayed by her girl
friend and taken to Macao instead of Singapore where she had
wanted to study EngUsh. She ended up working as a prostitute in a
sauna which employed forty women, fuUy half of them being
Mongols. The women worked from eight in the evening until
eight in the morning. On average, each woman served at least five
customers per night, and sometimes up to fifteen on busy nights.
AU women signed six-month contracts with the sauna manager
who confiscated their passports so they could not escape. After
they had worked for six months, each woman was allowed to ret
urn home for a few days, but they are obliged to enlist another
woman from their homeland. They are offered a large commission
for successfully recruiting another woman to the sauna.
Bolor said, “There are a lot of Mongolian women working as
prostitutes in Macao, in karaoke venues, bars, swimming pools,
saunas, and other places of entertainment.” Most of the women
knew in advance they would work as prostitutes, but a few were
cheated and trafficked to Macao. She hopes that the Mongolian
government will take measures against prostitution and to protect
girls who live on the street. She said that street girls as young as
fourteen and fifteen years of age are often trafficked to Macao,
Singapore and Malaysia.
Due to the economic hardships that followed the political and
economic changes in the early 1990s and more foreigners coming
34 “The Dark Side of Casino Lights,” The UB Post, 24 March 2005, 4.
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to Mongolia from richer capitalist countries, prostitution as a phe
nomenon of a market economy began to appear in Mongolia.
There were no laws prohibiting sexual harassment until September
2002,^^ but even after banning prostitution in that year, the prac
tice has spread among girls and women and there are private indi
viduals and groups who make money from acting as their agents.
As early as in 1997, there were one thousand instances of prostitu
tion registered with the police in Ulaanbaatar alone.In 2002, the
official registration figures came down to sixty-one, but a study
conducted by the Mongolian National University in 2001 found
that 200-250 girls in Ulaanbaatar were involved in prostitution.
Most of them were living away from home without supervision
and had previously suffered sexual abuse.^
The increase in child labor and the number of street children
owing to poverty and poverty-driven domestic abuse also provi
ded a source for commercial sex. According to a pilot survey con
ducted in 1998 by the Women’s Information and Research Center
and Save the Children Fund, there were approximately 400 girls
engaged in sex work in Ulaanbaatar. Depending on where they
worked, the girls were paid from two to six dollars per hour and
from six to fifteen dollars per night.’*
Among the eighteen interviewees, 66.7% of the girls answered
that they became sex workers to earn money and 38.9% because it
was part of the street Ufe. Most of the girls live on the street and
some of their families also live on the street. The factors and rea
sons for the girls to become sex workers were inadequate home
“Mongolia,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices — 2002, U.S. Dep
artment of State, http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18255.htm (acc
essed 4 July 2005).
National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia and Centre for Human
Rights and Development, “The crime of trafficking of women and children in
Mongolia: The current situation,” (Ulaanbaatar: November 2002), 9, http://
www.owc.org.mn/chrd/publication/Trafficking%20Report%202002-eng.doc
(accessed 4 July 2005).
“Juverdle Justice in Mongolia,” 13, UNICEF - Mongolia, http://mirror.undp.
org/mongolia/publicationsZjJ_Eng.pdf (accessed 6 July 2005).
“Girls as Sex Workers: Situation and Trends in Mongolia,” Gender Center for
Sustainable Development, http://www.wirc.mn/research/page4.htm (accessed
3 July 2005).
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environment, poverty, conflict in the family, and a lack of appro
priate relationships between parents and children. For the girls
themselves, there were two reasons for being engaged in sex work.
They felt the need to earn money in order to support their low-in
come or unemployed families, and as street girls they regarded
prostitution as their only viable option. Another important reason
given by these interviewees was their very low self-esteem. Having
suffered poverty, hunger, and ultimately being looked down upon
by others, especially by other young people, these women saw in
prostitution their way to better clothing, food, and other opportu39
nities.
The country report on human rights of the U.S. Department of
State also indicates that some female and teenage citizens of Mon
golia worked in the sex trade in Asia and Eastern Europe, and an
unknown number of them may have been trafficked. In 2003, the
national police documented 148 cases of underage prostitution. In
that same year, police investigated seven cases involving nineteen
suspects accused of trafficking sixty women to Hong Kong, Ma
cao, and South Korea. During the year, non-governmental organi
zations reported that seven women were trafficked to Poland
from the counttyf. Authorities detained and subsequently denied
entry to two foreign nationals (one British and one South Korean)
for alleged trafficking of women. The need of foreigners for
commercial sex will be probably on the increase if Mongolia cont
inues to carry on economic reforms towards a market economy.
According to the joint report of the National Human Rights
Commission of Mongolia and the Center for Human Rights and
Development, there are circumstances within Mongolian society
today that are suited to the trafficking of humans. These include a
direct relationship between negative social phenomena that have
arisen as a result of Mongolia’s transition to capitalism. Some of
these phenomena are increased poverty, unemployment, and pros
titution among women as well as drug use among youth, illegal
emigration of citizens abroad, illegal labor of Mongolian citizens
•

•

“Girls as Sex Workers: Situation and Trends in Mongolia.”
“Mongolia,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004, U. S. Depart
ment of State. In http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41652.htm (acc
essed 3 July 2005).
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in foreign countries (including the manufacturing of false visas
and passports), and an increased interest among girls and women
to mart)" foreigners. AH of these factors contribute to an environ
ment in which the crime of trafficking can occur. In addition, a
lack of knowledge about life abroad and naive attitudes in trusting
different kinds of mediators are some of the factors that have led
to trafficking."'’
Prostitutes face a particularly high risk of becoming the object
of trafficking, according to a research conducted by the Center for
Human Rights and Development (CHRD) in 2003. The center
interviewed 124 prostitutes in Ulaanbaatar, Darhan, Choibalsan,
Zamyn-Uud and the Chinese town of Erlian, as well as seventeen
women and girls working in nightclubs and bars in Ulaanbaatar.
Almost a quarter of them were ready to accept proposals to go
overseas for well-paid work if their expenses were covered. The
survey concluded that sales of people take place not only overseas,
but also in Mongolia. Bringing girls and young women from rural
regions to big cities and towns for prostitution has become a
widespread business. 28.2% of the prostitutes responded that they
had been sold forcibly, proving that they are under the patronage
of pimps."'^
In all of the trafficking cases that the CHRD documented, the
women were recruited and transported abroad for the purpose of
coerced prostitution, after being deceived about the nature and/or
conditions of the “employment” awaiting them. Most women
were required to sign contracts, but they were not told about the
debts they would “owe” nor were they aware of the dangers they
were about to face. The recruiters were mostly Mongols, working
in cooperation with agents abroad, and the recruits tended to be
young, single women who are unemployed, students, and/or al
ready engaged in prostitution. Traffickers lured their victims with
promises of high paying jobs, training, education, and/or assist
ance in manning foreigners.

“The crime of trafficking of women and children in Mongolia: The current
situation,” 7.
**2 “People Trafficking on the Rise,” The Mongol Messenger^ http://www.mongol
messenger.mn/issue/040207.php (accessed 6Jul)' 2005).
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According to the research findings, there are many suspicious
recruitment advertisements for women in the Mongolian press in
cluding ads for virgins and specifications about women’s physical
appearance. Although recruiters for overseas employment are re
quired to obtain a licence from the Ministry of Social Welfare, in
reality there is no mechanism for monitoring or enforcing this reg
ulation. Ulaanbaatar and other major urban centers such as Darkhan and Erdenet are the main recruitment centers for traffickers,
and Macao is the most common destinadon, although Mongol
women are also trafficked to China, other parts of Asia, and even
to Europe."^^ It is obvious that girls and women make up the maj
ority of humans trafficked abroad, and many of them are engaged
in prostitudon.
Prosdtudon is new in post-communist Mongolia, but it is cer
tainly not new in Mongolia. Ma Ho-t’ien mendons in his diary that
prosdtutes in Urga (today’s Ulaanbaatar) were said to total two or
three thousand. They included quite a few Russians and Japan-ese
as well as Mongols. Most of the Russians who engaged in prosdtu
don were Buriats, and more than a hundred Japanese women had
embraced that profession.'^ In the 1920s, because the power of
Chinese merchants was sdll overwhelming in Mongolia, many
clients of the prosdtutes were Chinese merchants. At pre-sent, the
clients are not limited to Chinese. They include other foreigners as
well as Mongols, but Japanese women are no longer working as
sex workers in Mongolia.

MONGOLIAN SUMO WRESTLERS IN JAPAN
The last page of each issue of the UB Post features the sports
secdon which is frequendy dominated by news concerning Mong
olian sumo wresders and tournaments. The issue of February 3 re
ported the outstanding record of Mongolian sumo players in To
kyo. The news read, “All-in-all six men from the steppe posted
Centre for Human Rights and Development, “Combating human trafficking
in Mongolia: issues and opportunities,” Ulaanbaatar 2003-2004, http://www.
asiafoundation.org/pdf/Mongolia-trafficking.pdf (accessed 6 July 2005).
Ma Ho-t’ien, Chinese agent in Mongolia, 128-129.
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winning records in Tokyo.” It continued, “These contemporary
Mongols are succeeding where their thirteenth century compatri
ots failed — in completing a successful invasion of Japan. Over se
ven hundred years ago two violent storms helped repel Mongolian
armies from the shores of Kyushu. From there the legend of ka
mikaze was born. This time, however, there appears to be no div
ine wind powerful enough to stop the modern Mongolian
hordes.” The news also mentioned the anxiety of the Japanese by
quoting a Japanese news headline saying, “Foreigners head for tot
al domination of sumo.”'^^ Foreign sumo wrestlers in Japan come
not only from Mongolia, but also from Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia,
Estonia, the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Hungary, South Korea,
China, Brazil, and Tonga. However, more than thirty Mongolian
wrestlers are currently participating in sumo tournaments and they
constitute more than half of the foreign sumo wrestlers in Japan."^^
Under the impact of market economy and globalization, sumo
wrestiing is not only a traditional sport for the Japanese, but also a
game of international stature.
Among the three manly sports of the Mongols, wrestling is the
most popular. The top wrestlers are national heroes. After Mong
olia began its democratic reforms and turned toward a market ec
onomy, many Mongols opened their eyes to foreign countries to
find their opportunities. For Mongolian wrestlers, Japanese sumo
wrestling is a perfect stage for them to try out. Mongolian sumo
wrestlers soon earned their place in Japan. Their pictures appear in
Mongolia’s newspapers, magazines, posters, calendars, and even
political campaign material. Famous sumo wrestlers such as Asashoryu D. Dagvadorj, Kyokushuzan D. Batbayar, and Kyokutenho N. Tsevegnyam became national heroes among the Mongols
due to their great achievements and victories in professional sumo
wrestling. They were even awarded with medals and honored as
“Image Ambassador of Mongolia” by the Mongolian National
Chamber of Commerce and Industry because of their “contribu
tions to promulgating and glorifying MongoUa abroad, extending
“*5 “Gambare Nippon! Native Sumo Subjugated by Foreign Conquerors,” The
UB Post, 3 February 2005, 8.
“AH sumo foreign rikishi,” http://mod.sumogames.com/tForeigners.htm
(accessed 11 July 2005).
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foreign relations, and promoting business and foreign invest
ments.”''^
D. Batbayar is one of the three pioneer Mongolian wrestlers
who went to participate in sumo wrestling back in 1992.“'* His ring
name is Kyokushuzan and highest rank is komusubi, the fourth
highest rank in sumo.*''' He is known as a “supermarket of tricks”
among sumo fans. It is said that he has brought innovation and
dynamics to the traditional sumo wrestling by using Mongolian
wrestling techniques and even tricks long forgotten by Japanese
sumo wrestlers. Most Japanese agree that sumo wrestling became
different after Batbayar entered the arena. His successful debut in
sumo had encouraged many young Mongols to tr\^ out this new
field and caused a surge in interest in sumo wrestling among the
Mongols.^" In sumo, sheer size is no substitute for technique.
Mongolian sumo wrestlers are witness of this point. A Japanese
web proclaims that “the powerfully built Mongolian wrestlers
dazzle the eye with their crisply executed throwing techniques and
are creating a new trend that favors technique over size.” ' This is
the contribution of Mongolian wrestlers to sumo.
Asashor^na Akinori, born as Dolgorsuren Dagvadorj in Ulaanbaatar, went to Japan in 1997 and made his professional debut in
January 1999. When he gained the status of ozeki, the second
highest rank in sumo, in July 2002, he was not only the first Mon
golian and fourth foreign wrestler ever to reach this rank, but also
the fastest to do so since 1958.^^ Asashoryu also became the first
“Database: Inspiring Mongolia,” Mongolian National Chamber of Com
merce and Industry, http://www.mongolchamber.mn/en/modules.php? name
=News&file=article&sid=110 (accessed 11 July 2005).
“A Sumo Pioneer,” Kansai Time Out, no. 333, November 2004, http://www.
kto.co.jp/2004nov/article4.html (accessed 12 July 2005).
“Kyokushuzan,” Goo, Grand Sumo, http://sumo.goo.ne.jp/eng/ozumo_
meikan/rikishi_joho/rikishi.php?A=38 (accessed 12July 2005).
“‘Supermarket’ of WrestPjing Tricks,” Mongolia Today, issue no. 3, http://
www..mongoliatoday.com/issue/3/supermarket_tricks.html (accessed 12 July
2005).
“Sumo Goes International,” Trends in Japan, http://web-japan.org/trends/
sports/spo040204.html (accessed 13 July 2005).
52 “Mongolian Wrestler Promoted to Ozeki,” The japan Times, July 25, 2002,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5Pss20020725al.htm (access-
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Mongolian sumo wrestler to become a yokozuna, the highest rank
in sumo. He was granted the title on January 30, 2003, and is curr
ently the only active yokozuna.^^ Asashoryu was trained as a wrest
ler by his father from childhood. His father and four brothers are
all wrestlers. Asashoryu is relatively Ught for a sumo wrestler, but
he toppled Japanese wrestlers far bigger than himself in spectacu
lar fashion on his way to reaching sumo's pinnacle at the 2003
New Year Grand Sumo Tournament. His success is a matter of
great pride for his family and his homeland.^''

Kyokushuzan D. Batbayar

Kyokutenho N. Tsevegnyam

Asashoryu D. Dagvadoi

As a top national hero, Asashoryu’s activities attrack great att
ention in Mongolia, and it is not surprising to find information ab
out him in the newspapers. During the period that I studied the
UB Post, I came across many headlines such as “Asashoryu Sets
Up Fund for Mongolian Students,”^^“Asashoryu Completes For
malities: Yokozuna Cruises to Victory Despite Late Upset,”^'' “Asashor}oi on Course for Hawaiian Record: Mongolian Set to Take
the Plaudits as Sumo’s Greatest Foreigner,”^^ “Asashoryu Racks
Up Deadly Dozen: Yokozuna Holds Firm to Take Historic Victoed 11 July 2005).
53 “Asashor^di Akinori,” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asashoryu (accessed 11 July 2005).
“Sumo Goes International.”
55 The UB Post, 31 March 2005, 5.
56 The UB Post, 31 March 2005, 8.
5^ The UB Post, 19 May 2005, 8.
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ry,”^* and “Asashoryu Wins With Both Mind and Body; Champ
ion Exhibits Mental Grip Over Challengers.”^® After the May su
mo tournament, Asashoryu and other Mongolian professional su
mo wresders arrived in Ulaanbaatar to play basketball against a
team of traditional wrestlers. The sumo wrestlers won by a score
of 39 to 35. The UB Post reported that “basketball league experts
said that this game had changed people’s understanding of sumo
wrestlers, who because of their weight, move very slowly like turt
les. Asashoryu, who is the team captain, is 184 cm tail and weighs
145 kg. He scored thirteen points in the game.”®®
Although professional sumo wrestlers, who “are succeeding
where their thirteenth century compatriots failed,” are the pride of
Mongolia, keeping Mongolian citizenship is not always in their
personal interest. Kyokutenho N. Tsevegnyam became the first
Mongolian wrestler to get Japanese citizenship on June 22, 2005.
This enabled him to stay in the sumo world after he retires and
become a sumo elder. His fellow Mongol and stablemate Kyokutenzan B. Enkhbat followed suit and also became a Japanese citi
zen.'^' Since neither Mongolia and Japan recognize dual citizenship,
the wrestlers who received Japanese citizenship have to give up
their Mongolian citizenship. Mongols are probably not happy to
see their heroes become foreign citizens, as evidenced by a
reader’s comment in the UB Post. After learning that Tsevegnyam
received Japanese citizenship, a Mongolian reader wrote to the ed
itor that “I feel that he is a pretty selfish guy. After all, who cares
about him. He is not good. Get out of here..
In an era of glo58 The UB Post, 26 May 2005, 8.
55 The UB Post, 1 June 2005, 8.
50 “Sumo vs Tradition in Famous Names Basketball Game,” The UB Post, 1 June
2005, 8.
5' “Mongolian Obtains Citizenship,” The Japan
June 26, 2005, http;//www.
japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getsp.pl5Psp20050626al.htm; “Sumo Wrestler Tseveg
nyam Obtains Japanese Citizenship,” The UB Post, June 29, 2005, http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1120042576&archiv
e=&start_from=&ucat=10& (accessed 11 July 2005).
52 A reader’s comment to “Sumo Wrestler Tsevegnyam Obtains Japanese Citi
zenship,” in http://ubpost.mongolnews.mn/index.php?subaction=showfuU&id
=1120042576&archive=&start_from=&ucat=10& (accessed 11 July 2005).
When I rechecked the news on November 19,1 found this comment removed.

Globalization and the UB Post

121

balization, foreign citizenship is welcome by many Mongols even
though they are stiU proud of being Mongols, but for many others
traditional pride and practical gain are not always compatible.

CONCLUSION
From the evidence provided by the UB Post in the short period
of four months, we can clearly see the enormous impact of global
ization on the life of the Mongols. They have begun to learn
English, Japanese, and Korean, the languages of what they
perceive as model countries. Chinese has also become more useful
and popular. Thousands of Mongols are working or studying in
China, Japan, and South Korea, and many more wish to do so.
Mongolian wrestlers have begun to join sumo wrestling in Japan
and have brought something new to the sport. Within a little bit
more than a decade, they have created a praiseworthy record and
become themselves heroes among many Mongols and sumo fans.
In addition to languages and sumo, cuisines from other cultures
have entered Mongolia and diversified the diet of the Mongols.
While shamanism and Buddhism are recovering their hold in
Mongolia after a hiatus of more than sixty years, Christianity has
also returned, this time as a symbol of the modern developed
West. The well-known Mongolian principle of religious tolerance
seems to have revived. On the down side, Mongolia’s wider open
ing to the rest of the world has also resulted in some decidedly
negative phenomena the worst of which are prostitution and the
trafficking of women. Although declared illegal and roundly con
demned as immoral, they have become a common practice in
Mongolia.
These new developments signify not only language, diet, job,
or religious diversification, but a change of value system and iden
tity as well. During the Soviet era, the Mongols were proud of
their country as the first socialist country in Asia and a country
that “jumped into socialism, bypassing capitalism.” They did not
consider Mongolia poor because it is a vast country of 1,565,000
square kilometers with a sparse human population and a vast
number of herds. However, when Mongolia began its political and
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economic reforms in the early 1990s, the Mongols suddenly reali2ed that their country is neither big nor rich. I have heard on
many occasions some Mongols say that Mongolia is a poor or
even a small countr}". Since Mongolia has chosen a new road of
democracy and market economy, its new role models are the West,
Japan, and the so-called four Asian tigers, i.e. South Korea, Tai
wan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. While old people remain some
what conservative, many even missing the “good old days,” the
younger generations in Mongolia are ver}^ flexible and ready to
exploit any opportunity to reach out to the world. They may be
still proud of the glorious past of their ancestors, but they are
pragmatic and looking to the fumre. They are writing a new histo
ry of their own.
Unlike anti-globalization protesters in other countries, Mongols
seem not to worry too much about the impact of globalization.
On the contrary, reading the news and articles in the UB Post, one
gets the impression that Mongols welcome globalization and are
happy to go with the flow. They want to be part of the modern
world. However, whether globalization is a blessing or a curse for
Mongolia is worth further discussion.'’’ The Mongols may be too
optimistic or too naive about what globalization will bring them. It
is true that globalization is not a new thing. It happened before in
history, and the active agents of globalization have often been loc
ated far from the West.'’** The Mongol empire was an agent of this
kind in the thirteenth centur}'. However, it is also true that the act
ive agents of the current process of globalization are mainly the
Western countries. Therefore, this new form of globalization is
largely and unavoidably a process of economic, political, and cult
ural Westernization. Throughout much of the twentieth centur\f
Mongolia had undergone a process of Westernization through
Soviet influences, but it was ver}" different from today’s kind.
Mongolia is now a relatively poor countr}' coping with great social
changes and uncertainties due to its political and economic trans
formation. With the inclusion of globalization as a variable to the
^'’[Editor’s note: See Paul D. Buell and Ngan Le’s chapter in this book].
Amartya Sen, “Does Globalization Equal Westernization?” The Globalist,
March 25, 2002, http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspxPStoryId
=2353 (accessed 15 July 2005).

Globalization and the UB Post

123

stiU vulnerable infrastructure, Mongolia without a solid social base
will face more difficulties ahead. Since the Mongols have demons
trated their wisdom in the process of post-communist democrati
zation, we expect them to eventually reach a socially acceptable
balance between economic prosperity and social justice.
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Global Hip-Hop and Youth Cultural
Politics in Urban Mongolia
Peter K. Marsh
One of the most geographically remote nations in the world,
Mongolia has been affected by many of the same cultural flows
that have transformed youth culture throughout the world during
the twentieth century. Since the 1960s, the nation’s youth have
been in contact with various forms of Western commercial popu
lar music. When hip-hop emerged from the Bronx in the 1980s, it
spread throughout the United States and then on to other nations.
It took root in Mongolia as well, arriving in the mid- to late 1990s.
Since the early 2000s it has become one of the most important
mainstream musical and cultural forms.
On the surface, the progress of rap and hip-hop culture from
New York City to Ulaanbaatar appears simply to be the result of
the forces of globalization, the integration of capitalist markets
that allows the free movement of commodities from one part of
the world to another. Yet as Appadurai reminds us, the process is
considerably more complex, involving the movement of people,
money, ideas, media and technology—all of which are “fluid,
overlapping, and disjunctive”' in ways in which no one dimension
is paramount over nor controlled by any one monolithic entity or
system. But when dealing with complex cultural forms, it is impor
tant to ask not only what is being created but also how it is being re’ Arjun Appadurai, “Disjunctures and Difference in the Global Cultural Econ
omy,” Public Culture 2:2 (1990), 7.
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ceived. While both Mongolia and the United States have hip-hop
cultures, the different ways each of them is conceived can help us
to better understand Mongolia’s relationship with the processes of
cultural globalization.
This study examines the development of hip-hop in the con
text of an emerging popular music industry in Mongolia over the
period of approximately forty years. From this perspective, hiphop appears to be no mere imitative or derivative form of West
ern popular music, but rather one that has been skillfully appropri
ated by media-saturated Mongolian youths and adapted to specific
conditions of their local context in urban Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia’s
sprawling and densely populated capital city. While Mongolian
hip-hop bears clear similarities with the ‘gangsta’ rap traditions of
the United States, a closer look shows that it is much more abst
ract than may at first be apparent. Tricia Rose has offered valuable
frameworks for the study of hip-hop within African American
contexts, but the studies by scholars such as Tony Mitchell and
Ian Maxwell, who have examined hip-hop outside of the United
States, offer especially useful sources for this analysis. While Mon
golian rappers are interacting with the transnational hip-hop scene,
they are also responding to the popular musical scene in their own
nation in ways that are rich with new ideas about being young and
Mongolian in contemporaty^ Mongolia.

WESTERN-INSPIRED POPULAR MUSIC
Western-inspired popular music genres have a long histoty' in
Mongolia. Russian and Soviet forms of popular culture were intro
duced to the country following the People’s Revolution of 1921,
which soon brought Mongolia into the orbit of the Soviet Union.
Throughout the twentieth centutyy genres such as circus and film
music, ballroom dance, and jazz held an important place in the
newly developed national media, a network of newspapers, radio,
film, and (later) television that the state expanded into the farthest
reaches of the Mongolian countn^side. Other important forms of
popular culture included professional folk music, music theatre,
and a uniquely Mongolian form of popular song known as “com-
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posed” songs {^okhioljn duu)} Each of these genres was integrated
into the nation’s newly developed schools of music and closely
controlled by state-run cultural organizations, often in close coop
eration with musicians, composers, and producers from the Soviet
Union.
Restrictions on travel and trade that were maintained by the
Soviet-backed ruling party, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary
Party (MPRP), effectively isolated the country from the cultural
influences of nations outside of the Soviet world. But even so, by
the 1960s, elements of the mainstream musical culture of the nonSoviet West began to find their way into the hands of Mongolian
youths. These included vinyl LP records and recorded audio tapes
featuring the music of the Beaties, the Rolling Stones, Led ZeppeHn, Smokie and other Western popular music groups of the late
1960s and early 1970s, which were often smuggled into the countvj in their luggage by the children of Mongolian diplomats posted
abroad or musicians returning from foreign tours. These cultural
materials were then circulated in decidedly illicit ways, frequently
passing among youths (primarily in Ulaanbaatar) through hand-tohand networks, not unlike those described by Ryback’ and others
in parts of the former Soviet Union. Many Mongolian youths were
fascinated with the new sounds that these groups were creating
and the new forms of youth culture they represented. A thriving
underground market in popular material culture grew up in the pe
riod, which beyond musical recordings included the distribution of
Western styles of clothing (particularly blue jeans), magazines,
posters, and )ewelr}^
At first suspicious of this music and the global or “capitalist”
systems that had brought it to the doorstep of their nation, the

2 Zokhioljn duu is a hybrid genre featuring newly composed melodies that are
modeled after folk song melodies and accompanied by small ensembles or or
chestras.
’ Timothy Ryback, Kock Around the B/oc: A History of Bock Music in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); see also S. Fred
erick Starr, Bed and Hot: The Fate ofJat^p^ in the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983); Artemy Troitsky, Back in the USSB (London: Faber and
Faber, 1987); and Sabrina Petra Ramet, ed., Blocking the State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).
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leaders in the MPRP soon came to realize that they could not stop
this movement of Western material culture by banning it or viol
ently suppressing it. Thus they chose to appropriate it into the nat
ional culture, but on the Party’s own terms. Starting in the early
1970s, the Party formed and managed a number of so-called estrad
ensembles (the Russian word for staged entertainment), two of the
first being Cultural Jewel {Sojol Erdene) and Rich Mongolia {Bajan
Mongol).
These were groups of Mongolian artists performing Westerninspired popular music in a “socialist” style. While Cultural Jewel
on-stage—with a drummer, one to two electric guitarists, a bassist
and a lead singer—resembled its Western counterparts, the culmral
setting in which the group worked was entirely different. As a
state-managed ensemble, this and other such ensembles were
assigned specific places within a hierarchy of other state-run orga
nizations direcdy linked to the Ministry of Culture. The Party pro
vided them with regular salaries, access to musical instruments and
training, and organized regular concerts, recording opportunities,
and tours throughout the Mongolian countryside and to other so
cialist “brother” nations. In exchange, these artists and groups had
to go where the Party wanted them to go and to do what it wanted
them to do: they were expected to wear the stage uniforms the
Party created for them, to perform the repertoire the Party gave
them, and even to cut their hair as the Party directed.
By the 1980s estrad music formed an important part of the nat
ion’s cultural mainstream. Especially popular were sentimental
love ballads and those that drew upon more traditional themes,
such as songs that praised the beauty of the Mongolian landscape.
Artists were also provided with songs that glorified the nation’s
development and the wisdom of the Soviet leaders. But the Party’s
official legitimation of Western-inspired popular music proved to
be a double-edged sword as artists increasingly began to challenge
the Party’s authority to control the entire political and artistic
space within the realm of popular culture. In the mid-1980s the
lead singer of the group Cultural Jewel, D. Jargalsaikhan, felt that
the time was right to defy Party rules and sing a song he had writ
ten about Chinggis Khan, a subject that was still largely considered
to be taboo in public discussion. The song praised the spirit of the
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great khan, asking him to forgive the Mongolian people for forget
ting about him for so many years. In singing it at a public concert,
Jargalsaikhan was not only expressing his deep convictions about
this powerful symbol of Mongolian identity, but also playing to
the growing nationalist sentiments of his Mongolian listeners.
The band Bell {Khonkh) also played an important role in this re
gard. It was led by two young Mongolian classmates who had just
returned from journalism school in Russia. The group’s most fam
ous song, “Sound of the BeU” (JQ/onkhtty duu), calls on people to
wake up to the dawning of a new day. Its melody was taken up
and sung by protesters during the street demonstrations and prot
est rallies that took place outside government buildings between
1989 and 1990.

The group Khonkh performing during one of the pre-democracy protest
rallies in 1990. Courtesy Peter Marsh

Another of the group’s very popular songs depicts the confu
sion, if not desperation, of Party members who are watching the
growing political protests from their office windows:
The city looks very heautiful. Ifyou look through the window,
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people walk purposefully on the streets. Through the window,
life seems pleasant. Send a message, girl: All isfine, all is right.
Please take this down, write it down. Tell them not to demand
any more^
The song resonated with a widespread sense of unease about a
national leadership that many felt to be out of touch with the eve
ryday lives and problems of its citizens. Its popularity also reflec
ted the rise of an independent-minded generation of artists who
sought to claim the realm of popular culture for themselves. Mon
golian estrad groups were no longer merely imitating their Western
idols nor passively glorifying state ideolog}'. They instead had mas
tered their Western genres and the technical skills needed to prod
uce them and were increasingly appropriating them to speak to the
situations in which they found themselves. The important role
that the group Bell played in helping to focus the sentiments of
the pro-democracy demonstrators demonstrated the emerging ma
turity and growing authority that popular music was attaining in
the period, trends that would continue without pause into the
post-socialist era.

MONGOLIAN POP FINDS ITS OWN VOICE
Popular music around the time of the so-called democratic rev
olution of 1990 was frequently rife with political ideas and critic
ism. This was a time, Jargalsaikhan says, “when politics was in the
air we breathed.”’^ But following the rapid introduction of market
economic reforms and the successful completion of the nation’s
first multi-party election, youth interest in politics faded fast. A
contributing factor for this was the severe economic downturn
that accompanied the sudden end to generous Soviet subsidies,
coupled with the economic shock therapy advocated by the World
Bank. Mongols suddenly faced not only the disappearance of ma
ny social services they had come to rely upon, but also a steep de^ Nicholas D. Kristof, “A Mongolian Rock Group Fosters Democracy,” The
New York Times (26 March 1990), Cl 1:1.
5 Jargalsaikhan, in 1999 interview.
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dine in their living standards. For many in this period, even find
ing enough food to eat was difficult. Mongols had finally won the
right to speak their minds and to travel freely, although few had
the resources to do so.
Despite the difficult economic situation (and likely in part bec
ause of it), Mongolian popular culture expanded dramatically in
the first half of the 1990s, fueled in large part by the sudden avail
ability of communication and recording technologies. Several new
independent media and broadcasting companies began operations
in Ulaanbaatar, including a number of privately owned television
and FM radio stations, bringing real competition to the still statemn and still largely centrah2ed Montsame news service and Mong
olian Radio & Television. Satellite and cable TV entered the mar
ket by the mid-1990s and quickly gained popularity in the urban
areas. Some of the more popular ones included the MTV and
MTV-Asia channels. Computer centers also began to open around
the city that offered Mongols access to computer games and the
Internet as well as to training in how to build websites and use ad
vanced computer software. Such developments gave Mongolian
youths for the first time direct access to the transnational flows of
popular culture. At the same time, young people were gaining acc
ess to relatively inexpensive technologies that allowed them to rec
ord, mix, and master audio and video recordings, which in turn
allowed them to begin creating their own songs and videos at lev
els of quality and control that were unavailable to earlier genera
tions of popular musical artists. These new technologies allowed
artists to not only consume the “global” popular music but also
interact with it at a local level.
Mongolian popular music itself became increasingly diverse
throughout the 1990s as artists began to experiment with the new
genres that they were hearing in the international media, including
pop ballads, boy and girl bands, and rock music. Some of the most
famous artists included the pop singers Jargalsaikhan, Sarantuya,
and Ariunaa (who has been dubbed the ‘Madonna of Mongolia’);
boy bands like Camerton and girl bands like the Spike Girls. Hurd
and Kharanga also achieved a great deal of popularity as “heavy
metal” and “hard rock” groups, respectively. While these perform
ers were usually inspired by well-known Western artists and
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groups, each developed their own unique musical and presentatio
nal styles.
Typically, few popular musical artists perform cover versions
of Western popular music since most say that Mongolian audien
ces prefer their artists to create uniquely Mongolian forms of these
Western genres. For the artists, this means finding a stylistic bal
ance between the two. As in the socialist era, songs about finding
love and happiness have continued to be favored song themes.
But many artists have also continued to draw upon traditional
themes, such as love for one’s parents, the beauty of the Mongol
ian landscape, or the wonders of the Mongolian horse. It is com
mon for artists to create songs that blend the sounds of traditional
Mongolian folk musical instruments and singing styles. At the
same time, they have also become quite sophisticated at under
standing the wishes of their audiences, and many are wary of mov
ing too far towards the “traditional.” The members of the rock
band Hurd explained to me that most bands have two kinds of
song repertoires. For audiences consisting of foreigners or older
generations of Mongols they perform songs that are “more tradit
ional” or that romanticize Mongolian culture, but for their young
Mongolian fans, they perform songs that are instead closely inspir
ed by the Western rock bands they idolize, which for Hurd means
songs styled after the famous heavy metal bands Black Sabbath
and AC/DC.'’
Since at least the middle of the twentieth century, Mongolian
popular music has followed cultural trends that we can call cosm
opolitan.^ By the 1970s, the ruling MPRP insisted that its artists
produce uniquely Mongolian forms of music that could stand as
“Mongolian” contributions to the much larger Soviet “internatio
nal” world of popular music. In this way, Mongolian artists have
been dealing with the issues of the globalization of popular music
for decades, although the “global” in this sense was limited to the
world of the Soviet Union and its satellites. In the post-socialist
era, Mongols have continued to create hybrid forms of popular

Hurd, in 1999 interview.
Cf. Marsh for a discussion of cosmopolitan cultural trends in Mongolian mu
sic.
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music that is fashioned after Western popular song genres and yet
uniquely Mongolian in sound and style. When Mongols ask for
eign visitors how their music compares with Western popular mu
sic, one gets the sense that they would like to hear their music
compared seriously with the “best of the West.”

GROWTH OF A POP MUSIC INDUSTRY IN THE 1990s
By the late 1990s, popular musical artists were not only begin
ning to find their own individual voices, but also to conceive of
themselves as a distinct community. When the Mongolian govern
ment declared 1998 to be the “Year of the Youth,” a year-long ce
lebration of Mongolia’s young people and their potential, many of
the leading Mongolian popular music artists of the day gathered to
sing the song commissioned by the government for the event,
“The future begins today” (Ireedrn onoodroos ekhelnee). The song was
structured in a way that allowed individual artists and groups to
take turns singing verses, with short musical breaks made to acc
ommodate changes in genre style; the chorus refrain was then
sung by all the performers in unison. The artists lined up on stage
in a long row, stepping forward into the spotlight to sing their
own verse. The song and its accompanying video proved to be ve
ry popular with people throughout the nation and they were subsequentiy broadcast on local and national FM radio and television
broadcasts throughout the year. The song’s overall effect was to
present a musical community that, despite its diversity of individ
ual styles, was united in its goal of celebrating the nation’s youth,
not unlike the effect the 1985 song “We Are the World” had in
uniting leading Euro-American singers toward the goal of fighting
hunger in Africa.
Other important steps toward founding and unifying this com
munity involved the creation of organizations that helped to legiti
mize its practices. The establishment in 1997 of an annual yearend music awards ceremony called Pentatonic, which its organiz
ers now market as the “Mongolian Grammys,” allows this emerg
ing industry to recognize and reward the performers, producers,
and production companies that have achieved popular success
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within it. This is a process that, as with its American counterpart,
has helped to define the popular musical mainstream in Mongolia.
The formation of the Mongolian Singer’s Union {Mongoljn duuchny
kholboo) in 1998 has also assisted in this process. The organization
seeks to organize professional singers throughout the nation, to
lobby the government on important issues (their efforts contribut
ed to the Ulaanbaatar city government’s decision to build the mul
ti-stage “UB Palace” in 2002), and to assist singers in the countty"side.*
The increasingly formalized ways in which the business of pop
ular music was run in this period was encouraged in large part by
the young industry’s growing ties with big business. By the late
1990s, popular artists and bands were finding eager sponsors from
among many of the new emerging businesses of post-socialist
Mongolia, including luxury clothing (principally cashmere wool)
manufacturers; alcoholic breweries (principally the several highly
successful joint ventures between German and Mongolian beer
manufacturers established in the period in Ulaanbaatar), importers
and upper-class bars; and luxuty" car distributors (the local Merce
des-Benz distributor was one of the most generous). Other impor
tant sponsors included media companies that were, in this period,
in the process of consolidating into a few large private entities.
Since then they have come to control most of the important radio
and television stations and national and urban newspapers. These
sponsors financially supported artists in the production of their
CDs and music-videos and the organization of their concerts and
tours. In turn they benefited from their name association with
those that became successful. An extreme example of this came in
the late 1990s when the popular heavy metal band Hurd signed a
sponsorship deal with the Erel Company of Mongolia, one of the
largest of the domestic mining companies. Soon thereafter the
band was renamed Erel-Hurd.
The presence of these sponsors also points to a deeper social
transformation that has been occurring in Ulaanbaatar since the
mid-1990s. Though a large percentage of Mongols continue to live

* Hurd and Jargalsaikhan, in their 1999 interviews.
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in relative poverty,’ the overall growth of the national economy in
the past decade has helped many achieve a higher standard of liv
ing. Mining, tourism and trade are just some of the major new sec
tors of the nation’s economy. The recent boom in the markets for
new apartments, cars, and electronic goods in Ulaanbaatar is a sign
of an emerging middle class with cash to spend on goods, luxuries,
and entertainment. Mongolian popular musical artists have found
many new venues to perform with the opening of night clubs and
bars that cater to the middle and upper classes. The “classless” so
ciety that was said to exist during the socialist era is now becoming
increasingly divided between the relatively rich and poor sectors of
society.'" While there are many who are benefiting from the new
opportunities in the Mongolian economy, particularly Mongolian
entrepreneurs and the highly educated, there are many more who
are not or cannot, particularly those in the public sector. Even uni
versity professors and medical doctors working in public institu
tions continue to earn an average of $100 a month in salaty, and
often less in the counttyside.
The relative appearance of wealth in Ulaanbaatar, however,
continues to be a driving force in the rising number of people
who are migrating from rural areas to the capital city, where most
seek jobs and the services and amenities located there." Many,
however, end up in the sprawling ger districts on the edges of the
city. These are named after the traditional round tents {ger}) in
which nomadic herder families live in the countryside. Many new
immigrants to the city set up their ger^ and surround them with a
wooden fence, making a small family compound {khashad) that is
attached to other such compounds. Many of the residencies in
The latest measurements by the United Nations Development Programmes
state that 35.6% of the population in 1998 was living below the poverty line
(UNDP 2003: 12).
The UNDP found that the Gini-coefficient, a measure of income inequality,
increased by 42% between 1995 and 1998, showing “that the income distribu
tion is becoming more unequal in Mongolia” (UNDP 2003: 26).
” Joerg Janzen and his co-workers found that most people immigrated to the
city from rural areas in search of an improved standard of living and better acc
ess to employment, medical services and schools. See their H New Ger-Settlement
in Ulaanbaatar. Functional Differentiation, Demographic and Socioeconomic Structure and
Origin of Residents (Ulaanbaatar, 2002), 18.
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these districts lack electricity and running water, and other social
services Hke schools and medical clinics are in short supply. Most
families living there sold their domesticated animals before com
ing to the city with the hope that they would find jobs to support
themselves, but levels of unemployment in these districts remain
high, as do levels of crime. Despite the population density and
high levels of poverty, the ger districts are not widely considered to
be ghettos or slums among Mongols in Ulaanbaatar, as similar pla
ces might be in other parts of the world. But there is a growing
stigma among wealthier city residents towards those who live in
some of these districts. Popular musicians, for their part, remain
well aware that many of their fans come from poor households,
whether or not they live in the ger districts, and thus they try to
keep the costs of their concert tickets and CDs low, typically
around US$3 to $5 a piece.
Another sign of the growing influence of mainstream popular
music is the close relationships that exist between artists and lead
ing politicians and political parties. Political leaders are well aware
of the potential political power of popular music. More than a few
in the current generation might even have participated in the pub
lic demonstrations more than a decade ago. In each of the national
elections for both the Parliament and Presidency since the late
1990s, the main political parties have drafted popular music artists
into their campaigns; some demanding that artists sign contracts
that require them to work exclusively for a specific political party.
The appearance of pop stars and groups at campaign rallies and in
political campaign advertising has become a common part of the
political scene in contemporary Mongolia. Some artists have even
begun to actively campaign in support of particular candidates and
parties, sometimes even composing campaign theme songs.
Mongolian youths of the past several decades have shown
themselves to be keen observers of Western and “global” popular
cultural styles and fully capable of appropriating and adapting
them to their own musical and artistic worlds. Since the late 1980s
popular musical artists have taken advantage of the economic, pol
itical, and technological changes that have come to Mongolia and
established the basis for a powerful popular music industry. Popu
lar music in this country has developed hand-in-glove with emerg-
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ing entities in the worlds of the mass media, business, and politics,
each “scratching the other’s back.” This industry also has grown
in parallel with an emerging middle class in Ulaanbaatar. It is now
as integrated with the nation’s superculture as it was at the height
of the socialist era, one difference being that now many of the
formerly rebellious youths who chafed against the Party’s attempts
to control their art are themselves its representatives, and like the
Party leaders they served, these industry leaders have much at
stake in maintaining its conventions. But as in youth cultures
throughout the world, where one finds accommodation to main
stream authority, one wiU typically also find subculmral resistance
to it. In the late 1990s and early 2000s,
and ‘'hip hop”, terms
the Mongols themselves use, have emerged as both a reaction ag
ainst the conventions of the popular musical mainstream and exp
ressions of self-identity from a new generation of Mongols seek
ing to make their voice heard in the youth cultural scene.

RAPPERS AS THE ‘BAD BOYS’ OF THE MUSICAL WORLD
The first popular group to rap in their music was Black Rose
(Khar Samai). The group, consisting of two brothers, burst onto
the scene in the early 1990s with their loud, raw, and beat-heavy
music, wild hair, face paints, fantastic cosmmes, and vigorous dan
cing. Describing their music as “techno-rap,” the two singers
commonly traded raps with each other over heavy house beats.
The pair would often shout their lyrics at their audience in guttural
and growling voices. Their songs were typically fast-paced and on
stage the duo would constantly move about and dance, thrusting
their fists and legs into the air. While many of their songs dealt
with love, the duo described them as love songs that were “more
realistic” than those common to the mainstream ballad singers.
Their songs also often touched on taboo themes: one early hit for
the group described a man’s love for a prostitute.
In their musical, lyrical and presentational style. Black Rose sig
naled a clear break from the refined, well-quaffed and weU-behaved ballad singers who dominated the musical mainstream
throughout the era of socialism and into the 1990s. In challenging
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the Mongolian pop song conventions of the day, the group was
seeking to clear a space for a new subcultural musical style. Al
though influenced by the Western “techno and rap artists they
had experienced through the media, they sought to create and
market a new musical voice that they felt to be particularly well
suited to the cultural and political landscape of their homeland.

The “techno-rap” group Black Rose (Black Rose 2001).

The duo described themselves in the late 1990s as nationalists
who wanted their music and dance to instiU within young Mongols
a feeling of pride in their nation, its historyy and traditions. They
accomplished this by actively mixing Mongolian folk musical, song
and dance traditions and traditional song themes with hip-hop.
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techno, and house beats. The group’s attempts in the late 1990s to
establish a nationalist-oriented nationwide youth organization
shows that their “play” with these Western cultural forms was also
an engagement with the very serious business of cultural politics in
the nation in that period. Many hip-hop artists today do not consi
der Black Rose to be a part of the early histor}^ of rap in Mongolia,
labeling their style as “techno.” But in its popular mixture of mus
ic, dance, and performance art, as well as its cultural outspoken
ness, the group clearly did help a rising generation of Mongolian
performers to conceive of popular music in new ways.

The group Tatar (Tatar n.d.).
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A number of self-described rep groups had formed by the late1990s, but it was not until the early 2000s that the genre really be
gan to catch the public’s eye. Most of the first groups to gain pop
ularity then, including Digital, Ice Top, Montarep, Lumino, and
Tatar, remain some of the most popular and established groups
today, though there are now at least ten other groups working in
Ulaanbaatar. Of these only one, 3 Girls {3 Okhin), consists of wo
men rappers. In Mongolia, as in other parts of the world, rap is a
largely male activity, although women nearly always appear as
back-up singers on recordings and supporting actresses in videos.
The Mongolian artists interviewed for this study were quick to list
the international artists and groups that inspired them, some of
the more influential being Eminem, Tupac Shakur, Snoop Dogg}^
Dogg, MC Hammer, and Wu-Tang Clan, as well as some wellknown non-American groups like the French rappers MC Solaar
and I AM and even a number of South Korean and Japanese rap
groups.
Through their “street” clothing, body movements and gestures,
jewelry and forms of bodily ornamentation, Mongolian rappers
and hip-hop artists show their allegiance to their idols as well as
their determination to bring hip-hop to Mongolia in their own
unique ways. They also show the degree to which they are inter
acting with the master narratives about the origins and develop
ment of hip-hop that have accompanied the song form to the
country. Tricia Rose writes that as hip-hop spread and took root
in different parts of the United States, it retained the “larger forces
that define hip-hop and Afrodiasporic cultures,” including its arti
culation of “a sense of entitlement and pleasure in aggressive in
subordination.”’^ That Mongolian rappers have eagerly taken up
this sense of entitlement and insubordination is evident in most of
their rap concerts, videos, websites, CDs and other forms of pub
lic display.
For example, many revel in “gangsta” or “bad boy” imager}'.
Like their international counterparts, Mongolian rappers prefer
“street thug” clothing, typically ranging from loose-fitting sportsTricia Rose, Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary Mmerica
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1994), 60.
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wear (usually bearing the icons of American sports teams) to tightfitting leather jackets and pants. Many wear large pieces of jewelry,
such as rings and chain necklaces, and commonly bare body pier
cings and tattoos. Most wear baseball caps (worn backward or to
the side), but some shave off their hair completely. The rappers
bounce and sway to the beats of their music on stage and in their
videos, and p'picaUy use hand signals and gestures seen in Western
rap videos. In each of these ways, Mongolian rappers are both ali
gning themselves with international hip-hop customs while also

The group Lumino in hip-hop style (Lumino 2003).

defining their style as different from the love ballad, boy band,
and rock genres of the Mongolian popular musical mainstream.
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The “insubordination” of these Mongolian hip-hop groups ext
ends to their use of obscene language, graffiti, and provocative
storylines for their videos and CDs. Mongolian rappers’ heavy use
of swear words in their lyrics has led to the rise “parental advisory
for explicit content” labels’'^ similar to those in the United States
that artists are required to place onto their CDs. Rather than being
ashamed of these labels or hiding them on the back sides of their
CDs, however, most groups show them on the fronts of their
CDs as if they are badges of honor.
Graffiti has also emerged as another form of insubordination
broadly associated with hip-hop in Mongolia. While many instan-

Graffiti images associated with hip-hop groups in downtown Ulaanbaatar.
Courtesy Veter K Marsh.

ces of graffiti throughout Ulaanbaatar appear to be spontaneous
and illicit, such as spray-painting the names of hip-hop groups on
the sides of buildings, some of the more significant forms of graf-

In Mongolian, tiimend niitsekhuits khelleg aguulagdaw.
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fiti appear to be meticulously planned. A clear example of the lat
ter is found on a long concrete wall overlooking an unused lot in
downtown Ulaanbaatar, just across from the city’s central square.
Images associated with six different hip-hop groups have been
painted onto the walls in graffiti style. Members of some of these
groups said that these groups recently banded together to hire a
local artist to make these paintings. One of these paintings, how
ever, is an advertisement for a local sports bar painted in graffiti
Style, suggesting that they all could have been done with both fin
ancial support from local businesses and the approval of local au
thorities.
In a similar way, groups are often provocative in the images
they use to accompany their CDs and songs. In their 2004 CD
“New Life,” which features the logo of a marijuana leaf, the group
Ice Top includes a photographic spread in the liner notes featur
ing band members dressed as thieves meeting after a heist. While
some are counting stacks of American dollar bills, others appear
to be sniffing cocaine.

The group Ice Top dressed as thieves (Ice Top n.d.).

In 2002 the Mongolian government tried to stop the airing of a
music video of their song “Follow Me and Have Fun” (Namaig dagaad tsenge) by the group Lumino. Shot in a strip club, the video
featured band members rapping while Mongolian women in
thongs lay on tables and danced around them. Soon after its rel-
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ease, the Mongolian Minister of Justice labeled the video “pornog
raphic” and ordered it banned from being broadcast on those tele
vision stations closely allied with the ruling political party. As
might be expected, the Minister’s denunciation helped to boost
the sales of the group’s CD and enhanced the ‘bad boy’ image of
this and other rap groups. The song eventually became one of the
group’s biggest hits and went on to win the Best Song of the Year
award at the music industry’s Pentatonic awards ceremony later
that year. The group’s re-release of the video in 2004 featured the
words “censored” in English flashing on various parts of the
screen, as if the group was thumbing its nose at the Minister’s att
empts to ban it.
Other key elements of global hip-hop that Mongolian rappers
have picked up on are the ideas of the “crew” and “neighbor
hood.” Rose explains that American rappers employ the symbolic
language of the “ghetto” by referring to their band members as
their “crew.”’^^ She describes crews as a “new kind of families
forged with intercultural bonds that ... provide insulation and
support” not unlike the social networks within gangs. ” They share
a body of codes, from tattoos, piercings, haircut, and clothing
styles to body movement and hand gestures that signify their iden
tity as belonging to a particular gang or neighborhood. Mongolian
rappers tend not to have as highly defined a system of identity
markers, but they do commonly portray themselves as having a
“crew,” and some even use this word in their band’s name.'*’
Groups commonly like to portray themselves as a part of a com
munity or neighborhood of friends. One recent video by the
young group Snep Crew opens with the artists breakdancing on a
street in front of upper-middle class homes in Ulaanbaatar, surr
ounded and being urged on by their friends sitting nearby on the
ground and on parked cars.
The scenes change to an outdoor courtyard where they play
basketball, a sports hall where they box, a room in a house where
they “scratch” LP records, and an abandoned building where they
Rose, op. cit, 10.
'5 Ibid., 34.
“BAT and The Crew” and “Snep Crew” are the best known examples of this
practice.
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breakdance. The overall image is of a community filled with young
people living in one close-knit “neighborhood,” all having a good
time through dancing, listening to and making music, playing

Breakdancing on the street, from the video “Jin tan” (Snep Crew 2004).

sports, and “hanging out” together. For other rappers, however,
the “neighborhood” that their crew passes through has more in
common with the stereopjtical “hoods” found in Western ‘gangsta’ rap videos, such as abandoned factory sites, an old train yard,
or dilapidated buildings.
Setting their videos in such blighted and post-industrial parts of
Ulaanbaatar reflects the wish of many groups to address the dark
er sides of growing up. Many songs deal with the problems of fin
ding love, creating one’s own identity, and- figuring out one’s own
way in the world. WTiile love is a common theme in all popular
music, most Mongolian hip-hop songs about love are “harder”
and “darker.” Many deal with the pain of love, though often from
a man’s point of view, given that the majority of rappers are male.
The song “Someone’s” (KhtiniikI)) by the group Lumino features
one of the singers rapping to his friends about how he tried to win
the heart of the woman he truly loved, only to find out that she
“belonged” to someone else.
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The group Lumino, from the video “fChiiniikh” (Lumino 2003).

A song by the group Digital, “Only One Life to Live” {Gants I
amidarch tikhne), has the rappers struggling with deeper questions
about how one should live one’s Ufe:
In life, allpeople are growing up andfalling down,
So what are we to do with our lives'?
Some people drink a lot, others study a lot.
But what are they really reachingfor?
Ufe is difficult to understand^
Some groups take this idea of “harder” and “darker” further,
seeing hip-hop as a medium for criticizing larger social problems
in their society. A number of rappers said they were attracted to
hip-hop because of the freedom that the genre gave them to exp
ress their ideas, hopes, and fears. While most groups continue to
rap about love and the problems of growing up in Mongolia, ma
ny do see in hip-hop the opportunity to express their frustrations

Digital, “This Is Life” (2003).
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with larger problems in their society. The rapper Batorgil, from
the group Ice Top, is clear about this:
Our society is very dirty'® and we can easily
reveal these things through our hip-hop art.
There are many people who are angry and
anxious, and we can give them a voice. But
pop-rock [singers] always sing about love.
Pop-rock cannot raise these problems in our
society.
The rapper BAT emphasizes the idea that rap allows people to
speak about their world in realistic, rather than romantic, ways:
On both [of my previous] albums, I rap about
the country—and I don’t mean about how
beautiful it is because we have mountains or
whatever. I don’t do that. I just speak about
what I see, you know. Too many people are
asking for money. Too many people are drunk
or homeless. And I also talk about what the
government, these 76 [parliamentarians], are
doing."*
There are some groups that have created songs that criticize
specific types of bad behavior or difficult situations in Mongolia.
In its song “A Growing Flower,” the group Digital chastises peo
ple for treating street children badly. “Their condition is not their
fault,” they rap, “their parents are at fault for not thinking about
their children’s future.” The group War & Peace takes on the lar
ger question of the insensitivity of the nation’s leaders to the suff
ering of the poor in its song, “A Letter to Our President”:
The government spendsfouryears doing nothing. They never
do the things they promised. 1 have seenyour smilingface on
television and read whatyou’ve written, hut there is little that
you have implemented. Doyou run the countryfromyour
black glassed windowed cars? From behind the windows,
the poor Mongolians won’t be seenr
Bokhir means dirty but also “not fair or straight” and commonly referring to
corruption.
Batbold, in 2005 interview.
Dain ba Enkh, “Neg Chig” (2002).
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Such political criticism, which has politicians seeing the Ufe of the
citizens through tinted windows, is reminiscent of that voiced in
the protest songs by the group Bell. In a recent song, the group
Tatar blames the rich in general for the plight of the nation’s poor:
The rich ones with money live like in Heaven
Theyjustplay with their money and their girls and
Use their money to play with otherpeople.
But the other ones, on their birthdays, must drink alcohol and water
When their kids come home from school, they must eat just bread
and sugar
Why is it this way? Wouldyou say that this is an equal society?^’
In rapping about the inequalides of life in contemporar}' Mon
golia, these hip-hop groups appear to exemplify the sense of entit
lement and insubordination that Rose identified in rap music as it
spread to communities around the United States. Yet despite such
apparent similarities, Mongolian rap developed in a very different
cultural world than did rap of the American inner cities. The
“neighborhood” of New York City bears little in common with
that celebrated in the raps and videos of Mongolian hip-hop
groups, and one of the key differences is the absence of institutio
nal racism and discrimination.

RAP AND RACE IN MONGOLIA
Rose describes how the ghettos emerged in the 1970s as the
city underwent a period of rapid socio-economic transformation.
In this period, shrinking federal investment in the city, the decline
in the availability of affordable housing, and a shift in the job mar
ket away from blue-collar manufacturing positions and towards
white-collar, hit the city’s new immigrant communities and its
poorest residents hard.“^ Long-existing racially and ethnically
mixed communities, particularly African-American and Hispanic
communities, experienced the rapid disintegration of the commu
nal bonds and social services that had long held them together, a
Tatar, “Second Album” (n.d.)
Rose, op. cit, 30.
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process that was made worse by the city’s “renewal” projects in
the same period, which transformed the physical landscape of
these communides and forced many people to leave their homes.
The destruction of these communities contributed to the emerg
ence of profound social problems within them. For many people
on the outside looking in, these neighborhoods became “ghettos,”
places of “violence and danger” that “consumes the poorest and
most economically fragile communities of color.”^^
Rose goes on to describe how for the people in these troubled
communities, hip-hop provided a means of reclaiming their physi
cal neighborhood for themselves. Rapping about the everyday
lives of the people in these spaces through their songs, showing
the “hood” and the people who live there through their videos,
and “tagging” locations as their own through their graffiti were
just some of the ways in which these people could affirm their ex
periences and identities as residents of the ghetto. Using the “ghe
tto as a source of identity,” Rose says, “undermines the stigma of
poverty and social marginahty” for the people who Uve there and
gives them back a sense of pride and ownership.^"* It also allowed
them the oppormnity to critique the larger society for marginaliz
ing them and their communities.^^
In Ulaanbaatar, however, no such “ghetto” exists. While there
are some areas of the city, for instance the
districts, that are oft
en perceived as more dangerous than others, there are no parts of
the city that are widely associated with people of a particular racial,
ethnic, or socio-economic class. And while some members of the
new wealthy class are increasingly choosing to isolate themselves
from others,^*’ most Mongols of all socio-economic classes contin
ue to live in relative proximity with each other. The mythic “class
less” society of the socialist era still weighs heavily in Mongols’
perception of their nation.
But the belief that Mongolia is racially and ethnically homoge
neous is also widely held. While there are racial and ethnic minori11.
2“* Ibid., 12.
25 Ibid., 60.
2® This is particularly noticeable in the recent trend to build expensive condomi
niums behind large walled and guarded compounds.
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ties living and working in the country,Mongols can claim no
contemporary geographical or historical continuities with racial
oppression and difference as experienced within African-Ameri
can communities. Yet so pronounced is this aspect of racial opp
ression in the discourse of global rap that some Mongolian rapp
ers are tempted to create a historical link with it. The rapper “Skitzo” (Ankhbaatar) from the group Lumino tried to do this when he
described how Mongols and African-Americans both share a simi
lar history of oppression. “Just as the Blacks suffered under years
of slavery at the hands of colonial masters in the U.S.,” he says,
“so too did the Mongols suffer, first under the Manchus and then
at the hands of the Communists.This view is both historically
problematic and not widely shared among other Mongols.
The absence of a “ghetto” and any realistic historical connect
ions with racial or ethnic oppression in Ulaanbaatar shows the
problems that Mongolian rappers have had in appropriating this
global popular song genre and mapping it onto the landscape of
contemporary Ulaanbaatar. While they may shoot their videos in
marginalized, desolate, or long forgotten locations throughout the
city, they are typically generalized or virtual “hoods,” bearing few
identifying markers as to where they are or whose neighborhood it
is. In this way, as Rose pointed out, these “ghetto” locations bec
ome mere symbols of the “authentic,” a way for rappers to show
their “‘authenticity’ and hipness.Likewise, Mongolian rappers
may closely imitate the ‘gangsta’ looks, gestures, and bodily move
ments associated with African-American rappers, but they do little
to communicate to their Mongolian audiences what they mean
and why they are using them. It is as if, after appropriating a glo
bal song form deeply invested with the discourse of race and eth
nicity, Mongolian rappers have completely “erased” race and eth
nicity from it.
The Kazakhs are the largest minority in the countr)', but they only make up
around 6% of the total population and nearly all live in the far western province
of Bayan-Olgii.
2* Ankhbaatar, in 2004 interview. The reference to the Manchus indicates the
period when “Outer Mongolia” was a part of the Qing Manchu Dynasty (16911911).
Rose, op. cit, 11.
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It is because of this apparent disconnection with race that
some have dismissed the entire phenomenon of rap as foreign to
Mongolia. The singer Jargalsaikhan believes that rap can in no way
grow in the same soil of racial oppression and poverty in Mongo
lia that existed in the ghettos of the United States:
Rap music is the music of the ghettos of New
York City and places like that. These kids
[Mongolian rap artists] grew up in nice homes
and were all well-educated. They have no roots
in the conditions of life that created rap—like
racism, discrimination, and a hard life. The
blacks could sing this music because their blood
was boiling.^®
He adds that he’s been to the United States and “seen the ghet
tos” of the American East where “people are always shooting each
other and doing drugs,”^' and insists that such conditions just do
not exist in Mongolia.
The Mongolian rapper BAT furthers this characterization of
Mongolian rappers as merely imitating African-American culture
in ways similar to how actors play roles in movies:
They must think, if we can’t sing like gangsters,
then let’s pretend we are for our albums and
videos. These guys, they dress like this here,
but when you meet them on the street, do they
dress like that? No! They’re just middle class
guys who live with their mom and dad!^^
As these views indicate, the ongoing debates about the authen
ticity of rap often rest on fairly essentiaUzed views about the na
ture of both global rap and the experience of African-Americans
in the inner city of New York. To dismiss Mongolian rap as inau
thentic, however, because it cannot claim any direct connection
with these experiences is also to dismiss the experience of the
Mongolian youths who feel rap to be both authentic and real in
their home country. Ian Maxwell (2003) writes of a similar

Jargalsaikhan, in 2004 interview.

Ibid.
Batbold, in 2005 interview.
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situation in his study of rap in Sydney, Australia, where, as in
Mongolia, he found hip-hop being maintained in communities of
(often white) youths who likewise could not claim to share in “a
discourse of historical continuity” with African-American rappers.
Yet to label that their rap as inauthentic is, as Maxwell sees it, to
ignore “genuine, phenomenological subjects, furnishing them
selves and their practices, with narratives and knowledges that they
experience as genuine, as realP^^
It is in such settings that Rose’s framework for the study of
hip-hop as defined by the experience of Afrodiasporic cultures
breaks down. We need instead to turn to the views of scholars
who have studied the appropriation of hip-hop in contexts outside
of the United States. Tony Mitchell finds that as hip-hop became
truly global, its roots in the African-American experiences of Am
erican inner cities became less important. While hip-hop traditions
as appropriated by different peoples and cultures around the
world remain “undoubtedly initially influenced by U.S. hip-hop,”
he says, “they represent a continually shifting, heterogeneous, and
complex music scene in which hip-hop is displaced and often delyricized. In the process it becomes a more amorphous, abstract,
and atmospheric cross-genre musical practice, engulfing a wide
range of home-grown musical and lyrical influences.^'*
While Mongolian hip-hop shares many similarities with Ameri
can ‘ganstarap,’ it also has become, as Mitchell suggests, more of a
hybrid genre that makes use of “home-grown musical and lyrical
influences.” Its emphasis has become “more amorphous” and
“abstract.” The elements of entitlement and aggressive insubordi
nation that are evident in it have little to do with expressions of
frustration of people experiencing racial oppression and poverty,
and more to do with youths seeking to create a unique identity for
themselves within a larger world of musical expression, one which
many feel does not reflect their own unique experiences with the
world into which they are growing up. Tony Mitchell found that in
other parts of the world, hip-hop has become “a vehicle for global

Ian MaxweU, Phat Peats, Dope PJjjmes: Hip-Hop Down Under Cornin’ Upper (Mid
dletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2003), 47. Italics in the original source.
Tony Mitchell, “Another Root—Hip-Hop Outside the USA,” 16.
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youth affiliations and a tool for reworking local identities,”^^ and
in a number of ways, this appears to be the case in MongoUa.

HIP-HOP AND THE VOICE OF A NEW GENERATION
A number of Mongolian rappers generally confirmed the char
acterizations made by Jargalsaikhan and BAT that most of them
are neither poor nor racially oppressed. Rapper “Skitzo” describes
the members of his group Lumino as being “aU from good homes;
we’re not from the ghettos like the blacks of the United States.
In fact, many of the rap artists and groups now working in Ulaanbaatar do appear to come from the emerging middle class in soci
ety. Most have graduated from high school, some from college,
and more than a few have studied art or music or traveled to the
United States or Europe. Some have told me that becoming a rap
artist is not something the poor in their society can do because
they would need to have some capital to first create their product.
One singer told me that he had to sell his car to help his group
raise the money it needed to produce their first run of CDs.
Yet most of these rappers also draw a clear distinction between
U.S. hip-hop and the rap music and hip-hop culture that they are
seeking to create in Mongolia. Their goal, many say, is to show
people that Mongolian rappers are not the thugs and criminals
they may portray in their videos, but rather, as “Skitzo” puts it,
that they are “real artists who lead stable lives and are part of
professional bands.” Mongolian rappers want their subcultural art
to be taken seriously by the musical mainstream, and thus they
were pleased when the Pentatonic music awards included hip-hop
for the first time as one of the awards categories in 2001. That
same year the Mongolian Hip-Hop Association, which seeks to
promote Mongolian hip-hop domestically and internationally, rec
eived official recognition from the government. In the past few
years, hip-hop has become one of the most important new mar
kets to emerge in the popular music industry. “Now,” says rapper
Mitchell, op. cit., 7.
Ankhbaatar, in 2004 interview.
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Batorgil of the group Ice Top, “there is no large show in Ulaanbaatar that will not include at least one hip-hop group. We stayed
firm to our desire to bring this art to Mongoha.”^^
Just as importantiy, the rappers see themselves and their audi
ences, most of whom range in age from their teens to early twen
ties, as being of a distinctly different generation from those singers
and audiences that make up the musical mainstream in the coun
try. The rapper Batbayar from the group Digital expresses his sen
timent about his relationship with those of “socialist era” genera
tions, including his parents:
I got into rap because to me it was a way to
express myself in a free way. My parents used
to prohibit me from going to see hip-hop shows
and hip-hop art. This was just after the socialist
era, but people like them still had a socialist
mentality. I didn’t listen to my parents but
instead followed my own ideas. It’s been 10 years
since I got involved with hip-hop and I’m proud
that I can now make a living as a rap artist.^*^
“Skitzo” explains how his generation has grown up in a very diffe
rent kind of world than did those in the generations that preceded
them:
We want to show the older generations, those
in their 30s and 40s, that we are different from
them. These were the generations brought up
in the socialist era. These people were all taught
the same things and boiled in the same sauce.
Our generation likes songs that touch on reality
and don’t just talk about romantic love. Our
generation is just now opening its eyes to see the
whole world, not just Mongolia. We [Mongolian
rap artists] have started a revolution in our country
and we’re changing the way young people are thinking.”

Batorgil, in 2005 interview.
Batbayar, in 2005 interview.
Ankhbaatar, in 2004 interview.
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CONCLUSIONS
While Mongolian rappers may borrow freely from American
‘gangsta’ rap traditions, what this study shows is that they subsequendy use these cultural materials in entirely unique ways. Mon
golian rappers are not seeking to fight against institutionalized ra
cism and poverty, as Rose found in the rap of the American inner
cities. Nor are they using the genre as a weapon of social protest
against a powerful state government, as Michael Bodden found in
the youth musical cultures of Indonesia in the 1990s."^^’ Mongolian
rappers sing about poverty and governmental corruption, but
most of their songs touch on themes such as their desire to ach
ieve personal and artistic freedom, to look at the realities of love
and life with open eyes, and to be engaged with the world at large.
Rap in Mongolia is most strongly connected with a segment of
the youth who have used the medium as a vehicle for defining
their generational distinctiveness. These youths have effectively
used rap as a means of opening spaces for their voices in the nat
ion’s popular culture and creating opportunities for them to exp
ress those traits that they believe define their unique experience in
the world. In the process, they have also changed the nature of the
musical mainstream. While there is still debate among some of its
leading figures about the authenticity of Mongolian hip-hop, oth
ers are now embracing it. Some of the most famous Mongolian
ballad singers, including Ariunaa and Sarantuya, now frequently
include rapping and breakdancing in some of their songs and con
certs, often inviting hip-hop groups to share the stage with them.
At the same time, in closely associating their identity with the
global images of hip-hop, Mongolian rappers have also been stat
ing their affiliation with global youth cultural movements. As this
study shows, Mongolian youth are neither passive consumers nor
unfortunate victims of some monolithic global cultural imperial
ism emanating from the West. They have their eyes sharpened and
their ears pricked to pick up on interesting cultural materials wher
ever they originate, be they from the ghettos of the United States
“'0 See his “Rap in Indonesian Youth Music of the 1990s: ‘Globalization,’ ‘Out
law Genres,’ and Social Protest.”
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or a recording studio in Seoul, and they have shown themselves
quite adept at appropriating these “global” materials and adapting
them to their own local contexts. As the quality of their art dem
onstrates, Mongolian rappers are interacting with the global cult
ure with a high degree of sophistication.
Despite its ability to rework local identities and affirm global
youth affinities,"*’ however, Mongolian rap continues to remain
largely confined to the nation’s borders. This is because the global
flow of culture continues to move primarily in one direction, from
the “developed” nations towards places like Mongolia. Mongolian
hip-hop artists express frustration over their limited opportunities
to contribute their own unique forms of hip-hop to the transnat
ional Hip-Hop Nation. This has been a situation experienced by
Mongolian popular musical artists for the past several decades.
When they speak of gaining access to international markets, they
are not necessarily speaking about the United States or Europe.
With the development of MTV-Asia and VHl-Asia music chann
els in the mid-1990s, the Asian continent has emerged as an imp
ortant market for popular music in its own right. Most Mongolian
popular music artists include stops in Asia during their internatio
nal tours and a few have even appeared on the Asian music chan
nels. But so far none has been able to break into the popular cult
ure world of either the developed East or West, suggesting that
despite reaching even the most isolated places on Earth, these cul
tural flows continue to reflect some of the profound inequalities
of the global marketplace.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Appadurai, Arjun. “Disjunctures and Difference in the Global
Cultural Economy,” Public Culture 2\2 (1990), 1-24.
Bodden, Michael. “Rap in Indonesian Youth Music of the 1990s:
‘Globalization,’ ‘Outlaw Genres,’ and Social Protest,”of
A^sian Music 2)6\2 (2005), 1-26.
Hessler, Peter. “The Rap of Khan,” The Boston Globe (7 May 2001).
MitcheD, op. cit, 7.

Global Hip-hop and Youth in Urban Mongolia

159

Janzen, Joerg, et al. A New Ger-Settlement in Ulaanhaatar: Functional
Differentiation, Demographic and Socioeconomic Structure and Origin of
Residents. Ulaanhaatar; National University of Mongolia, Cen
ter for Development Research, 2002. (Research Paper no. 1).
Kristof, Nicholas D. “A Mongolian Rock Group Fosters Democ
racy,” The New York Times (26 March 1990), Cll;l.
Marsh, Peter K. The Horse-head Fiddle and the Cosmopolitan Keimagination of Tradition in Mongolia. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Maxwell, Ian. That Feats, Dope Thymes: Hip-Hop Down Under Comin ’
Upper. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2003.
Mitchell, Tony. “Another Root—Hip-Hop outside the USA.” In
Global Noise: Rap and Hip-Hop Outside the USA, ed. Tony Mit
chell. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2002.
Ramet, Sabrina Petra, ed. Rocking the State. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1994.
Rose, Tricia. Flack Noise: Rup Music and Flack Culture in Contempora
ry America. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1994.
Ryback, Timothy W. Rock Around the Floe: A History of Rock Music
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. New York: Oxford Univ
ersity Press, 1990.
Starr, S. Frederick. R,ed and Hot. The Fate ofJar^t^ in the Soviet Union.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Troitsky, Artemy. Fack in the USSK London: Faber and Faber,
1987.

RECORDINGS
Black Rose, “Tengeriin Tamga,” Moritkhangai Company CD 3401
(2001)
Dain ba Enkh, “Neg Chig,” Ritm Studio (2002)
Digital, “This Is Life,” Michid Records (2003)
Ice Top, New Life,” Star Studios (n.d.)
Lumino, “Ireed butssan khair mini — Special Edition,” Michig
Records (2003)
Snep Crew, “Jin Tan Tsomog,” Michid Records (2004)
Tatar, “Second Album,” Sonor Records, n.d.

160

Peter K. Marsh

INTERVIEWS
Ankhbaatar, D., Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (September 13, 2004)
Batbayar, D., Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (July 4, 2005)
Batbold, B., Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (July 4, 2005)
Batorgil, J., Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (June 27, 2005)
Hurd, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (May 15,1999)
Jargalsaikhan, D., Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (March 16, 1999)
, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (September 26, 2004)

The Effects of Globalization on Youth in
Mongolia
Bayartsetseg Terbish
In the era of globalization, a general question facing Mongolia
is not whether globalization is good or bad, but how we could be
nefit from it and how we should prioritize our personal choices to
account for the realities of a new era. From a positive perspective,
globalization has been a process of the social, political, legal and
economic integration of all countries, resulting in policies, techno
logies and institutions that make our world a better place to live
in. However, sometimes globalization seems to be a force shaped
by the developed countries and beneficial only for those countries
and individuals with money and power. This limitation is not only
apparent in the political arena but also visible in the lives of youth.
Therefore, as a young individual, it was interesting for me to try to
distinguish what are the positive and negative effects of globaliza
tion in the lives of young people in Mongolia.
This paper will start off with some statistics about the youth
population in Mongolia, and then will share some personal obser
vations and thoughts about the positive and negative effects of
globalization on the lives of young people in Mongolia. In partic
ular, the paper will describe challenges that are keeping many
young Mongols from succeeding and using globalization to their
own advantage.
According to the Mongolian National Statistical Office, 22.4%
of the total population is between the ages of 15-24.’ In the World
' Mongolia, National Statistical Office. Statistical Yearbook, www.nso.mn. Acces
sed July 9, 2004.
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Fact Book 2005, it is noted that the median age of the overall po
pulation in Mongolia is 24.28 years, where the male population
median age was 23.93 and female population median age was
24.64. Fadzillah emphasizes that “when it comes to globalization
or transnational connections youth cultures are in the forefront of
theoretical interest; youth, their ideas and commodities move eas
ily across national borders, shaping and being shaped by all kinds
of structures and meanings.”^ Based on the above population stat
istics, it is highly likely that more young people are experiencing
the effects of globalization than Mongols in any other ten-year age
group.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFEECTS OF GLOBALIZA
TION
During the current period of democratization and moderniza
tion, young individuals in Mongolia are striving hard to master
high-tech communication skills in order to keep themselves up
dated with what is happening around the world. Internet and oth
er audio and visual techniques have become some of the basic
skills that help them to succeed in a competitive job market. The
letter “E” has become ver}^ important in doing business, banking,
trading, studying and even finding a life partner.
I remember that in my childhood the list of “do’s” was consi
derably shorter than the one for “don’fs”. A part of my culture
kept me in a restrictive frame and never allowed me to ask quest
ions of adults outside of that frame. As a reward, I was praised
and grew up to be a good modest girl. Now, however, as one of
the consequences of globalization, this culmral modesty seems to
have become outdated. Young individuals are becoming more
open-minded and assertive in their demands to know about global
issues. Eor example, young Mongols started to celebrate Global
Youth Service Day and to communicate online with different
2 I. Fadzillah, “The Amway connection: How transnational ideas of beauty and
money affect Northern Thai girls’ perceptions of their future options,” in
Youthscapes: The Popular, the National, the Global, Sunaina Maira and Elisabeth
Soep, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 86.
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youth groups in other countries in order to exchange their ideas
on critical issues such as children’s rights. Within Mongolia, young
people are routinely expressing their ideas and concerns to gov
ernment officials through online communications systems.
At the same time, we should not overlook the negative effects
that globalization has had on Mongolian youth. Young people in
my countr)' ignore their original cultural values, disregard the value
of the family, oppress each other and dismiss their family heritage.
Mongolian cultural values are becoming difficult to identify, espe
cially among the youth, when they are heavily influenced by West
ern cultural norms. By the West I mean such things as American
films which project positive images of the “American Dream” and
of America as a great power, through which the most common
images of the West by Mongolian youth are basically formed.
Once a young mind is influenced by Western positivism, it is more
likely that the traditional cultural values will be veiled and more
and more youth will wish to live abroad.
Young Mongolian girls’ perceptions of their female identity
and expectations are shaped by the influence of globalization and
they are filled with a desire to be fashion models. For teenage
girls, models of globalization encourage them to take on more
adult-Hke roles at an early age. For young female adults, this app
roach has caused an increase in the divorce rate and a lack of app
reciation of male partners. For example, working as beauty prod
uct distributors for multinational companies like Oriflame has giv
en girls more competence to participate in the labor force and, at
the same time, gave them increased confidence to fulfill their wish
to become a cosmopolitan model of attractiveness through even
such means as cosmetic surgery. This attitude may possibly be one
of the many sources of conflict that have led to family divorce be
cause many men are not ready to support female empowerment
due to deep-rooted concepts of patriarchal power in Mongolia.
For instance, in 1989, the divorce rate was 1.6% but this percent
age increased to 2.7% in 2004, which could possibly be linked to
increased female capacities and expectations.^
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, & UNFPA. Current Situation of Families.
Ulaanbaatar, 2004.
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Nowadays, the mass media in Mongolia bombard the young
people with their Westernized broadcasts, which are mosdy imit
ations of popular programs that attract youth interest in the West.
Young people learn about diverse musical genres, trends in mod
ern fashions and new products through the media and they feel
connected to the rest of the world through popular programs and
channels such as MTV. However, as mentioned above, the ideas
of youth and their preferences move easily across national bord
ers. It would be hard to find a common language to communicate
with young people if you wanted to talk about traditional folk
songs or games with them. Rather, the hot topic to discuss would
be the latest hip-hop hits, Hollywood movie releases or how to
tear my jeans in order to make them more fashionable.
This approach results in oppression and discrimination among
the young population. For instance, those who listen to traditional
music and who do not prefer funky clothing might be called awk
ward, old-fashioned or geeky. As a personal example, not long ago
my nephew asked me to send him the most modern and coolest
clothes, otherwise he would find it hard to be accepted into the
circle of boys in his class. Teachers and parents seem unable to see
the connection between oppression and low self-esteem in their
children, assuming that low self-esteem is a natural characteristic
of modest children. Some acute social problems that might occur
due to this phenomenon are marginalization and even increased
rates of suicide based on low self-esteem.
Traditionally, the parenting style in Mongolia has been more
authoritarian than in the West. Children are taught to accept rest
rictive and limited opportunities and do what their parents want
them to do. This tendency probably has led to increased argum
ents between parents and their children when the parents’ wish to
follow the traditional heritage collides with the preferences of mo
dern youth. All too often the result has been that parents see their
children as being disobedient and the children view their parents
as misusing parental authority.'^

''S.P. Robbins, P. Chaterjee, and R.E. Canda, Contemporary Human Behavior Theoty: Critical Perspectivefor Social Work (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1998).
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This rising tension between parents and their children has in
not a few cases been exacerbated by religion where parents and
their children belong to different religions. It seems that our socie
ty is not ready to accept and respect the difference in individual
religious beliefs, especially the youth’s belief in Christianity, even
though it is stated in the constitution that individuals have free
dom of conscience and religion. For example, many young people
claim that the main cause of family arguments was parental disres
pect and disagreement towards their belief in Christianity.

CHALLENGES FACING YOUTH
There is a huge gap of income inequality in our country which
creates a challenge for youth to experience the positive effects of
globalization equally. Youth from wealthier family have a greater
advantage in using of what globalization has to offer in the infor
mation and technology sectors, while youth from poor families are
left behind. Some of us enjoy driving fancy cars and get the latest
information online while others have never even touched a com
puter screen.
Inequality is closely related to another challenge, which is
urban and rural disparity. Many young and talented individuals do
not have equal opportunities to benefit from the globalization
process, in particular in rural Mongolia, because of poor infra
structure and isolated places of residence. For those who live in
urban areas, the world is a small place thanks to internet sites,
news and calling cards, which help them keep connected to every
thing they want. But this is only one side of the coin. Young peo
ple living in rural areas lack the opportunities to know what is
happening in the rest of the world, when there are only few
channels of information open to them.

CONCLUSION
In summary, globalization has both positive and negative eff
ects on youth life in Mongolia. Most of the effects seem to be as
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inseparable as two sides of a coin and it is extremely difficult to
judge today whether globali2ation offers mainly positive or nega
tive effects. This is because Mongolia has still a long way to go in
order to see the full effects of globalization. Positively, globaliza
tion provides accessibility to technological advancements and int
ernet products. It also helps us to understand the importance of
learning languages and it influences us to develop ourselves intell
ectually with a motivation of learning more. Therefore, it is crucial
for our country to distinguish between the positive and negative
effects of globalization and see to it that the positive impacts
affect all young people equally.
Negatively, globalization has influenced youth to disregard the
values of forming a family, ignore their traditional cultural values
in favor of Western attractions that are offered through media,
oppress each other and come into conflict with their family herit
age. Youth living in rural areas, preserving our nomadic way of
life, are a valuable segment of our cultural background and they
have their own chances to make a decision about whether they
would prefer to be “modernized” or continue their nomadic way
of living. The question remaining, which has not been answered is
“In which direction is the modern youth culture in Mongolia hea
ding?”
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